LIFE

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EPAMINONDAS,

AND OF

SCIPIO AFRICANUS;

INTENDED AS A

SUPPLEMENT to PLUTARCH'S LIVES.

WITH

NOTES and OBSERVATIONS

ONTHE

BATTLE of ZAMA,

AND REMARKS, CRITICAL AND HISTORICAL, ON THE PRINCIPAL BATTLES OF

EPAMINONDAS,

By M. DE FOLARD.

To which is prefixed,

A DISSERTATION ON THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
A GREAT MAN, AND AN ILLUSTRIOUS
OR EMINENT MAN;

By the Abbé De St. Pierre, of the French Academy.

Now first translated into English from the Original French of the Abbé Seran de la Tour,

By the Rev. R. PARRY,
RECTOR of KEMERTON, GLOUCESTESHIRE.

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PREFACE

EPAMINONDAS is one of those heroes of antiquity of whom Mr. de la Bruiere has said, it is difficult to determine whether they are more indebted to history or history to them. If she has embellished their actions with her most splendid ornaments, they have furnished her with rich grounds for those embellishments. But for history, their names would have been buried in their tombs; and without these patterns of virtue, often as inimitable as they are admirable, what would history be?

Plutarch wrote a Life of Epaminondas, but it met with the fate of a great part of his works, which have not reached us. A continuator of Amiot repaired this loss in his time, which was in the fixteenth century; but the language, stile, and taste of history are so changed, that this work, were it now republished, would probably find but very sew readers. Besides, this writer does not on any of his sacts quote the historians from whom he has taken his account; for which reason I have not been able to derive any assistance from him. I was obliged to have recourse to Xenophon, Polybius, Pausanias, Justin, Plutarch, Cornelius Nepos, Diodorus Siculus, and several others, to be able to give to the scattered fragments of the life of Epaminondas that series, connection, and form, required in history.

Vol. II.

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Persons

Persons versed in the knowledge of antiquity have been long surprised that writers, eager to handle the most beautiful remains of history, have suffered one of its most precious ornaments to remain fo long unattended to. I had undertaken this work by the advice of the Abbe de St. Pierre, when the Chancellor Daguesseau did me the honour to encourage me to pursue it. Advice from so great a man, in a manner changes its nature; I looked upon that of Mr. Daguesseau as a command, and therefore laboured without delay to execute it. Nothing furely can more ef. fectually encourage men of letters than the pains the first magistrate of France takes to patronise their works; attentive to employ every means the nation afforded to encourage these talents and virtues, which form great men and make heroes, he long wished to present them with the nobleft pattern that could possibly be set before them. It was principally with this view that I undertook the following history, happy if the ardour and purity of my zeal might fupply what was wanting in abilities, to render it worthy of the minister by whose orders it was attempted.

In publishing it, I think it incumbent on me to inform the world of some particulars concerning it. I shall not here repeat the just complaints which have forced me to enter upon this expostulation, I shall be satisfied with barely relating the sacts which enabled me to resute the calumny.

I had nearly finished the first book of this history, when a person of distinction informed me that the Abbe Gedoyn was upon the point of publishing it; I immediately waited on the Abbe; I freely expressed the apprehension I was under of appearing as his competitor; I assured him, if there was the least truth in the report, I was ready to make to his reputation, or rather to my own, a sacrifice of what I had already done on this subject. This sacrifice would

have cost me little, I should have gained too much on one side to feel what I lost on the other.

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The Abbe Gedoyn answered me with the same frankness; he informed me he had made choice of the most brilliant actions of this samous Greek general, for the subject of a discourse he was to deliver at the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Letters, but that he had not the least thought of giving in it a complete life. Having thus confirmed me, he concluded with exhorting me to persevere in my undertaking, which I did not resolve on till I had in a manner asked his consent.

Some time after the Abbe Gedoyn delivered his difcourse, with that applause which he ever shares with the illustrious companions of his labours and success. The beginning of this discourse plainly shewed the design of the author, (the same as I have related) of which no one can doubt, who is not either unable or unwilling to comprehend him. And this account, which I have been forced to give, ought to be sufficient to silence all cavillers.

Would I were able as easily to justify the faults, which clear fighted and rigid critics will undoubtedly find, or perhaps have already discovered, in this work, even without searching too curiously for them; sure I am it has many which I may think it free from. The greatest geniusses are ever the most ready to acknowledge the absurdity of expecting perfection in the productions of the human mind. This proceeds, if you will, from that modesty which usually accompanies a superiority of talents or knowledge; but what in them is only modesty, is with other men a just and natural sentiment.

I can be bold to fay I have spared no pains to make this history useful and agreeable. A diligent examination of the testimonies of different authors, too often hard to be

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reconciled

but what they report; method in stating facts; attention in directing, suspending, and keeping up the interest the heart takes in events which affect and please; severity towards the reslections, the sentiments, the stile, especially in this new edition, have all been employed, as far as my abilities would go, to merit that indulgence which those who do not stand in need of it, ask from a refinement of vanity, but which I implore through necessity.

After all these precautions, I am perhaps far enough from the point I aimed at; and if so, let them not delay to shew it me. I consent to a learned and particular critique; if I am unable to reply, I will be the first to approach the account of the instance of it.

plaud, by acknowledging the justness of it.

I have not annexed plans of the battles of Leuctra and Mantinea, for reasons of no consequence to the public. Those who are desirous of seeing the order and plans of these famous battles at one view, may be satisfied by consulting the first volume of Polybius, by the Chevalier de Folard. The remarks of that learned soldier on these two actions are given at the conclusion of this history, and will in some measure supply the want of engravings.

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EPAMINONDAS.

BOOK THE FIRST.

GREECE, one of the most admired countries in the world for whatever could make it famous, consisted of a part of what we now know by the name of Turkey, in Europe. To the East, West and South, it was bounded by seas, the names of which exist now only in ancient history. Illyrium, Thrace, and Dardania were its frontiers on the North.

It was fituated in a pure ferene air; a vast number of rivers watered every part of it: their fertile banks supplied rich pasturage for cattle, and the lands distant from the waters produced plentiful crops of grain and fruits, necessary to the comforts and enjoyment of life.

Citheron, Parnassus, Helicon, names renowned in fabulous history, were mountains covered with forests, which supplied timber in abundance. Her ports facilitated commerce, which procured her what she could not raise at home, and brought in the wealth of her neighbours.

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Her inhabitants were of a convenient stature, of a robust constitution, and an invincible hardiness for labour and fatigue; their hearts were naturally inclined to virtue, and their genius at the same time led them to the study of all the arts and sciences: they were, I may say, nourished from their birth, by the strong and extensive genius of the first Greeks, who almost monopolized them. Greece was their cradle in their insancy, and by a just return, in proportion as they emerged out of darkness and ignorance, they became the glory and honour of Greece.

A celebrated academician (a) comparing, after the example of a Roman historian, (b) the continuance of nations to the life of man, divides

the Greek history into four ages.

Its youth so remarkable for the famous siege of Troy; then the siery Achilles, the sage Nestor, the shrewd Ulysses, reigned there, over several countries. The poets have endeavoured to embellish with the richest ornaments of sable, the bright actions of these eminent men. If we can give credit to mythology, the gods themselves did not disdain to mix, in the most intimate manner, with these heroes. So much so, that at the time of the expedition to Troy, heaven was divided between the Greeks and Trojans. Whimsical additions, ever rejected by true history.

The manhood of the Greeks, the shortest and most glorious period, contains hardly two centuries; but each day, if I may be allowed the expression, is marked with some memorable event.*

No people ever produced in such eminent plenty,

(a) Note I. (b) Note II.

^{*} From 564, about the time of Pythagoras's appearance, to 323, before the yulgar æra, the epoch of the death of Alexander.

fo many great and illustrious men, of all forts. If Greece, at that time, faw her most famous heroes, Themistocles, Aristides, Alcibiades, Epaminondas, Philip, his son Alexander the Great, and an infinite number besides spring up; she gave being at the same time to celebrated writers, whose pens have consecuted to immortality the histories of these worthies. Herodotus, Thucidides, Xenophon succeeded each other, in a kind of order which seemed continued by nature to carry on that excellent work. Never did so many and such great captains command; never did any people gain victories more brilliant than those of Marathon, Salamis, Platea, and Leuctra.

Socrates, Plato, Aristotle taught men to think, to reason, to know, and to improve their faculties. Eloquence was not less fortunate than history and philosophy. Demosthenes, whom we may call the father of it, and who will continue throughout all ages to be the best pattern, shewed at that time, what power the art of thinking, of speaking and persuading, could exert over mankind, when employed by such as are well ac-

quainted with its principles.

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As foon as this nation had got rid of its barbarous ignorance, and knew how to choose a government, she preferred monarchy. It is truly astonishing to see a people, who at last became so polished and enlightened, wandering through wilds and forests, during the rudeness of their infancy.* Reason was with them, at that time, like a hidden treasure, which they possessed but did not enjoy; governed almost by instinct alone, like brute beasts, they associated with them, and subsisted upon herbs and roots. Without B 4

^{*} Pliny, Nat. Hift. B. 4.

manners, without laws, without fociety, without religion or divine worship, this people, who in process of time was esteemed a nation of sages, of philosophers, of heroes, was then only a wandering tribe of unruly savages. As the Romans, those conquerors of the world, deduced their origin from a band of robbers, so out of the bosom of forests, and their most obscure caves, sprang the people of Greece, who prior to Rome made all the empires on earth tremble,

At length the current of time collected them together; they knew, they polished themselves, and submitted to gods and kings. But the love of liberty, which seemed to constitute their character, soon revolted against the absolute power of masters of their own appointing. The kingdoms of Sparta, Athens, and Thebes, the chief cities of Laconia, Attica, and Beotia, became by a sudden and almost general revolution so many

republics.

Polybius* however does not feem to place Thebes, or even Athens, which had the chief honour in the battle of Salamis, among the principal republics of Greece, an exception which strikes us at first fight with the appearance of injustice; but is, for all that, founded in true judgment, and the nicest equity. It is not, according to this judicious author, a few brilliant actions which constitute the true grandeur of a nation, it is the wisdom with which they know how to support that high degree of glory to which they have attained. Thebes and Athens acquired a distinguished rank, but knew not how to maintain it. They were constant in nothing, but an unquiet

quiet and turbulent temper, which bred continual revolutions within themselves.

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The Thebans and Athenians were not intrinfically great, they were so only by accident. The Athenians became famous under the command of Themistocles, the Thebans under that of Epaminondas and Pelopidas; but the glory they then acquired was due rather to the wisdom and ability of their leaders, than to their virtue: It was the offspring of these men, born to command; and it died with them.

These two republics, Polybius adds, were like ships, which are the sport of winds and the prey of tempests, when without a pilot, but which arrive happily at the end of their voyage, when an experienced hand directs their course, presides over their motions, discovers, and guides them clear of the many shelfs and sands the sea abounds with.

The republics of Thebes and Athens were powerful, capable of any thing when they submitted to be governed; but when they indulged their natural temper, which led to independence, troubles, seditions; when the people usurped the supreme authority, they were like ships without sails, without rudders, without pilots, which could not but suffer a shipwreck, equally disgraceful and deplorable. The Athenians were as ready at insurrections as they were incapable of being kept within the bounds of their first violences. The Thebans even out-did them; and from a contempt of the laws, passed on, with a kind of servicity, to the most outrageous inexcusable extremes,

The government of Sparta was totally different; equality among all the citizens, modesty

in the young, a habit of labour, frugality in food, a rigid way of life, a spirit of subordination, of justice and zeal for the public good, were its sirst principles. A wise administration, a virtuous spirit disfused through all ranks and conditions, soon raised the Spartans above the rest of Greece. At first they attracted admiration; the esteem conceived for them soon made them mediators in all differences. At last, from being judges they became masters, which they no sooner were, than haughtiness and unbounded ambition rendered them unworthy of the pre-eminence.

Such was the state of these three republics when Epaminondas was born at Thebes.* Polymnis (c) his father, reckoned kings among his ancestors, being lineally descended from the ancient sovereigns of his country. But whether the nobility of his origin entailed on him persecution, from a people who looked upon all citizens as equal, or the consequent missfortunes of the times deprived his samily of the estates they ought to have possess, poverty was his patrimony, and became the most valuable inheritance he could leave his son, agreeable to the manner of thinking he

had imbibed in his infancy.

The fentiments of Polymnis were not at all affected by the narrowness of his fortune. He perceived the only means left of distinguishing himself were virtue and integrity; treasures attainable in any condition of life, and which alone are worthy the love and esteem of mankind. His merits, with time and labour, broke through the veil and obscurity of his situation. The poorest citizen of Thebes was the most virtuous, and became insensibly the most considerable. As soon as he was known, they began to pity him; esteem

⁽c) Note III.

Diod. Sic. Corn. Nep.

foon followed, and the love of his fellow-citizens

was not long in coming after.

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The defeat of Amyntas, the fecond king of Macedon, furnished the Thebans with an opportunity of shewing the opinion they had of Polymnis. After a long war this prince was totally vanquished by the Illyrians, and obliged to acknowledge the superiority of his conquerors, by an annual tribute he was forced to pay them.* that age, the word of princes was looked upon rather as the effect of necessity than a solemn binding engagement, for which reason the Illyrians demanded hostages of Amyntas to secure the performance of the treaty concluded with them. (d) Amyntas's youngest child, Philip, the most powerful and renowned king of Macedon, had he not been father to Alexander the Great, was demanded by the Illyrians, and delivered to them by the king his father, as a pledge of his fidelity.

Illyria feemed to them too near Macedon, for the residence of an hostage of such importance; they determined to remove him farther off, and sent him into Beotia, at the same time instructing the Thebans to cover with the appearance of liberty the bondage in which they meant to detain him; they also charged them to give all the attention to his education his rank entitled

him to.

Philip being arrived at Thebes, it was necessary to entrust him to a person capable of watching over his conduct and instruction. Polymnis, of all the citizens, was thought the sittest for this employment. The Thebans put young Philip under his care; and as they charged him to educate him in a manner suitable to his birth, it is

^{*} Diod. Sic. Bib. book 16; about the year 375 before the vulgar æra.

⁽d) Note IV.

to be prefumed they affigned out of the public treasury an annual pension, to answer the expenses his new guest would necessarily require.

Philip found in Polymnis's house every thing he could desire to make his life easy and agreeable. Young Epaminondas, by the accomplishments of his mind, the sweetness of his temper, his great attention and politeness, made his residence daily more and more pleasing. One essential, however, was wanting to the education of the young prince, viz. a man of letters and science, who might inspire him with a taste for, and instruct him in the knowledge of them. The obscurity of Thebes had sunk it in prosound ignorance.

The difference of the Pythagorean philosophers, and their banishment from Italy, supplied the perfon fo much wanted. Condemned to exile, they confulted, when they received their order to depart, what course to take in their misfortune, The animofity of their enemies pursued them even to their retreat. They fet fire round it, and the greatest part of the philosophers perished in the flames. Contrivance and strength faved Lysis from the dreadful fate of his brethren. The miferable remains of a persecuted sect, he came to Beotia, in fearch of an afylum against the inveteracy of his perfecutors, and was there received with every mark of fincere joy; perhaps this proceeded less from the esteem they had for his profession, than the want they were in of his af-Motives which felf-love does not always distinguish, and frequently takes a pleasure in confounding.

Lysis, though young, had acquired from his own reflections, and conversing with philosophers, a great knowledge of the human heart. Skilled in the management of tempers, of which his line

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of study had taught him to discover the springs, he knew how to make himself understood, and relished by young people; as indulgent to others as he was severe to himself, he instilled with gentleness the most austere morality. Above all, he laboured to inspire a contempt of riches, extrinsic advantages, foreign to man and dangerous in the abuse to which the passions apply them.

Philip did not receive the instructions of Lysis as a prince content with admiring the first elements of virtue and truth. His mind, as penetrating as it was insatiable, pursued the sciences with an eagerness and facility which led it rapidly from the first principles to those parts of which he was ignorant; but too fond, even then, of notice and distinction, he confined all the advantages he drew from them to the pleasure of possessing the most rare knowledge, and letting the world see that he did not confined all the world see

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Epaminondas, on the contrary, heard Lysis as a philosopher;* the progress of his mind in the sciences was in proportion to that which his heart made in the love of virtue. His modesty exceeded his application, which was discovered only in his conduct. The attention and penetration of the disciple flattered Lysis too much not to engage all his care to make them effectual. The one was never weary of instructing, the other of learning. To this happy harmony Epaminondas owed the rapidity with which he advanced in philosophy. He perceived so strong a relation between its maxims and the means of attaining happiness, that he gave himself entirely up to them. He would have esteemed it an irreparable loss had

[·] Plut. in Pelop.

he not seconded with all his powers the zeal which Lysis shewed to improve the happy disposition he had found in him.

While Epaminondas was thus employed at home, he performed abroad with equal fuccess all the exercises of his age.* Those of wrestling and running, were at Thebes, as at Sparta, the usual amusements of young men. Epaminon. das knew the advantages derived from them too well, not to aim at the distinction they might procure him. These bodily exercises were the relaxation of his mind. A philosopher by taste, an athletic from duty and emulation, for notwithstanding his partiality to philosophy, he never fail. ed in the submission due to the laws. True it is, that he often regretted giving up the delicious pleasures of study and meditation, for the insipid conversation of riotous young men. He felt the necessity every member of a republic is under of mutual support by a good example in the study and practice of virtue.

This maxim carried him chearfully to all the meetings of the young people of his age. In the midst of dissipation and intemperance with which his companions gave themselves up to pleasure, the gravity of his character was not once altered. He listened willingly, spoke feldom, to his most intimate friends; but the sew words which escaped him, contained that exquisite and judicious good sense which strikes, dazzles, and betrays a modesty the most guarded against the

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fnares of pride and felf-love.

It was this referve which gave rife to that handsome compliment of a certain Tarentine, named Spintarus.† He was intimately acquainted with

^{*} Corn. Nepos. + Plut. in Pelop.

with Epaminondas at Thebes; and before he left it, gave this testimony of the esteem he had for him. I never knew a man, fays he, speaking of him, who understood so much, and faid so little. Epaminondas was not above fifteen when this compliment, which antiquity has preferved, was paid him.

His discourse certainly must have discovered a vast fund of discernment and sagacity to gain him fuch a high reputation fo early; for history informs us, he spoke so little that he was looked upon as of a gloomy referved temper, ill suited to fociety, from the difficulty with which he feem-

ed to deliver himself.

This grave referve raifed in Pelopidas a defire to discover the cause of it, and then laid the foundation of that inviolable friendship which afterwards united him to Epaminondas. Pelopidas, born of one of the most illustrious families of Thebes, loft his parents in his most early infancy; almost as foon as he came into the world, he became heir to and master of an immense fortune, which they left him at their death. He was the richest citizen of Thebes, as Epaminondas was one of the poorest.

Each had received from nature a mind and heart capable of those great actions for which they were born.* But with the same dispositions for talents and virtue, which formed these great men, each had imbibed fentiments widely different with regard to riches. Epaminondas, nursed in the lap of poverty, constantly professed a partiality and esteem for it. Pelopidas, on the contrary, was fond of the pomp and splendour of

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^{*} Plut. in Vit. Pelop.

great possessions, which enabled him to be useful to his fellow citizens. Generous, even prodigal, to the unfortunate, he suffered their indigence to continue only while it was unknown to The abundance of a liberal citizen, fupplied poverty with a decent competence. He gave so genteelly, and with fuch a good grace, that there was a pleasure in being obliged to him, Epaminondas, his most dear and faithful friend. was the only person who refused to partake of his The lessons of Lysis had impressed on the mind of the disciple so strong an idea of the vanity and infufficiency of riches, that he did them the strictest justice so long as he lived. We shall, in the sequel, see him raised to the political and civil government of his country. Honours were to the aufterity of his manners, and the simplicity of his life, as shades to pictures, they ferved only to make them appear with greater lustre. At the head of the armies of Thebes, conqueror of the enemies of his country, the drefs, the fuite, the table, the manners of the general, were as plain and simple as those of the common foldier.

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Pelopidas, unable to persuade him to change his sentiments respecting poverty, embraced the same spirit himself in the bosom of opulence. Moderation in his apparel succeeded to magnificence, and frugality took place of extravagance at his table; it even seemed, from his unbounded liberality, as if riches were a load he was impatient to be relieved of.

A friend reproving him one day for his excessive profusion, "You neglect, says he, an effective proint." "And pray what is that?" replied Pelopidas, "It is to preserve a good fortune

" fortune for yourself." "That is indeed essen-" tial, but to this man," replied Pelopidas, pointing to a miserable object who had lost his arms

and fight.

By these means Epaminondas himself established the philosophy of Lysis. No one could see the sweetness of his manners, his content of mind, his peace of heart, without wishing to be like him. Pelopidas being more active, mixed his application to study with the exercises of wrefling and running, to accustom himself early to fatigue. As for Epaminondas, he gave up almost all his leifure to meditation upon the general principles of natural morality; an inexhaustible source of happiness to men: the knowledge and practice of them is a treasure, the possession of which is ever accompanied with the most pure and unchangeable delight; nothing can rob those of it who have happily attained to it. This precious depofit is lodged in the center of the heart.

Impatience to enjoy these advantages, attached Epaminondas more and more to the love and study of philosophy; Lysis, his beloved instructor in a science so useful and pleasing, died while he might still have benefited from his assistance. The grief of the Thebans in general, and of those he had educated in particular, shewed the esteem and consideration he had acquired. Sensible however as Epimanondas selt his loss, he bore it like a man who had received from the friend he lamented, a remedy for so reasonable an affliction. His sondness for retirement, and his choice of poverty, appeared in an extraordinary instance after the

death of Lyfis.

When the persecution the Pythagoreans had suffered was abated, Arcezus, one of those who Vol. II.

had the good fortune to escape from his enemies, returned to Sicily. He was intimate with Lysis before their common misfortune, and had conceived the greatest hopes of him. After much enquiry, he discovered that he had retired to Thebes. Unable to travel on account of his great age, but desirous before his death to secure Lysis an independence, he made his will in his favour, and charged Theanor, one of his disciples, with the execution of his last wishes, who faithfully came to Thebes to deliver Lysis a considerable sum Arcezus had bequeathed him. (e)

Epaminondas's virtue did not long remain in the obscurity in which he buried it; the strict friendship subsisting between him and Pelopidas, the most distinguished person in Thebes, insensi-

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bly gave him much confequence.

Jason, the tyrant of Thessalv,* resolved about this time to enter into an alliance with the The-Nothing appeared more likely to promote it than engaging Epaminondas in his interest, as he enjoyed the whole confidence of Pelopidas, the richest and most powerful individual of Thebes; he flattered himself he should easily purchase the affiftance of Epaminondas. He came therefore to Thebes, perfuaded that if the friend of Pelopidas was able to withstand his eloquence, and infinuating artful conversation, he must be seduced by the attraction of his prefents. The two first means having been attempted without success, Jason had recourse to the third, and prefented Epaminondas with a vast sum; the extreme poverty he faw him in made him conclude he would not hefitate to embrace the means of fo highly improving his condition. Epaminondas

(e) Note V. * Plut. Life of Jason.

Epaminondas, incensed at Jason's conceiving so mean an opinion of him, answered, that the hopes of corrupting was the most cruel outrage he could have offered him; that he looked upon his attempt as a declaration of war; and that born a citizen of a free city, so far from selling the freedom of suffrage of its citizens, he would support

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Jason was brave, resolute, and fortunate, he had in Thessaly a considerable army accustomed to conquest; the more noble Epaminondas's answer, the more must he have been hurt at it. It was however dangerous for the Thebans to embroil themselves with so formidable a neighbour. Pelopidas, more provident or more politic than his friend, made these reslections. He appeased Jason's anger, renewed the treaty, and entered into a fresh alliance with him. Jason satisfied with his journey, returned to Thessaly.

Not long after his departure Theanor arrived at Thebes with Arcezus's legacy. While people were in doubt whether he would accept it, Epaminondas without hesitation resolved to refuse it. "Jason," fays he to Theanor, "a little while " ago was affronted when I made him the same " answer. He tried to corrupt me with money, " to engage our citizens not to oppose the sub-" jection of Theffaly, which he had begun to re-" duce to his authority. I answered him, like a " man who had a lively fense of the insult offered " to my probity and integrity. Your intention " is very different," continues he, "it is consist-" ent with honour, virtue, and gratitude; I ap-" plaud, I admire it; but these riches you offer " me, are like giving a medicine to a person in " perfect health.

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" Suppose yourself to be one of our allies, " who thinking we were at war should bring us " arms and provisions to affift us in carrying it " on; being come amongst us, he finds us enjoy-" ing a profound peace, is it not probable he " would immediately convey back the fuccours " he had brought, which would be useless to us " having no occasion for them? You imagined " I was tired of the poverty I professed, and " bring me effectual remedies against it; but so " far is it from being disagreeable to me, that it " is the most beloved guest in my house, my de-" light, my happiness. The philosophers who " have fent you, applied their wealth to the no-" blest purpose: you may affure them I readily " do them justice; but inform them, at the same " time, that I also make as good use of my po-" verty."

Theanor, unable to prevail farther, determined to engage Epaminondas to reimburse himself the expences his father Polymnis had incurred, by the maintenance of Lysis, and the grand suneral he had made for him. It was doubtless the saving and overplus of what the state had paid for young Philip, who was returned to Macedon. Epaminondas, inflexible, told Theanor, that Lysis had abundantly repaid him, in teaching him to practice and enjoy poverty; and in shewing him the path which led to virtue, he had far exceeded any offers that could be made him.

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The obstinate refusal of Epaminondas, and Theanor's desire to prevail with him to accept his present, drew them insensibly into a discourse on the nature and contempt of riches. A proper use of them, says Theanor, makes them valuable; if we ought not to be shocked and impa-

tient at poverty, it is equally our duty to endea-

vour to procure a comfortable subsistence.

In answer to this, Epaminondas took occasion to explain to Theanor, how custom, prejudices, and abuses, when they only are consulted, will without end multiply the necessities of mankind. "We are subject," says he, "to two forts of de-" fires; the one effential and inherent in human " nature; the other accidental, and wholly un-" connected with it. The first are born with us, " they are fown in our blood, and implanted in " our hearts, nothing can destroy them; they in-" cessantly require to be satisfied, and a man com-" plying with this necessity follows the order of " nature; doubtless it is a great humiliation, but " we have no cause to be ashamed of it. " the condition of our being, there are the terms " on which we exist; the mind is not sensible of " this fubjection, and therefore need not regret " it, fince it does not in the least detract from " her dignity and purity.

" It is not fo," continued he, "with defires " which are foreign and acquired, which the ge-" nerality of mankind attempt to put upon the " fame footing; these are the effects of pride, of " injustice, and of error. Such, among others, " is a love and efteem for riches; what good, " what advantage can they bring to our heart " and mind? Of what use is the possession of " them to him who knows they can make to " themselves wings and fly away, and who has " early accustomed himself to be content with " that he hath? What troubles and evils, on the " other hand, do they not bring upon fuch as are " devoured with a rage for heaping them? They

" prefently usurp a most absolute sway, the mind

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" infensibly

" bondage; the delightful feelings of liberty and

" independence are deftroyed, the foul is en-

" feebled, corrupted, and debased, and those pas-

" fions which are acquired diffurb and torment it

" more cruelly than even those which are born

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From these general principles the Theban philosopher descended to a particular application, and concluded with declining to accept Theanor's present; a contest as rare as it was singular, which will for ever do honour to that age, and redound to the praise of Epaminondas.

His attachment to poverty was not his main object, in giving so bright a proof of his disinterestedness; he hoped to be able by it to reform the manners of his fellow citizens, and to extinguish that rage for enriching themselves which engaged

the attention of all.

The Lacedemonians, their neighbours, a temperate, brave, and indefatigable people, educated in the love and practice of every virtue, affected a kind of pre-eminence over the other republics of Greece. Luxury, effeminacy, a passion for wealth, enervated the Thebans more and more; Epaminondas trembled for the liberty of his country, should the Lacedemonians attack them at a time when they were fo little capable of making any effectual refistance. It was this fear, this love of his country, which led him on all occasions to oppose the vices and looseness of manners which prevailed at Thebes. While the Lacedemonians, obliged to fit down at the public tables, were contented with bare necessaries and the coarfest food, nothing was feen at Thebes but private tables most delicately and sumptuously covered. Epaminondas

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Fpaminondas was one day invited to a grand entertainment given by one of his friends; every thing was prepared with luxury, and fet off with elegance; the wines in particular were delicious. Epaminondas drank only four wine; his friend begged to have his reason for behaving in such a manner. It is, says he, that I may not forget how I live at home. Thus did he gently correct the soft and effeminate manners of his friends and sellow citizens; he censured them more by his actions than his words.

Another Theban having invited him to dine, he waited on him; but shocked with the magnificence and profusion of the table, and overcome with the excessive odour of the most costly perfumes, "I "suppose," says he to him, "you are preparing to offer a facrifice, not to sit down to a scan-"dalous excess of feasting and revelling." He departed immediately, and with all their intreaties

could not be prevailed upon to return.

The city of Thebes, another time, celebrating a public festival, the Thebans esteemed it a point of honour to keep it with the utmost extravagance. All appeared anointed with the most expensive oils, more highly perfumed, and more superbly dreffed than usual; after the feast it was cuttomary to visit each other, and conclude it with the most delicious entertainments. Epaminondas appeared amongst his fellow citizens without having been anointed, without perfumes, and dressed if possible plainer than usual; in this manner he walked up and down in the place of public resort, alone and pensive. One of his friends asking why he refused to take part in the general joy, and feemed even unwilling to speak to any one, Epaminondas answered, "Because I wish " fafety of the town, when you are all drowned

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" in wine and debauchery."

These strokes of satire, and examples of temperance, had by degrees the desired effect; all good men laboured with Epaminondas to revive the love and practice of virtue. As they began to distinguish, with honours and high employments, those only who gave proofs of it, so ambition soon made it fashionable. This happy change was owing solely to the example, the conduct, and the persevering sirmness of one single individual, who had the courage to undertake the reformation of his country, that she might be able to resist the unjust attempts of her restless neighbours.

Pelopidas was one of those who contributed most warmly to the effecting this design;* he constantly laboured in concert with Epaminondas; the friendship which bound them together was founded in virtue only, therefore it was never interrupted or cooled. Had they aimed at falle glory or riches, their union would have been foon diffolved; but all their defigns, all their actions, had no other end than the enlargement of the power and happiness of their country, whose glory they wished to restore; the success of the one was confidered by the other as his own. Jealoufy, which is able to divide those who are the most closely united, could never disturb their friendship; the object they had in view was too pure and noble to produce such pernicious effects.

According to the testimony of Plutarch, some authors have related that their friendship was not grown to its full strength, till the first battle

of Mantinea; but the nature of the proofs they bring for it will not permit us to believe it. fentiment of courage only will hardly induce a man to hazard his life so generously for an indifferent person, and one whom he knows little of, only from the danger he fees him exposed to. it is the part of valour to affift an unfortunate man when oppressed, it is also that of prudence to do it with discretion, and not rashly risk two lives with an uncertainty of faving either. But friendship, fuch especially as that age produced, of which history has preferved fo many noble examples, was a stranger to reflection. A friend in danger was all a friend out of it attended to. These two men gave an eminent proof of it in the next battle.

The return of Xenophon to Greece brought in the love of arms, and a passion for war.* Those brave foldiers who had followed it in remote climates, and who engaged in no action with the most warlike nations without gaining a victory, entertained their countrymen with accounts only of the glory of their exploits. The passage of Agefilaus into Afia, and the fuccess attending it, had so accustomed the Greeks to war, that no one was esteemed amongst them who had not diftinguished himself in action. All who had the hardiness to oppose them, had submitted to their skill and courage; unable to find among all the nations of the world an enemy worthy of them, they fought for one among themselves. Revolts and feditions prevailed every where, and the fword was the fole arbiter of the differences which were raised,

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The Arcadians were the first who had the courage to attempt to throw off the yoke which the Lacedemonians, the absolute masters of Greece by the superiority of their forces, had imposed upon all their neighbours; war immediately sollowed the revolt; it was the more alarming as their party was considerable. The Lacedemonians, to attack them with greater advantage, assembled with their allies all the force in their power. The Thebans had not as yet broken the alliance which subsisted between their republic and Lacedemon; they sent a body of their best troops

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to Agefilaus. Pelopidas and Epaminondas were not forgotten on this occasion. As for Pelopidas it was natural to fend him on this expedition; he had ever applied himself to all those exercites which form a man for war, and had acquired a good deal of reputation in them; but Epaminondas, shut up in an obscure retreat, wholly engrossed by a love of knowledge and fearch after truth, must naturally have escaped the attention of his countrymen, if the great military talents he possessed could have been concealed. How much soever he wished to be unknown, his true character was discovered, and he was named amongst those appointed to march to the affistance of the Lacedemonians. As foon as all the allies had joined the army, they advanced towards the Arcadians, whose hatred and prefumption foon brought on an engagement. They met near Mantinea, were attacked, and of course beaten.

The Arcadians charged with the most furious impetuosity; the right wing of the Lacedemonians,* in which Epaminondas and Pelopidas serv-

^{*} Pauf. in Beot. Plut. in Pelop.

ed, was routed on the first onset; the generous friends remained alone in their posts, to set their companions an example of invincible steadiness; they covered each other with their shields, and sustained the whole effort of the Arcadians. Their obstinate resistance drew the enemy in crouds upon them; for a long time they beat them off, but of what avail is the most heroic courage against numbers? Pelopidas, after having sought with incredible sirmness, until loss of blood entirely deprived him of strength, fell at last on a heap of slain of each party; he had received seven wounds, and seemed to have only just breath enough lest

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His fate, instead of depressing, roused the spifits of Epaminondas; he threw himself upon the body of his friend, covered it with his shield in one hand, and with his fword in the other beat off all who attacked him. His only fear was left they should rob him of what he now regarded as the precious remains of a friend, most dearly beloved, and fincerely regretted; he was refolved to fuffer a thousand deaths rather than abandon them. Weakness, pain, and his wounds had almost overcome him: Happily Agesipolis, King of Sparta, perceived the danger he was in; he flew to his rehef with all the force he could collect, and at last delivered him out of the hands of the Arcadians. In this action he received a wound with a pike in his body, and another across his arm with a sword; but his wounds, as well as those of Pelopidas, were treated so judiciously, that in a short time they both recovered.

Their steadines's having rallied the Lacedemonians, victory declared for them; the Arcadians were totally routed. The Thebans in general,

Pelopidas

Pelopidas and Epaminondas in particular, solely determined the success of the day, even the Lacedemonians themselves did not deny them the honour of it; but envy soon prevailed over the just sentiment of gratitude. They had seen the valour of the Thebans; they began with applauses, and ended in apprehensions of them.

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The battle of Mantinea revived the ancient reputation of the Thebans. The Lacedemonians, who had ministered the occasion, could not observe this people rise with so much lustre out of the obscurity they had so long been buried in, without being alarmed. Beotia, of which Thebes was the capital, was the richest and most sertile country of Greece; that plenty which constantly invited new inhabitants, had made it very populous: for courage the Thebans soon gave proofs that they were able to rival the bravest in Greece. These resections raised fears in the Lacedemonians lest they should, when occasion offered, dispute even the empire with them.

The kings of Sparta at that time were Agenlaus and Agenpolis,* two men of characters diametrically opposite to each other. Agenpolis was a just prince, moderate in his views, equitable in his judgments; above all, a strenuous supporter of the sundamental alliances of Greece, which protected the weak from the oppression of the strong. Ageniaus, on the contrary, was restless, ambitous, he breathed nothing but disturbance and war, and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduct that he aimed and manifested by his whole conduc

pired to the mastery of Greece.

The two polemarchs, or chief magistrates of Thebes, were not better united together.† The opposition of their sentiments had produced an open

^{*} Xenophon, B. 1. + Plut. in Pelop.

open rupture; Leontiades, the most politic and popular, seemed inclined to the Lacedemonians; Ismenias, his colleague, boldly defended the liberty of his country, and would not consent to suffer the form of government, which was republished.

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While these misunderstandings and domestic divisions agitated the Thebans, deputies from the Apollonians and Acanthians arrived at Sparta. These people inhabited the northern extremity of Greece. Apollonia was situated at the foot of Mount Pangea, which separates Macedonia from Thrace. Acanthus was seated on the Gulph of Strymon, not far from Mount Athos. The great distance of these towns from Sparta shews how powerful the Lacedemonians were, when people so distant came to implore their assistance. The Ephori, informed of the arrival of the deputies, convoked the council, and gave them audience in the presence of the allies. Clygenius, who was for Acanthus, thus addressed them:*

"We cannot suppose, O Lacedemonians, that
"ye are ignorant of the troubles about to be
"raised in Greece. The Olynthians, masters of
"one of the strongest towns of Thrace, have at"tacked without the least pretext, except that of
"aggrandizing themselves, several states, which
"they have subdued and forced to live ac"cording to their laws. Success inflaming their
hopes, they have marched against some places
of Macedonia, which they have wrested from
the government of their natural prince Amyn
tas. They have already got possession of Pella,
the strongest town of Macedonia, and aim at
nothing less than chasing Amyntas from his
throne.

^{*} Xenophon, B. 6.

"throne. Being arrived on the confines of Acanthus and Apollonia, they sent orders to us to join their troops, and on our refusal have declared war against us. We are free and independent, and desire only to live in peace as ter our own manners and customs; nevertheless we shall be constrained to follow the Olynthians unless we can find some assistance. They have a potent and well disciplined army, and it would be the extremity of rashness in us even to hope to withstand them.

"When we set out, we learnt that deputies from Athens and Thebes were come to the Olynthians, and that they also had sent to those

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"When we set out, we learnt that deputies from Athens and Thebes were come to the Olynthians, and that they also had sent to those two states to enter into alliances with them. Beware, O Lacedemonians! of a power forming in your neighbourhood. Who can say that the Athenians and Thebans have no thoughts, from this alliance, of acquiring strength sufficient to attack even you? How dangerous is it for you to suffer the Thebans to grow still stronger! You know their resources both by sea and land. Who will be able to resist them, should they take part in the war? Their forests are covered with timber sit for building ships of war; their ports, the imposts they draw from strangers, their trade, bring them in an immense sum: the fertility of their soil makes them more populous than any other part of Greece.

"they will, with their usual prudence, reap every benefit they can from it. Their present de"pressed state conceals their ambition; it will show itself when they become considerable."

The gods, in their wisdom, proportion the ele-

"War may procure them many other advantages;

" vation of men's fentiments to their fortunes.
" What

"What have you not to apprehend from these people, should they enter into so close an alliance with the Olynthians as to cement their union by intermarriages? But if the Olynthians are opposed in time, it will be easy to check this torrent now in its infancy. True it is they have subdued many states and towns, but they are generally detested; the least reverse of fortune will draw after it the defection of those allies whom fear and force alone keep to their party. You have now heard, O Lacedemonians! what we were charged to deliver from our citizens; it rests with you to answer according to justice and your own interest."

The Ephori, upon this discourse, agreed unanimously with the whole assembly to assist Acanthus and Apollonia against the Olynthians, and to repress the ambition of the Thebans. They issued orders to raise an army of 6000 men, part of which was destined to garrison the neighbouring towns of the Olynthians. The command of this expedition was given to Eudamidas, who demanded for his colleague his brother Phæbidas; the latter remained some time in Laconia to receive the troops of the allies, and Eudamidas departed, at the head of 2000 men, to check the progress of the Olynthians.

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Some time after Phæbidas put himself in motion to join his brother. In his rout he happened to encamp under the walls of Thebes. He had with him 8000 men, which alarmed all the good citizens who were friends to liberty; but Leontiades, the polemarch, who was eager for submiting to the Lacedemonians, gave himself up without reserve, on their arrival, to the most indecent transports of joy. Ismenias, on the contrary, who

detested

detested their injustice and ambition, did not deign even to favour Phœbidas with a visit.* A haughtiness so noble shewed, though inessectually, to his colleague, the baseness of his own conduct. Leontiades was too weak in his person and party to destroy that which opposed him; and rather than submit, he preferred the shame of betraying his country to the Lacedemonians, to the glory of preserving her liberty. In every thing he out-run Phœbidas's wishes, and prevented him by every kind of good office. When by his constant compliances he had gained his considence, he attacked the young general on the soible of his age; and, to bring him into his views, tempted his ambition also.

" Fortune," fays he, "O Phœbidas, † presents vou with a fair occasion of doing your country " the most effential piece of service; if you will " follow my advice, and depend on my zeal, I will " endeavour to put the Cadmea into your hands. "You know my colleague, Ismenias, has iffued a " decree forbidding any of the Beotians to join " you. In spite of all his care, if you will trust " to me, it depends only on yourfelf to become " master of Thebes; her inhabitants will then be " obliged to follow your standard whether they " will or no. By this means you will greatly in-" crease the succours you carry to your brother " Eudamidas; he will be covered with glory in " fubduing the Olynthians. Judge then what will " be your portion, if you have the boldness to " feize upon Thebes, which is of fo much more

Phæbidas was a general without experience and without discernment; he viewed the enterprise Leontiades

* Plut. in Pelop. + Xenophon, B. 5.

Leontiades proposed to him, only as it would contribute to his same; he was so elated with it, that he did not suffer himself to make the least reflection. Entrusted with the command of an army, he looked only for an occasion of shewing that he was worthy of it; he had no idea of any glory but what is acquired by courage in the midst of danger; and counted his life of but small value, if he were but so happy as to distinguish himself. With such sentiments he eagerly embraced Leontiades's proposal; he agreed with the persidious Theban to decamp, as if he intended to pursue his rout, and not to return until Leontiades himself should come and inform him it was time. He began his march immediately.

The weather was excessively hot, and all had retired except the women, who celebrated a feast in honour of Ceres in the Cadmea. Notwithstanding the agitation into which the near approach of an hostile army had thrown the town, there were only a few magistrates under the piazzas of the Forum; Leontiades, observing these things, mounted his horse, joined Phæbidas at full speed, gave him the keys of the Cadmea, and desired him to suffer none to enter but such as he pointed out to him.

The treason was effected with all the good fortune possible; Phoebidas surprized the Cadmea, got possession of it, and placed in it a garrison of 1500 men. Is smenias, that generous defender of his country's liberty, was carried to prison, and condemned to death soon after as an enemy to the state, the author of the missortunes of Thebes, and the disturber of the repose of Greece; the general as well as fatal consequence of the partition of the executive power. Jealousy soon creates division, enmity and declared hatred quickly Vol. II.

follow; and when one of the rivals gets the upper hand, the life of the weakest is ever made answerable to the most powerful, for daring to dispute a

point he was not able to maintain.

After this infamous action Leontiades repaired to Sparta, to receive the thanks and praises he thought he was entitled to. Being admitted into the council he gave an account of his conduct, and the motives of it; which were, said he, the pride of the Thebans, and their desire to aggrandize themselves at the expence of their neighbours.

The villany and perfidy of the deed excited the indignation of every honest man in Sparta. The Ephori, and all who still preserved the pure manners of the ancient Spartans, loudly blamed the imprudence and injustice of Phæbidas, who had, of his own authority, undertaken an enterprise so fcandalous and iniquitous. But Agefilaus, who was delighted at feeing the Thebans humbled, and having a fresh opportunity to display his military talents, rifing to speak, said, They should not be in such haste to condemn Phæbidas; that before they pronounced against him, it would be proper to enquire whether what he had done was detrimental or beneficial to the republic; that it his enterprise was hurtful to the Lacedemonians, he deserved censure; but if, on the contrary, it was advantageous, they ought to avow what he had the courage to undertake without the knowledge and authority of the council.

As Agefilaus had an almost absolute sway in the affembly, his advice was followed. The majority resolved not to restore the Cadmea to the Thebans; however, to preserve some appearance of justice, they agreed to deprive Phæbidas of the command of the troops, and condemned him in a heavy

a heavy fine. A conduct, fays Polybius,* as hard to explain as to comprehend; as if the punishment of Phæbidas was a full satisfaction to the Thebans, and justice did not at the same time require that they should withdraw their garrison out of the Cadmea. To hold fast the fruits of injustice while they were punishing it, was it not to commit a greater crime than the first offenders were guilty of? But these principles of equity did not agree with the immoderate ambition of Agesilaus. It was the blind rage of that passion alone which dictated so absurd a decree.

When the Cadmea was surprised by the Lacedemonians, † the greatest part of the Thebans, taken unawares, astonished, without arms, and desenceless, retired hastily into their houses to avoid the cruelty of their enemies, each seeking an asylum with his neighbour; and great numbers sled to Athens to implore the assistance of their allies

against the tyranny of the Spartans.

Pelopidas, the most distinguished amongst them, who was most sensible of the subjection of Thebes, and the best qualified to extricate her, represented incessantly to the Athenians, that the Thebans had a few years before happily delivered them from the like calamity. Leontiades, informed of his solicitations at Athens, and the motions of several other refugees who had accompanied him, by a public decree declared him banished. This fresh disgrace served only to increase the attachment of the Athenians to him and his party. After sour years interceding and negotiating, they at last granted him the assistance of 5000 foot and 500 horse, of which the command was given to Demophon.

D 2 Pelopidas

^{*} Polyb. B. 4. + Plut. in Pelop.

Pelopidas judged that in fuch cases it was the part of prudence to support force with policy. He had the address to engage the chief men of Thebes in the plot of the exiles to deliver their country. Philidas, fecretary to one of the polemarchs or administrators, was of the party, and upon him their fuccess principally depended. He invited the polemarchs to supper the evening on which the conspiracy was to be executed. He was not ashamed, for the sake of serving and saving his country, to stoop to the vile office of miniftering to the pleasures of those infamous oppressors of the public liberty. The most beautiful women of Thebes were to be facrificed to their luft, which indeed was the reason of their admitting a man so much beneath them to fuch a familiar intimacy.

Every thing being fettled, the conspirators affured of the Athenian fuccours which were to follow them, and of a house at Thebes into which they might retire until it was proper to declare themselves openly, Pelopidas communicated the whole to Epaminondas, and exhorted him to join the conspirators. Epaminondas replied, that if all the conspirators were as moderate as their leader, he should not hesitate to take up arms with them; but that it was too probable feveral amongst them would, in their heat and transport, mingle the blood of the innocent with that of the guilty. That the disorder and licence which reign on these occasions, terrified him more than the uncertainty of the enterprise; that one Eumolpidas, and one Samiades, desperate, violent fellows, would fet no bounds to their private revenge: in a word, that the dread of an unjust slaughter of the good citizens, would not fuffer him to join the conspirators; that, nevertheless, he would do all that lay

in his power, but secretly in concert with Gordias,

to bring the plot to an happy iffue.

He waited only till the enterprise was advanced thus far, to excite in the hearts of the Thebans a fense of the humiliating state of slavery in which they languished under the government of the Lacedemonians. He took care artfully to engage them to challenge the Lacedemonians, in garrison in the Cadmea, to combats of running and wrestling. The strength of the Thebans determined the contest almost always in their favour; the plaudits of the spectators flattered the vanity they felt from their fuccess. Epaminondas, instead of praising them with the rest, loaded them with reproaches. "You ought rather to blush," he would fay to them, "than to be thus proud; you " have every advantage over the Lacedemonians; " you know them, and yet you quietly fubmit to " the flavery in which they hold you." He spoke in this open manner only to fuch as he was fure of, and who he knew were capable of inspiring their companions with the fame fentiments: he feldom went out of his house except to the stadium and the public exercises; the rest of his time he gave up to folitude and the study of philosophy, in fo much that the administrators whom the Lacedemonians had appointed, believing him fully employed, had not the least distrust of him.

The great, the important day, so long and so anxiously looked for by Pelopidas, which was to deliver his country from the slavery of their haughty masters, at last appeared. The exiled conspirators arrived from Athens in the neighbourhood of Thebes; the nearer they came to it the more their hopes and fears increased. They halted to deliberate on the manner in which they

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should enter; it was agreed that the younger should risk themselves first. Before they parted, their companions bound themselves to them by an oath, in case they had the missortune to be discovered, to be husbands and fathers to their wives and chil-

dren, and share their fortunes with them.

Pelopidas, Milo, Dameclides, and Theopompus were proposed, with eight others, to be exposed to the first danger; they accepted their offers, and departed, twelve in number, to repair to Friendship, hope, fear, courage, solemn Thebes. engagements, eager defire to free their countrymen, abhorrence of tyrants, were so many ties to ftrengthen their union.* The weather at that time was particularly cold, and it was probable there would be but few people in the streets; for all that, they divided, difguifed as sportsmen, leading dogs with them, and carrying in their hands poles for fixing nets, to remove every fuspicion from the minds of those they should happen to meet. In this manner they fortunately reached the house of Charon, and after them thirty-fix other conspirators who had remained behind.

The Athenian fuccours were not to make their appearance before day-break, and to advance flowly. Befides, there were in Thebes and its environs, 8000 citizens ready to take up arms on the first successful motion of the conspirators. Charon advertised Philidas of their arrival; he had calculated so well that he had already engaged

the polemarchs at his own house.

While these things were doing, Hypostenidas, an upright man, a good citizen, sincerely attached to the conspirators whose party he had joined, but who wanted strength of mind equal to such an un-

dertaking, was suddenly terrified at the thought of what was shortly to be executed. The danger his friends were about to encounter, the obstacles they might meet with, the blood which must be spilt in all parts of Thebes, raised such a consusion of horrid ideas in his mind, that shocked at the picture his frighted imagination had drawn, and stupisfied with his own resections, he returned to his house, resolved to withdraw from the conspiracy. (f)

As he feared his absence might bring him under a suspicion of treachery, he gave orders to one of his servants to go to the house of Charon, and intreat him to prevail with his friends to defer the execution of their enterprise to the morrow. Happily the servant neglected to obey his orders,

and things remained as before.

In the mean time the polemarchs began to drink freely. The news of the arrival of the exiles was instantly spread through Thebes, every one was consident they were there, and that they were received into the first houses. Philidas being alarmed, used every effort to discredit the report, which he represented as an absurd ridiculous story. Archias, one of the polemarchs, who still preserved sufficient presence of mind to be sensible of the consequences of such a report, immediately dispatched an officer to Charon, with orders to come to him directly.

The conspirators, on their part, burned with impatience to come to action; they had already put their swords on, they seized their shields, and were quickly prepared to sacrifice the cruel enemies of their country. An unexpected accident

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created fome alarm. They heard a loud knock. ing at Charon's door; the late hour of the night, the repeated knocking of the person at the door, raised some fears in the breasts of the most determined. Charon went down, the officer delivered him Archias's orders; Charon defired him to go on before, and he would follow. went in again amazed, and with terror painted in his countenance, informed the exiles of Archias's commands. Not one but looked upon himself as loft, and every one supposed the plot must have "However," faid fome who been discovered. were least disconcerted, "it may not be so for all "appearances; the polemarch may have fome " other reason for sending for Charon, and in such " a case we should be very unwise to be discou-" raged, and perhaps have much cause to repent " having given up our defign." This advice was approved of; they followed it. The conspirators also thought fit that Charon should obey, and go to Archias to find out exactly when they ought to

stop.

Charon had a heart full of firmness and intrepidity; he was incapable of dreading dangers which threatened only his own person: but those which his friends were about to run, the apprehension of being suspected of betraying them, and of being esteemed by them as a rascal and a traitor, cruelly tortured him. In this agitation of mind he ran into his wise's chamber, took his only son out of his cradle, and delivered him to the conspirators as an hostage for his integrity and sidelity. This sweet child was, for his age, most remarkably strong and beautiful; he was Charon's only hope, as well as the sole object of his tenderness and affection. Charon boldly delivered him

to Pelopidas, and in spite of the perturbation of his mind, looking on his companions with that air of confidence which virtue only can give, "I de"posit this dear son in your hands," says he,
"to be security to you for my sidelity. If you
"find that I have betrayed you, or acted with the
"least infincerity, he is an enemy whom I aban"don to you; shew him no pity, and revenge

" on him the perfidy of his father."

The tenderness of this generous father, the sublimity and nobleness of his resolution, drew tears from the eyes of all the spectators; not one who did not feel himself hurt by the suspicions he had formed. All intreated him to take his fon again, to preserve for them an avenger if he should be so fortunate as to escape, after their death, from the resentment of the Lacedemonians. Charon obstinately refused. "Alas! this unhappy child!" cries he, "what a life will he lead should we pe-"rish! Can he be delivered from tyranny in a " more glorious manner than by mingling his " blood with that of his father and his friends?" He at the same time implored the justice of heaven, embraced the conspirators, and left them to go and appear before the polemarch.

In the way between his house and that of Philidas he shook off his uneasiness and agitation of mind, and appeared before the company with as much coolness as if he had not had the most just cause to tremble. "Charon," says Archias to him, "who are these strangers who are come into "the town to-night, and who are concealed in several houses? Do you know what citizens

" have given them shelter and protection?"

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Charon answered only by repeating the question to him. He protested he had not the least know-

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ledge of any thing he had now related to him. Archias feemed fatisfied with his answer; he concluded from it that he had been misinformed, and that he knew nothing certain. "May not this he a trick" continued he "which forms

" be a trick," continued he, "which some one has played you to interrupt your pleasures?

" however such a report perhaps ought not to be sighted; I will go and endeavour to trace it to

" its fource, and be cautious."*

Philidas, the better to deceive the polemarchs, praised Charon's prudence mightily, and exhorted him to be watchful over the public safety. Archias trusted all to him, and returned to his company cool and contented as if he had discovered the whole.

Charon, on his return to his own house, sound the conspirators determined to sell their lives at a dear rate, and not to give up their design till the last extremity. As they did not doubt but their secret was discovered, they no longer entertained the flattering idea of avenging and delivering their country; they only resolved to shed the last drop of their blood rather than desert the public cause. The assurance Charon gave them that Archias had not the least knowledge of the conspiracy, renewed their hopes. He related to them all that had passed, and no one, after having escaped such imminent danger, had the least doubt of success.

But in spite of the wisest measures a leader of a conspiracy may take, to how many revolutions are not such perilous enterprises exposed? If to be bold enough to form the plot, and to undertake the management of it, the most extensive genius, the most intrepid courage, a spirit the most complying, most intriguing, and most fertile in re-

fources

^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

fources, is requisite; how sew men possess these talents in a degree necessary to ensure success? To be qualified to conduct a conspiracy without blunders, a man must have been concerned in one before: but it seldom happens that any one is engaged in two plots in his whole life; either the first succeeds, and his point is carried; or it fails,

and he of course perishes.

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Be this as it may, the fate of Pelopidas was to get out of the greatest dangers only to plunge into others, apparently still more inevitable. The polemarchs were at last informed of the whole, beyond a possibility of doubting; it depended on themselves alone, to prolong their tyranny, and seize the conspirators, if the excess of their debauch had left reason any controul: they were in possession not only of the plan of the conspiracy, an exact account of its management, the manner in which it was to be executed; but they knew moreover the names, and number of the persons engaged in it, the time and place when and where they were to act, and the house in which they were affembled; intelligence which their own imprudence and the good fortune of Pelopidas, rendered ineffectual.

The polemarchs drowned in wine, longed for the beauties which had been promised them. A messenger arrived at Philidas's. He said he had letters of importance to deliver to Archias, and was admitted. He informed him that he was come post from Athens; that he was sent by another Archias, the chief pontiss of that city, and an intimate friend of the polemarchs. "Sir," says he, in delivering his dispatches, "my master conjures you to read these letters instantly, be-

" cause

44 LIFE OF EPAMINONDAS.

" cause they contain matters of the last import. " ance."

The improvident Archias dismissed the messenger in two words, with a smile of security which exhibited the state of his mind. To-morrow for business, answered he, putting his friend's letter

under the pillow of his fopha.

At last, these charming women, so long and fo impatiently expected, arrived. The pole. marchs immediately ordered them to be invited in; but feigning a shyness, the last remnant of modefty, they answered, that they could not ap. pear while any of the flaves were prefent. They were instantly sent out. These beauties, whose virtue heightened their charms, (for Philidas had promised not only the most beautiful, but also those who passed for the most virtuous) presented themselves to the eager ardour of the polemarchs. The concealed objects, who caused and who increafed it, were a party of the conspirators, who had covered their armour with female dreffes: to hide their faces, they bore on their heads crowns of pine and poplar, the branches of which falling down with as much grace as art, shaded them from the prying eyes of these lustful men. Charon and Milo were at the head of the party which went to the house of Philidas. They effectually watched over the public safety, according to the promise of the former to Archias, but it was in a fense very different from that which he had given him to understand. Only Archias and Philip, the two polemarchs appointed by the Lacedemonians, supped with Philidas; they wished to conceal their pleasures and their triumph from Leontiades, the third polemarch.

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The fignal for action, agreed on between Phi-

lidas and the conspirators, was the invitation to be feated.* They were not wanting in preffing them; Charon and Milo immediately advanced, threw off their robes, (g) drew their poignards, and difpatched these unmanly, lustful tyrants from the debauchery of wine and the expectation of pleafures, into all the horrors of instant death. Some of the company were inclined to make relistance, but Philidas having affured them that their defign was meant only against the oppressors of the liberty of Thebes, and that he would be fecurity for their lives, if they remained quiet, they made no farther resistance. In an instant Archias, Philip, and all of their party were killed; the conspirators found not the least difficulty with respect to them. The execution was not so easy with regard to Leontiades. Pelopidas, who had been well aware of it, for that reason took it upon himself; he had to do with a man, cool, faithless to his country, but brave and courageous. knocked at his door, it was opened; instantly the conspirators crowded to his apartment, after having put the person who opened the door to death.

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Phiidas Leontiades alarmed at this tumult at midnight, suspected a design upon his life, and prepared to desend it like a man of courage. He ran to the door of his chamber to prevent their entering; they forced it, but he laid Cephisidorus, the first who entered, dead at his seet. Fortunately he had watch lamps in his chamber; Pelopidas, by their light, sollowed and attacked him. The struggle lasted some time, but Pelopidas, by his superior strength and art, got the better. He plunged his sword into the breast of the persidious Leontiades.

^{*} Xenop. B. 3. (g) Note VII.

Leontiades, and left him lying breathless; then the two parties went to the houses of all who were in the Lacedemonian interest, and not one es-

caped them.

As foon as this bloody massacre was completed, Pelopidas sent couriers to Demophon, to direct him to advance briskly with his troops. The conspirators would have been ruined after all this success, if the five hundred Lacedemonians in the Cadmea had attacked them. They were too weak and too sew in number to be able to make the least resistance; but the citadel was affected with the alarm which resounded through the town.

They heard nothing on every fide but screams of affright and horror. The citizens who were not in the secret, expected trembling the death which they fled from, and which was inflicted on their neighbours. The streets were illuminated with an immense number of slambeaux; the people dismayed, knew not when the carnage would end, nor who might hope to be objects of savour.

The tumult and alarm continued till day-light, when the Athenian troops arrived. Epaminon-das, who had intelligence of every thing, repaired to the place where the people were affembled; he appeared there, as well to put a ftop to the flaughter, as to diffipate their fears. He was attended by all the honest citizens, whose only hopes were in him, by Gorgidas and the priests with facrifices; these last bore in their hands the facred fillets, in token of thanks to the gods. At length he informed this weeping multitude, that the blood which had been shed was only that of tyrants, and the enemies of their country. At the same time he introduced Pelopidas to them, who had so happily conducted this important enterprise; all eyes were

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were turned upon him, and seemed still to express some doubt of their safety and deliverance. There was but one universal shout of joy and gratitude. Thousands of voices roared out at once, Liberty! Liberty! saluted Pelopidas as their saviour, and appointed him to manage the war against the Lacedemonians.

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The first account of authority exercised by the new chief,* in consequence of the power the people had put into his hands, was the fending Philidas to fet at liberty those unhappy citizens with whom the tyranny of his predecessors had filled the prisons. Philidas having called the keeper, told him that he came to deliver a prisoner to him by order of the polemarch. The keeper opening without difficulty, Philidas instantly ran him through the body, and let at liberty all who were confined on account of their public conduct. When they were informed of the revolution which had happened, they defired to have arms, and ran to the houses of the enemies of their country. They extended their refentment even to the children; the villany and treason of the fathers were punished a second time in the persons of these innocent victims, and their blood continued to be thed even some time after their death: an excess of cruelty scarcely to be avoided in such circumitances. What Epaminondas had dreaded was woefully verified by the torrents of blood which were unjustly spilled.

Pelopidas's orders having put a stop to the masfacre,† he instantly assembled the troops then at Thebes, and led them directly against the Cadmea. Upon the refusal of the Lacedemonians to surrender, he invested it without losing a moment,

and

^{*} Xenoph. B. 3. + Xenoph. Diod. Sicul.

and formed the siege. The Athenians were of much use at first, but in a short time so many soldiers repaired to him from all parts of Beotia, that he could easily dispense with their assistance. All the passes were secured, and supplies cut off; the garrison, which wanted provisions, had no hope left but in the arrival of an army from Sparta, which was daily expected. The valour of those within was equal to the courage of the besiegers, who attacked them so briskly; they galled Pelopidas's army very much with clouds of arrows,

and great stones, shot into his camp.

It was a rule and principle of honour with the Spartans, to die rather than give up a post entrusted to them. These (the Spartans) were refolute, they bore stoutly the want of provisions, and the other hardships of a siege, carried on with all imaginable rigour; but the garrison was principally composed of allies, who had not the fame firmness. As they were the stronger party, and as they faw no prospect of being able to hold out for any long time, nor any means of sublisting even if they could, they obliged the Lacedemonians to furrender. Pelopidas granted them their lives, and they instantly quitted the Cadmea. When they arrived at Sparta, the three harmoftia who commanded were immediately brought to trial; two were condemned to fuffer death, and executed on the fpot; the third had fo heavy a fine laid upon him, that being unable to pay it, he was constrained to go into voluntary banishment, and finish his days in exile.

If the advice of the Spartans, who were for holding out, had prevailed, Beotia would perhaps never have recovered her liberty. The garrison on its return, in the Peloponnesus, met Cleombro-

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tus, brother and fuccessor of Agesipolis, who was dead, and colleague with Agesilaus in the throne. He was at the head of a formidable army; the war with the Olynthians, allies of the Thebans, had terminated in their defeat, and the reduction of all their fortresses. The sole hope of a powerful and permanent diversion had induced the Athenians to come to an open rupture with the Lacedemonians. When they were told that the Olynthians were subdued, dread of the power and resentment of Sparta led them to desert the party of the Thebans, their allies and former deliverers.

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Thebes, abandoned to her own resources, without aid, without hope, but most resolute and determined in her revolt, or rather indeed in desence of her liberty, became an object of compassion even to her most cruel enemies. There was not the least doubt but she must be crushed by the weight of the Lacedemonian power; and her pusillanimous neighbours, though they had not the

spirit to affist, could not help pitying her.

This universal desertion, and the approaching danger of a fervitude as cruel as it feemed immediate, excited all the affection of Epaminondas for his dear country. Pelopidas had for a long time pressed him to share with him the trouble and fatigue of government, and of the war. A vast genius, a found judgment, an approved courage, qualified him for every thing; but a passion for philosophy, a thorough knowledge of the emptiness and vanity of glory, led him to prefer solitude to all the honours of the first employments. A miser of his time, which he dedicated to the enquiry after the chief good, he shunned public employments, fays an eminent writer, (h) in a portrait VOL. II.

which he has sketched of this great man from the historians. He never canvassed but to get himself rejected, better satisfied and more happy in the obscurity of his retreat, than he could be when great and glorious at the head of the army, and the helm of state. The absolute necessity of his country alone brought forward the most able general of his age, concealed under the humble

guife of an obscure philosopher.*

The Athenians were not content with abandoning the Thebans; to justify themselves to the Lacedemonians, they punished with imprisonment or exile all who had affifted them. Epaminondas, wholly taken up with the mifery of Thebes, fludied, together with Pelopidas and Gorgidas, the means of averting the tempest with which they The Beotians were brave, they were threatened. were capable of exerting their courage to the best advantage; but they perceived, that standing alone against the whole force of Sparta, they were too weak to maintain fo unequal a contest. The Athenians esteemed them, they knew the justice of their cause, they pitied them; but all thele fentiments yielded to the dread of drawing upon themselves the resentment of the Lacedemonians. Thus embarraffed, the Beotians had recourse to a stratagem to bring back the Athenians to their party, and happily for them it succeeded.

When the news of the conspiracy, and the murder of the polemarchs, arrived at Sparta, Ageslaus caused war to be immediately declared against the Thebans. This prince, born in other respects with all the virtues of a king and citizen, was, as has been already observed, possessed of the most insatiable ambition, which aimed with very

little dissimulation at the sovereignty of Greece. The Lacedemonians murmured loudly against the injustice which he had done the Thebans, whose sole crime was having retaken their citadel, which the Lacedemonians had by his advice unjustly kept possession of, against all fort of laws. But jealously and passion rendered the Thebans inexcusable to his pride; and he determined utterly to extirpate this audacious people who had dared to oppose him. His influence in the council of Sparta got the better of the repugnance of all equitable and moderate men; to that alone it was owing that the iniquitous declaration of war, which he proposed against them, passed.

As his age and services * exempted him from taking the command of an army, he declined, under this pretext, taking the command of that which was sent into Beotia. His real reason was, an unwillingness openly to appear the promoter of that tyranny, he wished to establish. (i) To this only Cleombrotus, his colleague in the royalty, owed the honour of being appointed ge-

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He took his departure immediately; he sent forward detachments to secure the defiles of mount Citheron, through which he must pass, and arrived under the walls of Thespia, a town of Beotia. The prudence and activity of the Theban generals prevented him effecting any thing; the campaign ended without any loss on their side, or reputation on his. He retreated into Laconia, and carried with him the greatest part of his forces; the rest he lest with Sphodrias, to whom he gave up the command, and the magazines E 2 appointed

[•] Xenoph. B. 7. (i) Note IX.

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Sphodrias was esteemed one of the best officers in Sparta; but he was a man bold even to rashness, enterprising without discretion, and fond of projects the most chimerical. Pelopidas and Epaminondas discovered his character, and knew him well. It is peculiar to great men, to attain their ends, to avail themselves of the defects of others, as well as of their own abilities. Pelopidas gave an instance of it on this occasion. Having secretly gained a merchant of Thebes, a man of eloquence and persuasion, he engaged him to go to Sphodrias, and propose seizing the Pireus: This was the most celebrated port of all Greece, belonging to the Athenians.

The artful Theban, fully instructed in his undertaking, went in quest of Sphodrias; laid before him a most specious plan of the expedition against the Pireus; and gave him hints that it ill became a general of his reputation, to content himself with harraffing the Beotians and debauching his foldiers. "In a word," fays he to him, "you " have it in your power to fignalize yourfelf by " the most noble exploits; and it will be your " own fault if you do not get possession of the Nothing easier than surprising the " Pireus. " Athenians, who depend entirely upon you. "The Thebans, who esteem them as deserters, " will certainly give them no affiftance, nor can " you undertake any thing that will be more " pleasing or advantageous to the Lacedemo-" nians than this enterprise." A considerable present at the same time added weight to a difcourse so flattering, and well calculated to mislead Sphodrias; it had the defired effect to the full. Hc

He greedily espoused the project, ordered his army to take nourishment, and to be prepared to march as night set in, that they might reach the

Pireus by break of day.

Every thing fell out well except the most effential point, which was the arriving in the night, for the conquest which the credulous Sphodrias had promifed himfelf; the day furprifed him, and he was obliged to return. His rage at having failed in his design more than answered Pelopidas's hopes, which was to embroil Athens with Sparta. He carried fire and fword through the plains of Attica, he drove off their cattle, pillaged their houses, and laid waste their whole territory. The Athenians fent to Sparta, demanding justice for these hostilities. Sphodrias was condemned by the ephori to lofe his head; but he fled, and kept himself concealed till Agesilaus had obtained his Such an act of injustice going unpunishpardon. ed alarmed all Greece, and so incensed the Athenians, that they attached themselves more firmly Their recovery was than ever to the Thebans. the confequence of the fage conduct and address of Pelopidas, Gorgidas, and Epaminondas, who laboured in concert with each other to support their finking country.

The Lacedemonians, although they had hitherto been almost without interruption in a continual
habit of conquering, could not bear with temper
the bad success of Cleombrotus and Sphodrias.
Agesilaus was thought alone capable of supporting the reputation of their arms; equally able
and fortunate, a long experience in war had instructed him in the glorious art of fighting and
conquering. The council intreated him, in the
name of the whole nation, to take upon himself

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Agefilaus, like an able general, took every measure which could secure him the honour of this campaign: but nevertheless it was confined to the ravaging fome defenceless lands of the Be. otians. He was met by the Thebans every where, who, by the conduct and valour of their generals, restrained him from undertaking any thing considerable. The most distinguished, says Diodorus Siculus expressly, were Pelopidas and Gorgidas, but Epaminondas, adds he, was still much superior to them. To the talents which make a great foldier, he joined the most refined learning of his time; he was not only esteemed the most learned man of Beotia, but he was regarded as the luminary and ornament of all Greece. Besides, more defirous of the character of being a good citizen than any thing elfe, he dedicated himself entirely to the service of his country. To gain the esteem and affections of the Thebans, he had only to be known to them. He employed himself principally in doing away that difcouraging opinion his countrymen had of themselves; and in confequence of the pains he took, he foon faw their former diffidence converted into that happy felfconfidence of conquering, which when it is well founded is in itself more than half the battle.

The Thebans, before he led them, had never dared to stand, even with superior force, against

the Spartans; by his courage and conduct, taught them to conquer with equal numbers. all flight skirmishes the advantage remained constantly on their side. It is true indeed, that these fuccesses were trisling, and did not at all abate the courage of the vanquished, but they daily improved that of the conquerors, which was all he desired.

In one of these actions it was, that Agesilaus, who behaved more like a foldier than a general, happened to be dangerously wounded. The Thebans concealed in an ambush, waited for the Lacedemonians, to attack them as they were returning to their camp. As foon as they appeared, they marched briskly out of the defiles in which they had lain hid, and charged them with fuch fury, that nothing could refift them. Celion and Epilitides, two of the principal officers, fell in the first shock, together with a great part both of the infantry and cavalry of the detachment.*

Agefilaus, in the beginning of this rout, rather than engagement, threw himself into the hottest part of the battle, and to animate his men, did more than, as their general, was incumbent on him; his ardour did not cool till he received a wound which obliged him to be carried out of the action. Antalcidas feeing him in the arms of some foldiers, could not help frankly faying to him, "You have received a just recompense for hav-" ing forced the Thebans to apply themselves to

" the art of war; but for you they would still have " known nothing of it."+

It was indeed to Agefilaus that they were obliged for the glory they shortly acquired by E 4 their

^{*} Xenoph. B. 5. † Plut. in Ages.

Lycurgus, who well knew how imtheir arms. prudent it was for even the bravest and best disciplined troops to engage frequently with those who are the least so, intended to prevent this inconvenience by an express ordinance; it forbid his fucceffors from continuing to prolong a war against one and the fame enemy. The principle he went upon was, that by being beaten they would, by their very defeats, learn at last how to conquer in their turn. But Agesilaus in this war was not led by the spirit of this sage legislator; he hated the Thebans, he was jealous of them, he was determined either to fubdue or deftroy them,* and his obstinacy on this head was ever inflexible to the remonstrances of the Ephori and the council.

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The presence of Agesilaus did not render this expedition more fortunate for the Lacedemonians than the preceding. All his glory was confined to laying the country waste, and ravaging the lands dependent on the Beotians, with a cruelty

inexcufable even in an enemy.

The season for military operations being over, he discharged the allies, and returned to Laconia. He only less a sew troops in the neighbourhood of Thespis, which he fortisted, at the head of whom he placed Phæbidas, the first author of this war.

The ill fuccess of the Lacedemonians obliged this new general to look out for an opportunity to avenge their late affronts, and restore their ancient reputation to its former brightness. The three chiefs of the Thebans, Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and Gorgidas, were not of a temper to retire before the remnant of the army, after having braved it when in full force. The Thespians, allies and subjects

[·] Plut. in Agef,

subjects of Thebes, had admitted a Lacedemonian garrison without any resistance. Epaminondas, resolved to punish their cowardice or treachery, advanced close under the walls of their town, in defiance, if I may so say, of Phæbidas. This general, on his approach, ordered the Lacedemonians to march out instantly, and the Thespians to follow them. Phæbidas performed all that could be expected of a brave man, who holds his honour dearer than life; he broke the Thebans, drove them before him, and followed them even into a wood, out of which he thought it im-

possible for a single person to escape him.

Epaminondas feeing that there was no way to retreat, ordered the cavalry to halt, and to make head against the enemy, whilst he went to endeavour to rally, and form the rest of his troops. The extremity of the danger recalled their courage; they stood the shock of the Lacedemonians with unshaken firmness. Ashamed of their flight and of their dastardly behaviour, they ventured to attack in their turn, difordered the enemy's ranks, broke them, routed them, and made way fword in hand even to Phoebidas himself: the most obstinate resistance was unable to preserve his life against soldiers animated both by shame and succels; he fell, together with the principal officers who had crouded to his affiftance. The detachment having no longer any leader, dispersed and fled; Lacedemonians and Thespians all made precipitately for the town, and did not stop till they got there.

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Agefilaus exasperated with rage and shame, returned a second time with a more numerous and select army than that of the year preceding. The destruction he had made, and which he renewed in the territories of the Beotians, brought on a famine; but the Thebans were possessed of immense riches, and could hardly be starved while there were provisions among their neighbours. After the example of the Athenians, and chiefly by the advice of Epaminondas, they began to form a marine, and by this means it became almost impossible to reduce them by famine.

Agesilaus unable to subdue them by force, had recourse to stratagem; he pretended to go to Thespis, as in the last year, ordered his provisions to be carried there, and appointed it the general rendezvous of the army. The Thebans, on these appearances, hastened to take possession of the passes leading to that town, and encamped in the environs of it. While they were yet getting together Agesilaus, in one day, by a forced march, performed a journey which in all likelihood would have taken up two, and advanced with the utmost expedition towards the city of Thebes itself.

Pelopidas and Epaminondas faw they were deceived, and that Agefilaus had been too cunning They marched back inftantly, and as for them. foon as they discovered the enemy's army, prepared for battle. For this purpose they choic a confined fpot, where they could not be furrounded, or over-powered by numbers; they raised an intrenchment in their rear, which they defended with the carriages of their baggage and ammunition, and as foon as it was completed they formed in order of battle with the most intrepid countenance. Agefilaus instead of accepting the offer they made him to engage, decamped and marched strait to Tanagra. This town, the nearest to Thebes, was separated from it only by a small vale, washed by the river Ismen. Agesilaus's plan,

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and the execution of it, would do honour to the most expert general. The Thebans discovered a fecond time, by dangerous experience, what an adversary they had to cope with; but they had generals on their fide no whit inferior to him in the art of war. Pelopidas and Epaminondas inflantly availed themselves of the only resource left; the extent of genius with which they planned, and the quickness with which they acted, shewed that the mistakes of great men are frequently productive of as much glory as their knowledge. They suffered Agesilaus's army quietly to march for Thebes across the valley; they gained the heights which commanded it, and by advancing at the same time with the Lacedemonians, they galled them with their arrows, and descended forthwith into the plain to throw themfelves between Thebes and their army. was, that fighting for their wives and families, for their temples and their gods, their usual valour outdid itself; they defended the entrance to Thebes with fo much vigour, that Agefilaus, repulfed and beaten on all fides, was obliged to give way, and retreat in haste. At this time he really went to Thespis, happy in finding there a shelter from enemies whom he began to dread. Superiority of force, reputation, military experience, warlike stratagems, nothing succeeded with him on this occasion.

The Theban generals carried all before them by their valour, their activity, and the fertility of their genius in finding out expedients in the most desperate circumstances. The fortunate deliverance of Thebes was, in the eyes of their fellow citizens, an action worthy of everlasting gratitude; they consecrated the remembrance of it to poste-

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terity, by a monument which they raised to the

glory of their deliverers.

The battle of Tegyra, which the Thebans gained some time after over the Lacedemonians, completely did away the opinion which had prevailed. that the arms of Sparta were invincible. was a pitched battle in all its forms, and the victory which Pelopidas gained in this memorable action, did not leave the vanquished any the least pretext to cover the reproach of their defeat. It was complete, and the glory of the Thebans was fo much the greater, as their number was far short of that of the Lacedemonians.

This celebrated day, fays Plutarch,* gave the people of Greece to understand that it was not the territory washed by the Eurotas alone which could produce warlike people and brave foldiers. It shewed them that noble, daring, and intrepid courage is of all countries, where the inhabitants are taught to blush at whatever is shameful and unworthy, and to be prodigal of their blood in the cause of justice and honour. On these great principles great men are formed, and no enemies are fo dangerous and irrefiftible as those who have been bred up in them.

These happy successes of the Thebans, into whom their chiefs ceased not to inspire these generous maxims, brought their country at last to be esteemed among the number of those which produced heroes. But confiderable as these advantages were, on account of their rapidity, and above all their novelty, they were but the prelude to those which Thebes was about to gain over her enemies, under the fole conduct of Epaminondas, The fequel of his history will shew what is possi-

LIFE OF EPAMINONDAS. 61

ble to be effected in a state by one brave, wise, and virtuous man, when the esteem and considence of his fellow citizens put the reins of government into his hands.

THE END OF THE FIRST BOOK.



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LIFE

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EPAMINONDAS.

BOOK THE SECOND.

THIS country, fo rich, fo powerful, fo fertile in brave foldiers and great generals, was cruelly torn to pieces by domestic troubles; the conquest of the neighbouring states, who divided amongst them the empire of Asia, would have cost less expence of blood than was shed on this occasion. They had only to have employed their arms against them, instead of turning them upon one another.

An ancient author fays,* that the Greeks who did not live to fee Alexander feated upon the throne of Darius, were deprived of the most glorious and flattering fight. Plutarch, on the contrary, delivers a much truer and more refined sentiment, in faying that those same Greeks who lived in the preceding age, would have shed floods of tears, had they been witnesses of his same, in reslecting on the honours and triumphs they themselves had neglected and lost. He owed them only to the imprudence they were guilty of, in keeping up

* Plut. in Agef.

their intestine divisions. However that may be, a war so brisk and so bloody, soon drained all Greece so much as to make peace universally de-Artaxerxes Mnemon, king of Persia, with whom the Lacedemonians were in alliance, used all his efforts to put an end to this civil war; he was acquainted with the Grecian troops, and in the design he then had formed of declaring war against Egypt, he flattered himself, that after having re-established their union, they might be engaged to follow his standard. Agesilaus, for all his obstinate fondness for war, entered into his measures, and convoked at Sparta an affembly of all the states of Greece. They fent deputies there, according to ancient custom, to proceed without delay to confider ways and means of reestablishing among themselves that goodly harmony in which their chief strength confisted.

Epaminondas was placed by the Thebans at the head of their deputation. It was the firmness with which this great man had inspired them, it was the horror which he had taught them to conceive at that scandalous despondence in which they had lived till his time, which had lighted up that war; he therefore was charged with negociating the peace, and on fuch conditions as he

judged to be the most advantageous.

The authority the Lacedemonians had usurped over all Greece,* gave Agefilaus an absolute controul in this affembly. Respect and fear made his wishes to be blindly received as so many laws. It was dangerous for the states to oppose them. The zeal of a good citizen, joined to the firmness of an intrepid philosopher, raised Epaminondas above this servile compliance. He rose with a noble

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boldness, when all the several members of the asfembly were ready to subscribe to the forms of the ambitious Agesilaus, he delivered immediately, with all the fire of the most nervous eloquence, a most powerful harangue, not for the Thebans only, but in favour of all the states of Greece. He shewed that the different wars they had waged till that time, had ferved only to augment the power of Lacedemon; that the superiority of her forces, and the increase of her territory, which they imprudently fuffered, had put it out of the power of any of her neighbours to resist her; that the Lacedemonians, whose strength was daily increasing, had only to shew themselves, to conquer a people worn out with fuccessive attacks; that, however, there was one mean left of fecuring to Greece a durable peace, and this was to restore the equilibrium between the several powers; without which it might more justly be called an engagement of flavery than a treaty of peace, which the deputies were about to fign. (k)

The whole affembly fecretly approved the proposal made by Epaminondas,* and admired the boldness with which he delivered it. Agesilaus alone, who perceived how fatal it would be to his views, appeared displeased. To stop the mouth of this generous Theban, he asked him, if he thought it were just and reasonable to grant liberty and independence to the towns of Beotia?

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ble els, Under the specious pretext of the liberty of the Beotians the king intended the utter ruin of the Theban power. She would have been so much the more effectually enseebled by this independence of the towns from which she drew her forces,

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⁽k) Note X. * Plut. in Agef.

in as much as Agefilaus, in thus reducing her to extreme weakness, proposed at the same time to keep the towns of Laconia in absolute subjection to him; they also should have returned to their original freedom, if Agesilaus's intention had been to re-establish equality amongst the people of Greece.

Epaminondas penetrating his design, demanded of him, if he did not think it equally just and reasonable to place the towns of Laconia in the same state of independence which he proposed for those of Beotia?

Agefilaus was not accustomed to contradictions. The boldness of Epaminondas having thrown him into a kind of fury, he rose, and demanded of him again, with the tone of an angry master, if he would not consent that Beotia should be free? Epaminondas with the considence of a philosopher, who is never disconcerted, asked him in return, still keeping his temper, whether he would on his part grant the same to Laconia? The haughtiness of Agesilaus could not bear a reply which appeared to him so insolent; his only consolation was, that it surnished his animosity against the Thebans with a plea to break out with some appearance of reason.

The treaty which was to renew the Grecian league was proposed; he instantly erased, with equal joy and fury, the name of the Thebans; he set them down among the enemies of Greece, and declared war against them in the name of the

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whole nation.

With this iniquitous act the affembly broke up. He dismissed the deputies, exhorting them to sign the treaty before their departure, and to terminate their differences amicably: in conclusion he gave them

them to understand, that if advice was not powerful enough to enforce obedience, arms might pof-

fibly be more fortunate.*

The deputies of most of the towns appeared on Those of Beotia defired that what the morrow. they presented in favour of the Thebans might be registered, who wished to be comprehended in the treaty. Agefilaus returned for answer, that he would alter nothing of what was refolved on the preceding evening; as to any thing else, he would lay them under no restraint; and that if they chose to follow the Thebans in their revolt, he would order their names also to be struck out of the treaty.

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Thus Thebes, which only fought liberty, was declared an enemy, and threatened with all the strength of Greece. Epaminondas, touched to the heart with the evils which hung over his country, perceived that it was not by his lamentations that he was to shew his zeal and affection. repaired quickly to Pelopidas; thefe two great men made no doubt but the justice of their cause would engage heaven on their fide, and that their neighbours would oppose so tyrannous an oppreslion. But the obligation of the treaty they had jult ligned, and dread of the refentment of Agefilaus, were more powerful than the compassion excited by the unfortunate, most wickedly perfecuted.

The Athenians recalled the troops fent to their aid, and gave up all the places they had taken Thebes fingle against all the during the war. forces of Lacedemon, without hope, without allies, abandoned to her own weakness, expected F 2 nothing

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 16. Plut. in Pelop.

nothing but ruin or flavery. It was her fate to be menaced with the most inevitable destruction, and to escape it with glory, by the prudence and valour of her chiefs.

Cleombrotus, the colleague of Agesilaus in the royalty, was then at Phocidea, with an army of 10000 foot and 1000 horse. The Ephori sent him an order to give up his enterprise, and march immediately against the Thebans. At the same time they commanded new levies, as well in La-

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conia as amongst their allies.

The news of these preparations being arrived at Thebes, all joined with one voice to appoint Epaminondas to the government of the state, and the conduct of the war. Such great honours, as would have fatisfied the defires of the most ambitious. were, in the eyes of a philosopher commenced general, an insupportable burthen; he declared so to his fellow citizens, with that fincerity as much unknown to weak minds as it is familiar to great men; he defired they would affociate with him in his new dignity fix principal officers, who should share the weight of it. They gave him a power of doing whatever he judged beneficial for his country, and he immediately made choice of fix of the bravest and most experienced citizens, to whom he gave the name of Beotarchs, or governors of Beotia. Pelopidas was not forgotten; Epaminondas, who knew the confidence the troops had in his ability and courage, gave him the command of the facred battalion, the most distinguished corps of the whole nation.

Cleombrotus in the mean time advanced brifkly towards Beotia. When he arrived upon the frontiers, to keep up some shew of justice, he sent deputies to Thebes to summon it to restore the towns

of Beotia to their liberty; it was moreover required that the Thebans should rebuild those of Platea and Thespis, which had been demolished in the former war; and that they should indemnify the inhabitants for all the losses they had sustained

in the pillage and fack of their cities.

Epaminondas answered the deputies in the name of the republic, that the Lacedemonians had no controul over Beotia; and that the Thebans were under no obligation to give an account of their conduct to them. This answer, equally just and spirited, being reported to Cleombrotus, he held himself no longer under a necessity of keeping any measures. He entered Beotia, persuaded that a fingle battle would fuffice to punish and repress a haughtiness which appeared to him rash and fool hardy. Epaminondas, on his part, was prepared to receive him in the best manner possible; he caused a decree to be published throughout all the country immediately subject to Thebes, that all who were able to bear arms should instantly repair thither. All were ready to obey with that eager zeal which the dread of great evils, and the wish and hope of escaping them, usually inspire.

As fast as these new soldiers came in Epaminondas incorporated them with the veteran bands, and instructed them in the art of war by continual exercise; all those cares he took upon himself,

which left him little or no time for repose.

One day as he was returning home, worn out with labour and fatigue, he was told that a citizen was found dead in his bed. "O Hercules!" he cries out in furprise and astonishment, "how could this man find time to die in the midst of so much hurry and business?"

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When all the troops he could collect were arrived at Thebes, he took a review and muster of them; the whole amounted only to 6000 men. This was an army very weak in number, but the justice of the cause in which they were engaged, the extremity to which Agesilaus had reduced them, the presence of two generals who had taught them to conquer in instructing them how to fight, shewed on this occasion what a handful of brave men, led on by fortunate and experienced com-

manders, is capable of effecting.

Epaminondas, full of courage and confidence. departed from Thebes at the head of his little army, as foon as it was in a condition to march. His intention was to oppose the entrance of the Lacedemonians into Beotia; for this purpose he feized upon the straits and defiles of Mount He-I con and Parnassus, through which in all probability Cleombrotus would be obliged to take his rout; but the Lacedemonians having artfully concealed their march, passed these mountains near Thisbe, from whence they came to Creusis, another town fituated on the gulf of Corinth. In purfuing their march they feized the crews of twelve gallies which belonged to the Thebans, and obliged them to furrender the little fleet. They at last arrived in the environs of Leuctra, a town dependent upon Thebes.

Hardly had the Beotian army got out of the gates of Thebes* to go upon action, when an unlucky omen had like to have put an end to the expedition. A public crier, returning to the city with a blind man who had made his escape, was accidentally met on the road. As was usual, he said with a loud voice, "Carry him not out of

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^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15.

"Thebes, and do not put him to death, but con"duct him back to the city." In an age when ignorance had pushed superstition to the height, nothing more was wanting to alarm every one. The ancients were the first to apply to an army a sew words which had respect only to a blind man; the meeting him seemed a certain presage of some inevitable missortune; even the younger men, who are ever carried away by the torrent of example, would not have concealed their inclinations to return to Thebes, except only from the apprehension they had lest it might be imputed

to want of courage.

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Epaminondas, without endeavouring to find any thing fupernatural in a fimple ordinary event, with which he faw the multitude were alarmed, encouraged them by declaring, "that when they were " fighting for their country, the goodness and jus-" tice of fuch a cause were the only omens they " ought to confult." This generous fentiment determined the army to continue its march, without, however, totally removing the repugnance it felt. Prodigies still more surprising happened as they went on: A fudden guft of wind carried away a kind of banderol, (1) which contained the general's instructions, and blew it against the side of a column erected on a tomb; it there remained for some time as if fastened to it, for the wind which pressed against the pillar prevented its falling.

Upon this fecond omen the whole army was convinced that the gods in mercy gave them warning, that they would run upon certain death if they advanced any farther. The universal cry was

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The circumstance was critical. Although Epaminondas gave no faith to natural accidents, which the multitude looked upon as miraculous, he must have been embarrassed how to act. When a prejudiced multitude fancy they hear the voice of the gods, rarely will they obey that of men who dare to contradict it. Epaminondas considered that he had no means of doing away the terrors with which these ill omens had affected the minds of his soldiers, as credulous as they were ignorant, but by opposing fortunate ones to them; but in a waste open country he had no temples, whose priests he could bribe, to repair to.

While he was busied in finding out a remedy for this growing evil, the sky which was pure and serene became darkened in an instant, was all on fire, and they heard a most tremendous clap of thunder. "Can you any longer doubt the will of the gods?" faid some of the most considerable veterans to him. "What think you of this dread"ful noise?" Epaminondas, who was much more attentive to examine the camp of the Lacedemonians which he began to discover, than to think of the thunder, evaded the question in saying to them, with an air of assonishment, "I think "our adversary ought to lose his head for posting

"himself so ill, when he had the choice of so

" many advantageous fituations."

This was all the answer the veterans could get from him; they were obliged to be fatisfied, and continue their rout. Epaminondas led them safely into the celebrated plain of Leuctra, where he pitched pitched his camp within fight of that of Cleom-brotus.

A body of troops which were left behind happened at this time to join the army.* The first thing they did was to wait on the general. minondas took advantage of this lucky circumstance to encourage and give fresh spirits to his army. He addressed himself to the principal officers, informed them of what had happened, and convinced them that the superstitious credulity of the multitude was to be overcome only by contrary presages. For this purpose he agreed that they should carelessly spread a report through the camp, that the arms of Hercules had disappeared in the temple at Thebes, and that the grand pontiff had declared, that the god himself had come to take them to go and join the ancient heroes of Greece, in fighting for the defence of Thebes.

He bribed another person, and persuaded him to assert that he was come from the cave of Trophonius, (m) and that the god had expressly enjoined him to tell the Thebans that they must not sail to institute solemn games in honour of Jupiter, when they had gained the victory in the plains of Leictra, where they then were in sight of the

enemy.

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he ed Thirdly, a Lacedemonian deferter, who ferved with the Thebans, was ordered to report, that they had an old tradition at Sparta which threatened the Lacedemonians with an entire defeat in the fields of Leuctra. The priests and diviners who were called in, people ever employed to work upon the simplicity of weak minds, were to confirm these new omens, and to assure them they should make a vast slaughter of the Lacedemonians, near

^{*} Xenoph. B. 6. (m) Note XII.

the sepulchre of the daughters of Scedasus and Leuctrus, the same from whence the country took its name.

This story was founded on the hope of divine justice: In this spot the deputies of Lacedemon had formerly violated the daughters of Leuctrus and Scedasus. These wretched parents repaired to Sparta, to demand justice for the insult offered to their blood. It was denied them. Their daughters, driven to despair by such an outrageous act of injustice, preferring immediate death to an ignominy which must last as long as their lives, killed themselves.

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Their inconsolable fathers, affected by their shame and grief, could not bear to survive them. To preserve the memory of so disgraceful an event, the inhabitants erected a monument on the spot where this bloody tragedy was acted. In spite of the blindness of paganism, the idea which people have of the Deity assures them, that sooner or later vengeance will overtake insults and injuries, that are flagrant and unpardonable. This

it was which gave rife to this tradition.

When these several rumours were spread and credited throughout the camp, Epaminondas pretending to be surprised, and to distrust them himself, sent for the authors of them to examine whether they were worthy of credit. They published their fables with the greatest air of truth. Every body believed them, and by a sudden change of sentiments contradicting each other, usual with the vulgar, there was not a soldier but who, under a certainty of conquering, demanded to be led to the battle. This was what Epaminondas had flattered himself would be the consequence; he knew that troops, who fancy they are marching to a defeat.

feat, feldom gain a victory; and that, on the contrary, when they are confident of conquest, they

are hardly ever beaten.

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As foon as their courage was thus revived, Epaminondas affembled the council, to deliberate whether it were better to remain on the defensive, by intrenching themselves in sight of the enemy, or to offer him battle. There were but five of the Beotarchs, whom Epaminondas had affociated with himself, with the army; the sixth, which was Pelopidas, was absent. Their opinions were divided equally; three were for engaging, and three were of a contrary way of thinking.

Pelopidas happily arrived to determine the queftion. Epaminondas informed him of the fituation of the enemy, of the disposition of the army, and concluded with faying that his advice was to give battle. Pelopidas acquiesced in it without hesita-

tion, and thus put an end to the council.

His friendship, and the dependence he had on Epaminondas's judgment, did not fo much avail to determine him, as the necessity to which they were reduced of hazarding every thing. flates dependent upon Thebes threatened a general revolt; they could no way be kept in subjection except by fome brilliant action, which would confirm the wavering authority of the republic. Besides this reason there was another equally strong; the Lacedemonians, unless they beat them off, had it in their power to lay siege to Thebes; it was unfurnished with provisions, and although Epaminondas had taken the precaution to fend all the useless mouths to Athens, the army alone would foon have confumed the fmall store he had collected. These were the reasons which induced Pelopidas Pelopidas to decide for action; it was in fact, the fituation of things considered, the only part they

could prudently take.

Before we proceed it will not perhaps be unpleasing to take notice of a circumstance which marks the progress that reason had insensibly made, if we may judge from a comparison of this age with that which preceded it.

Pelopidas on the eve of the battle had a dream, in which he fancied that Scedafus appeared to him, and addressed him in these words: "If you wish to gain a victory over your enemies, you must

" facrifice to me a red-haired virgin."

In this same country a similar dream had formerly lost the life of the unfortunate daughter of Agamemnon. Agesilaus, who some time before had one of the same nature, to which he paid no attention, thought himself obliged by his bad success, which he had the weakness to attribute to his disobedience, to dismiss his troops, and abandon his enterprise. Many noted facts in Greece authorised the respect they had for these unformed productions of a distracted imagination, which they confounded with the voice of the gods; but it was a man of an enlightened mind who had the dream we are now talking of, it was a philosopher versed in the knowledge of the gods, considered as the parents and creators of mankind.

Convinced that the Supreme Being, the fountain of all reason, who communicates a ray of it to our soul, could not ordain any thing contrary to it, he rejected every thing that was not reconcileable with this principle. The horrible cruelty of a worship so barbarous, appeared to him incompatible with the goodness and clemency of the

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^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

gods. In these facrifices made to propitiate them, he could see nothing but the most shocking out-

rages both against them and humanity.

Besides, how or where to find a red-haired virgin? From what country, or what family, did this murderous dream require her? All these reslections naturally lead us to think that Epaminondas, who could not bring himself rashly to shed innocent blood, had bribed a diviner to prevent the suspicions of impiety, which an open disobedience

might have excited against him.

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Epaminondas, Pelopidas, and the other Beotarchs, held a council on the resolution they ought to take. Every thing was well contrived, and the difficulty was foon got over. A young filley, which had never been backed, running from fome place in the neighbourhood, came into the camp, bounding and neighing in fuch a manner as to be taken notice of by the whole army; she was beautiful, high-spirited, and full of mettle, and the foldiers could not help admiring her; but the most fortunate circumstance was, that her mane was of the most lively perfect red. A diviner was on the spot, apparently by mere chance; he came forward, and while they were at a loss where to find a victim, "See that which the gods demand, "most noble Beotarchs," fays he, pointing to the filley; "think of no other, fince the gods explain "their own meaning by this accident; perform " the facrifice to them."

The priest's explanation was spread abroad; they caught the filley, led her to the tomb of Scedasus, crowned her with slowers, invoked the gods, and according to the form of expiation, sprinkled the contaminated soil with her blood. The whole army had no doubt but the gods

were

were fatisfied. Nothing more was wanting to Agamemnon, and all those who were reduced by ignorance, and a mad barbarous superstition, to the same extremity, to have avoided the grief, the sin, and the remorse of having unjustly shed the most innocent blood.

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The facrifice being ended,* and the omens declared favourable, Epaminondas to take advantage of these circumstances gave battle. The bare fight of an army so superior in number as was that of Cleombrotus to the Thebans, would have been capable of discouraging the most daring. Besides that being at first much stronger,† Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, had greatly augmented it, by joining it with a body of troops raised in La-

This host of Grecians excited no other sentiment in the Theban army than hope of a victory, by so much the more glorious as it would be the more difficult to be attained. Epaminondas sormed his order of battle in a manner unknown before; the invention and conduct of which none but such a general was capable of.

Cleombrotus had ranged his army in phalanx after the Greek custom; his cavalry was drawn up in squadrons in the first line of the right wing, which he commanded in person. Epaminondas could not reasonably hope to conquer the Lacedemonians, but by throwing them into disorder and confusion on the loss or capture of their general.

The left wing of the Thebans was to attack that he was in. Epaminondas stationed in it the heavy armed soldiers, and what he had left of the boldest

^{*} Xenoph. B. 6. Plut. in Pelop. Diod. Sicul. B. 15.
Paufan. in Beot.

† Xenoph. B. 6.

and best approved men, who had served in the late war. He placed in the front of the first line the sew cavalry he had, to make head against the enemy's horse. He knew that the first shock of the Thebans would be irresistible; he made no doubt but they would break through the Lacedemonians.

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One thing was to be feared; and this mischief would have been unavoidable to a general of less forefight, namely, left the troops should be furrounded while they were charging. To remedy this inconvenience, Epaminondas robbing, if I may fo fpeak, his right wing, in which he left not above five or fix men deep, so strengthened his left, that each rank was composed of fifty file. He then extended his line by a quick and ready movement, with a defign of flanking Cleombrotus and to draw him nearer to him, by detaching him from the body of his army. Cleombrotus, who perceived his intention, changed his order of battle, and meant likewise to extend his right wing so as to furround Epaminondas with his troops. This indifcretion decided the fate of the battle, Pelopidas at the head of the facred battalion (n) closed Epaminondas's wing, and watched every opportunity; he observed the disorder which this movement had caused in the Lacedemonian army; he charged them instantly with that vigour peculiar to the Thebans, to which every thing gave way. He broke through them before they could recover their ranks, and threw them into terror and confusion. The Lacedemonian cavalry were thus defeated, in spite of the prodigious inequality of 5000 to 500 horse. In the mean time Epaminondas moved up with his phalanx, which confiited

⁽n) Note XIII.

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fisted of fifty file deep, against twelve. He had fecured too great an advantage on his fide for the victory to remain long doubtful. The Lacedemonians fought in consequence of their national principle, with incredible valour. The bravest foldiers, the ablest officers crouded to wherever the danger was greatest; they ranged themselves around Cleombrotus, they defended him with their spears, and with their swords, they covered him with their shields, and, for some time, fus. tained the impetuofity of the Thebans, who directed all their views at him alone. Dinon, Spho. deras, Cleonymus, his fons, the flower of the foldiers and officers, were laid dead at his feet. The Thebans at length opened a passage to him sword in hand. He funk at last, bathed in his own blood and that of his generous defenders, and fell lifeless on their bodies.

This fpot became the field of battle. cedemonians actuated by shame and despair, used every effort to avenge the death of their general and king. They made a dreadful flaughter around his body for a long time: rage, fury, revenge, inflamed all their spirits; but Cleombrotus being dead, his army became a body without order, being without a head. Terror, dejection, confusion, on the Lacedemonian side; on that of the Thebans the attention of Epaminondas to keep his men together, to recover their ranks, to make the most of the advantages he had already gained, decided the fuccess of this most hot and obstinate engagement. He observed that the great perserverance of the Lacedemonians arose only from the desire they had to carry off the body of Cleombrotus; he chose rather to complete the destruction of his army than dispute with them the possession of this

poor consolation. He sell upon the other wing, already weakened by the loss of many of their principal officers, and either cut to pieces or dispersed the whole of it. Pelopidas engaged all that he attacked, with the same success. The Lacedemonians broken, and in disorder every where, gave way, quitted the field of battle, and sled with the single praise of having recovered the body of Cleombrotus, out of the hands of their enemies.

The excellency of the Theban cavalry contributed not a little to this victory; they began the engagement and defeated that of the Lacedemonians. They had none at that time that were regular troops; the richest inhabitants kept the horses in time of peace, and when they went to war they mounted them with soldiers totally unacquainted with the exercise and manœuvres of the cavalry. The Theban, on the contrary, was excellent, they had served an apprenticeship in the battles of Thespis and Orchomenos, of which they carried off all the glory.

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On the Theban side, the whole loss did not exceed 300 men; the Lacedemonians lest 4,000 dead on the sield of battle, in which was included 1000 Spartiates, the slower and rising hopes of the nation; so much blood was never shed in any some battle, the greatest deseats seldom lost more than about sour or sive hundred. Before Epaminondas, Greece had produced many generals who knew how to conquer, but she never had one who so well understood how to make the most of a victory, in drawing from it the most permanent advantages.

The glory of the general in the celebrated action of Leuctra, eclipfed the moderation of the Vol. II.

G philosopher.

philosopher. Epaminondas gave himself up be, your measure, with all the open-heartedness of the best citizen of Thebes, to the joy of having, in so complete a manner, deseated the inveterate enemies of his country. He boasted of this good fortune and this glory with a satisfaction never to be satisfaction taught him to regain the elevation of his character. The excess of those first transports prevented his reason from perceiving it; he had declared the pleasure of his triumph with a kind of self applause, which when he came

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to recollect, he could not pardon.

The day after the battle, he put on, with a courage as fingular as it was heroic, a kind of mourning for the victory. On the fame spot where he had been feen to reap fo much glory he apeared filent, depressed, totally lost in thought. He shunned the looks of his soldiers as a criminal avoids those of his judge. A studied meg gence in every part of his dress, not usual, except the most forrowful occasions, raised apprenentions that he had met with some sudden unexpected misfortune. His fadness alarmed every one, all trembled for Thebes in their anxiety for her deliverer. Some of his most intimate friends ventured to break through the veil of fuch deep diftress, and ask him the cause. " Affure your. " felves," fays he, " it regards myfelf only; " feel that the immoderate joy I received from the " issue of the battle, caused an exultation of hear " which raised me in my own opinion much above " what I deserved: to bring myself down again to " my proper level I thus mortify myself to day." A modesty in a Pagan as praise worthy as it is rare, and which would do honour to the first christian general. While

While Epaminondas thought it incumbent on him to atone for the weaknesses of vanity, he did not deny himself the enjoyment of a just and reasonable pleasure; he often said, that what gave him the highest satisfaction in the victory of Leuctra, was the having gained it in the life time of his parents: a sure proof of the goodness of his heart, and the affection he bore to those who had given him being. Satisfied with the dangers, he resigned to them all the glory of so brilliant a

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The day after the battle the Lacedemonians intreated permission to carry off their dead, to give them the rights of burial. The pretence was too specious for Epaminondas to refuse: but this was not done purely from piety; a defire of concealing their great loss was the chief motive. Epaminondas, on the other hand, thought it of importance to his defigns, and the honour of his country, that it should be known to all Greece. He therefore granted their request, but on condition that none who lay on the field should be carried off except by those of their own tribe: by this means the whole army became acquainted with the number of Spartiates who had fallen in the action; it was, as has been observed already, considerable, and in those times unexampled. The inhabitants of the neighbouring towns, who had hastened thither on the news of their defeat, were as well acquainted with the number of the slain as the vanquished themselves, being present when they were carried off.

Epaminondas's first care was to inform his allies of a success as compleat as it was unexpected.*

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^{*} Xenoph. B. 6.

He made no doubt but he should be able to prevail with the most timid to come and join a victorious army. With this view he dispatched several messengers to all the principal states of Greece. He who was sent to Athens arrived there while the council was sitting. This republic, instead of sharing in the joy of the Thebans, gave striking marks of chagrin and jealousy at their good fortune. The courier was dismissed, not only without obtaining any succours, but even without receiving any answer; the Athenians did not so much as invite him to rest himself, according to the laws of hospitality which were religiously observed on such occasions; he was obliged to depart

instantly.

Jason, the tyrant of Thesfaly,* with whom the Thebans had entered into an alliance at the commencement of the war, fent a more favourable answer. He was a celebrated intrepid general, and a keen politician, who let nothing escape him. His own interest was, without doubt, the cause of the eagerness he shewed for marching into Beotia, rather than his regard for the Thebans. He neglected every other business to go and join them without delay. He was at this time engaged in quelling an unjust war brought upon him by his neighbours. They were not very formidable, and he did not look upon his presence at home to be so indifpenfably necessary but that he might venture to go away; however, as there might be danger if they knew of his departure for Beotia, he ordered a fleet to be hastily got ready, as if he intended to go there by sea, and took his route by land while these preparations were making. By this finesse he happily avoided the attacks of his enemies;

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^{*} Plut, in Jason.

enemies; they knew nothing of his march even

while he was crofling through their country.

By his fecrecy and dispatch he quickly arrived at the Theban camp; he brought with him 1500 foot and 500 horse. Epaminondas having communicated to him the defign he had formed of pursuing the Lacedemonians as far as Sparta, Jason ipared no pains to diffuade him from it. Epaminondas remonstrated in vain with him that it was impossible the enemy's army should stand their joint attack, when the Thebans should take them in front and the Thessalians in the rear. "You " are mistaken," said Jason to him, * " and you " presume too much upon the favour of Fortune; " she'does not like to be temped so often; an am-" bition to carry your glory too high, may occa-" fion the lofs of what you have already acquired. "Do not you fee," added he, "that you owed " the victory at Leuctra only to the extremity to " which you were reduced? the imprudence of " the Lacedemonians had laid you under the ne-" cessity either to conquer or die. Do you sup-" pose they will shew less courage and resolution " if you force them into the same situation? Con-" sider of this seriously; the gods often delight in " raising up the weak upon the ruins of force and " power."

Epaminondas perhaps saw through the views of the Thessalian, who intended, by saving the Lacedemonians, to preserve a rival to the Thebans capable of checking their progress. Jason, who thought only of aggrandizing himself, could never effect it so easily as when Thebes and Sparta, employed against each other, were mutually weak-

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^{*} Xenoph. B. 6.

ened in contending for the empire of Greece. However that was, Epaminondas, who was convinced that he was not in force without the affiftance of his ally to push his conquests surther, feigned for the present to give up his design. He also consented to a truce with the Lacedemonians,

of which Jason was the mediator.

The tyrant of Theffaly repaired to their camp to propose it.* Address supported by eloquence, and the appearance of fincerity, eafily perfuaded "I feel your misfortune," fays he to them, " as becomes a man penetrated with gratitude for " the obligations my father owed you; I am " proud of the honour of being attached to you, " but in my opinion you ought not at present to "think of repairing the loss you have fustained. "What will your foldiers, disheartened by their " defeat, be able to do against an army flushed " with fuccess? Employ yourselves therefore only " in collecting fresh troops, that you may be in a condition to take your revenge with more cer-" tainty on a future occasion. The approaching " defertion of many of your allies, who treat un-" derhand with the Thebans, ought to determine " you to it. I fee no other resource in your pre-" fent fituation than a truce, and I am come to " propose it, as zealous for your interest as you " can be yourselves. I am in such esteem with " the Thebans that I am bold to believe they " will not refuse it me."

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The truce was of course accepted by both parties. The Lacedemonians immediately repassed Mount Citheron, and entered Laconia. Archidamus there dismissed the allies, and returned to Sparta

^{*} Plut. in Jason.

Sparta with the miserable remnant of the finest army that haughty state had ever sent out.

Before Epaminondas they hardly ever revisited their capital unattended by victory; the genius of this great man deprived them of this glorious

In spite of the dishonour of so shameful a defeat Sparta afforded a sight worthy of admiration.*

The friends, the relations, the parents of the illustrious dead, who had bravely sacrificed their lives in defending the glory of their country, made public rejoicings for the loss of those generous citizens whose sate they envied. They embraced them chearfully, they appeared pleased, and received in form the congratulations of their fellow citizens. The love of their country, and the desire of glory, seemed in them to be a second nature, and to silence the voice of blood and natural affection.

On the other hand, the parents and friends of thole who had elcaped from the battle of Leuctra were afraid to appear, and had not courage to expole themselves to the view of the public; they were so many inexorable judges who punished the misfortune or cowardice of these unworthy Spartiates, with greater leverity than they would have telt in the pains of death, and the loss of life. Want of courage had preserved it, confusion and remorfe rendered it insupportable to them; they were so many citizens who had forfeited their honour, and were excluded by the inftitutions of Lycurgus, not only from all public employ and military command, but even from the honour of G 4 carrying

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^{*} Plut. in Agef.

carrying arms. The number however appeared

too great to be treated with rigour.

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The Ephori called a council, and deliberated on the means of faving, at the same time, both the laws and the citizens. Agesilaus, whose mind was fertile in expedients, proposed to suffer the laws to sleep for that day, and to restore them to their sull force on the next. His proposal was too wise not to be acceptable; the council and the ephoricame into it with one voice, and thus saved to their country an army of protectors. They hoped so much the more from the favour shewn them, as their honour would naturally engage them to prove themselves worthy of it, as well as the public good.

Jason, who had returned into Thessaly,* made the best advantage of the suspension of arms between the Lacedemonians and Thebans, daily to extend his conquests. He reduced by force those whom he could neither gain by bribes, artifice, or perfuafion. He arrived at a height of power which rendered him formidable to all Greece. He feemed even to aspire at the empire, and he became infenfibly, by his fuccesses and the increase of his forces, more likely to attain it. stopped his career, and overturned all his great defigns. He met with the fate of most of the members of a republic who assume to themselves an absolute power. He was put to death by his own subjects, and the affaffins were honoured as the avengers of public liberty.

A most abominable successor, one of those men who dishonour humanity, whom heaven in wrath now and then sends into the world as a scourge for sin, a tyrant both in name and practice, was adt

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^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15. Plut. in Pelop. & in Jason.

vanced upon the ruins of his power; formed of the same blood with Jason, whose brother he was, with the most odious vices and passions, he was not possessed of one of his good qualities. Jason was only ambitious, Alexander was at once the tyrant of his miserable subjects, and the executioner of his own family; the head of his brother Polydore served him for a step to mount to the throne; proscriptions, injustice, the essuant to the an unseeling heart, he ruled Thessaly with a scepter of iron. We shall presently see her imploring the pity and assistance of the Thebans against his oppression and cruelties.

The victory they had gained over the Lacedemonians put all Greece in motion; the latter thought themselves vanquished without resource. Their conquerors seemed disposed to make the most of their advantages. The despondency and consternation of the one, the haughtiness and ambition of the other, threatened Greece with a revolution of which she dreaded the consequences. All the neighbouring powers were employed in mediating a peace between these two nations, the

difficulties of which daily increased.

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Integrity, prudence, and love of justice, were the characteristics of the Acheans,* and induced both parties to accept their arbitration. This people, of no great strength as a nation, were become more respectable by their virtue, than force or power could ever have made them formidable. Justice never had a tribunal more incorruptible, nor judges better qualified; they decided between the two nations in a manner worthy of the confidence reposed in them; prudence and equity dic-

tated

The humbling the Lacedemonians had altered the interests of all the Grecian states. Athens, the near neighbour of Thebes, saw her advancement with as much dread as envy. After much deliberation this republic broke the neutrality. She judged she could no way so well check the growing power of the Thebans as by supporting fuch of their enemies as were able to divide their forces; this was what induced that republic to take part with the Lacedemonians. Sparta in return gave up the empire of the sea, which hitherto she had constantly disputed with her, and was fatisfied with taking the lead by land. Thebes contended for it with the greater advantage, as it became every day as doubtful as that of the fea was to the Athenians. The power of Thebes was no longer confined within the narrow limits of Beotia; all the towns that were discontented or jealous of the Lacedemonians had declared for Epaminondas, and entered into alliance with him. He became the prop of weakness and misfortune, which ever found in his protection a fecure refuge from arrogance and injustice.

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An uncommon capacity, a merit tried and approved both in war and peace, had raised Epaminondas and Pelopidas to such consequence with their fellow citizens, that they were absolute masters of the government; but from a firm and inviolable friendship, these two great men, ever rivals had they been so inclined, had no contest with each other but who should be foremost in promoting the good of their country; an heroic ambition which speaks their praises in forming

their characters. Their high reputation was to them a burthen of which they knew the weight, as attentive to preserve it as they had been active

in acquiring it.

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The pause of peace seemed to them the properest time to make preparations for war. It was not long before it broke out again. The difgrace of the Lacedemonians had revived in all the people whom they had fubdued, their native spirit of liberty and independence. It was no longer the council of Sparta which decided the disputes between them and the republic. Arms were quicker judges, and more agreeable to the genius of the nation; they at last determined them. The visible diminution of the power of the Lacedemonians was followed by a diminution of their Their neighbours, a reftless people, authority. jealous of one another, and naturally warlike, kept up no longer any fubordination amongst themselves when they had no longer any mafters.

The Arcadians being torn to pieces by a civil war,* Agefilaus, to preferve the appearance of fovereignty, fent Polytropus into their country, at the head of 1500 men, to keep them in order. Lycomedes, who commanded a detachment of Arcadians, advanced boldly against the imperious Lacedemonians, who had little left of their ancient grandeur, except its haughtiness. He had with him 4000 picked soldiers; these would have been but so many victims for the Lacedemonians in the happy days of their former reputation, but these glorious times were now no more; the decline of their empire was accompanied with that of their

valour.

Lycomedes

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15.

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Lycomedes offered battle to Polytropus under the walls of Orchomenos. Polytropus had the rashness to accept it. His own death, that of the greater part of his little detachment, and the flight of those who escaped, soon decided the victory. But the mere phantom of ex-It was complete. piring Sparta still kept all Greece in awe. Lycomedes for all this fuccess, could not think himfelf in a condition to withstand the vengeance which he doubted not she would be inclined to exact for this affront; he fent deputies to Athens to ask succours. But unfortunately for him, the policy of that republic was to restore the power of the Lacedemonians, not utterly to destroy them; he therefore obtained none from that quarter.

He was more fuccessful at Thebes. Epaminon-das, who had proposed some years before to the general assembly of Greece, to restore liberty to all the states originally independent, received with pleasure the deputation of a people, who desired only that he would maintain them in their rights. The promise he gave of assisting them remeved their sears. He lost no more time in sulfilling it, than what was necessary for the assembling of his

army.

He had learned from an event which had brought Thebes to the brink of destruction, how ruinous and dangerous it is to any country to become the seat of war.* He was willing that the Lacedemonians should feel the evil of it in their turn, to avenge the ravage committed on the lands of his republic, by laying waste their country. Sparta, who for the space of 600 years from the settlement of their ancestors in Greece, proudly boasted.

^{*} Plut. in Agef & Pelop. Diod. Sic. B. 15.

ed of never having feen an enemy fet foot in her territory, was at last despoiled of so flattering, so advantageous an exemption. The women of Lacedemonia paid, with dreadful alarms, for the undisturbed pleasure they had so long enjoyed, of never having beheld the smoke of an enemy's

camp.

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Epaminondas entered Laconia at the head of an army of 40000 fighting men, either Thebans or allies of the republic. It was followed by 30000 volunteer adventurers, attracted by the hopes of pillage and plunder. Agefilaus, who had gone in person against the Arcadians, after the defeat of Polytropus, was obliged to return. The people who had before avoided him feemed even to brave him to the face, when they learnt that Epami-

nondas was come to their affiftance.

An army fo numerous would foon have been in want of subsistence, in a country which they ruined in their march, had not their able general provided against such an inconvenience. He divided it into four detached bodies, which could eafily join one another again in case of necessity. He over-ran all Laconia with these several parties, carrying fire and fword through all that dared to oppole him. As to those who declared against the Lacedemonians, he admitted them to terms and did them no damage. Of this number were Elis, the country of the Argivans, and all Arcadia en-But the towns and states, which imprudently persisted in their attachment to Sparta, were treated with the greatest rigour, without favour as well as without exception. Epaminondas demonstrated in this campaign how little they had to expect from these protectors, hitherto so formidable, After long delays and negociating, the Athenians at last listened to the entreaties of Sparta.* Iphicrates, a famous Athenian general both by sea and land, was sent into Laconia with an army of 12,000 soldiers. It was entirely composed of young men either in the bloom of youth or the strength of manhood, from whom every thing

might be expected.

The near approach of the time in which the authority of Epaminondas and Pelopidas was to cease, threatened to interrupt their successes, when they were most brilliant. It depended on themfelves alone to conquer or fubdue Sparta; but according to the constitution of their republic their command was nearly at an end, and it was at Thebes only that they could be continued in it. They had acquired too much glory not to have created enemies. Meneclides, one of the chiefs of the conspiracy which had faved their country, could not patiently fee himself excluded from the first appointments by the merit of the two illustraous friends. He was a vain man, enterprizing and capable of any thing to overcome rivals who had raised themselves above him, if they gave him the least opening. A lively and persuasive eloquence rendered his enmity formidable in a nation where the people, so easy to be worked upon, decided the most important affairs.

The two generals had but one alternative, either to abandon their enterprize, and return with their troops into Beotia, or to purfue their advantages, and push their conquests as far as they

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Diod. Sic. B. 15. Xenoph. B. 7.

could extend them. (o) The former would doubtless have been the determination of the generality of men, who have not spirit enough to sacrifice themselves in a case of necessity, for the good of their country; but Epaminondas and Pelopidas preferred the latter, little anxious, each of them, about the honour of the command, and incapable from the elevation of their fentiments, of considering their own fafety when the public good was at stake. Their lives would be endangered by fo bold a step: they knew it well; they were also well aware that Meneclides would blacken the purity of their intentions with a charge of the most tyrannical ambition; but these reflections, so alarming to weak minds, made no impression upon their flout hearts. They were beloved by the foldiers, who wished only to advance; they were in daily apprehensions of being deprived of leaders so able to conduct them. These favourable sentiments added to the fituation of affairs, determined them to continue in the command, at the risk of their lives.

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The first use they made of it was to strike a-gainst Sparta the most dreadful blow that could have been given her. Epaminondas had ordered three detachments, which he had sent out to lay waste Laconia, to join him at once by separate routs. The town of Hellas was the rendezvous. Their march was so well concerted, that they all reached it on the day appointed.

Agefilaus, who did not think fit to attack the Theban army while it was divided, marched against it as soon as he knew it was reunited.* The public danger had brought together to him not only

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⁽o) Note XIV.

Polyb. Hist. B. 9.

all that were able to bear arms in the territories of Sparta, but also among the allies who continued faithful. He had resolved to offer battle to the Thebans as soon as he could come up with them, persuaded that their army must be totally demolished, should it be defeated in a country ready to avenge all the mischies of war, which it had experienced ever since their entrance into it. If he had the worst of it, it would be easy to save himself in some retreat, which he had not failed to secure.

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Epaminondas having feen thro' his defigns, took care only to conceal his own from him. To effect this, he ordered his army to leave their camp; he marked out his field of battle, he formed his men, he even fent to reconnoitre some advantageous posts, as if he had a defign of possessing them. As he did not leave his camp till towards evening, and did not return to it till night obliged him, Agefilaus made no doubt but he meant to engage on the morrow; all his army expected it likewife. The conduct and manœuvres of Epaminondas gave them every reason to presume it; but it is the property of great generals, never to be foimpenetrable as when the motive and mystery of their conduct appears to be least concealed. Epaminondas proved it on this occasion.

He had hastened the supper of his army, and his soldiers had taken their meal before they moved out of their camp. They re-entered it on one side only to depart instantly on the other, while Agesilaus thought them in a prosound sleep, they made a forced march all night, and arrived

at day-break in fight of Sparta.

It contained none but what were unable to resist, women, children and old men. Till that time, it had

had no other fortifications than the power and character of the Lacedemonians; it was not even furrounded with walls.

The fate of this most celebrated city depended upon Epaminondas. He had it in his power to take possession of it, and bury its pride under its own ruins. The incensed soldiers were ready to

carry fire and fword into the heart of it.

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Epaminondas judged that little glory would be gained by destroying a defenceless town. checked the ardour of his troops and prevented their attempting any thing. He wisely reflected that the ruin of Sparta, the boast of Greece, and the admiration of the world for feveral ages, would exasperate the minds of all against him, and draw upon him the indignation of mankind. He wished only to deliver his country from an unjust tyranny, by diminishing the overgrown power of Sparta, and he would have been declared a tyrant himself if he had attended only to the resentment of his troops. Aversion to a haughty and insupportable authority had armed all Greece against Agefilaus; the fame principle might induce them to take up arms against the Thebans, who would have imitated the pride of the Lacedemonians had they treated their capital with the utmost rigour.

These restections inclined Epaminondas to spare it. It owed its safety solely to the moderation of that general. A virtue seldom accompanying great successes. Epaminondas never suffered them to gain the ascendant over his reason.* The prudence of the philosopher never deserted him in the enterprising courage of the general. He was therefore contented with having ravaged the country.

^{*} Xenoph. B. 6.

try round Sparta. It was adorned with houses be longing to the principal inhabitants of the town; they were all pillaged and demolished. The woods and groves which embellished them were cut down and destroyed. They were employed to make palisadoes for the camp of Epaninondas, who, even when he seemed not to have the least apprehension of an infult, ever intrenched himself with as much caution as if the enemy had been at his heels.

Agefilaus, informed of the enterprise of the Thebans, haftened with the utmost expedition to the relief of his country. His presence and that of his army could not remove the consternation they were in at Sparta. They expected every instant to see the Thebans with brands in their hands converting this memorable city into a funeral pile. The women all in tears, intreating to be let out with their infants, to escape from their fury. The alarm had thrown the inhabitants into a tumuk and disorder from which they were unable to recover. Agefilaus was obliged to use all his authority to keep them quiet. He issued out the strictest orders that no one should be suffered to leave the town. They obeyed, because they had it not in their power to do otherwise; but it was only in devoting themselves to death, which they looked upon as inevitable. As for himself, heremained quiet, and took no step to drive away the enemy.

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Epaminondas, perceiving he would not come out to him, had the courage to move towards him, and attempt to force him in his capital. He thought it worthy of himself, and the revived valour of his country, to treat the Spartan women with the sight of a battle, and to raise a trophy

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in the very center of their city. This thought flattered him, and he determined upon it with joy. With this resolution, seeing that in vain he dared Agesilaus in the open field, he marched out of his camp, and advanced his army boldly to the banks of the Eurotas which separated it from the town.

Winter was already fet in; the rains and melting of the fnows had fo fwelled the river that the passage seemed impracticable. Epaminondas reached its banks, animated his foldiers, promifed them the victory if they had the courage to follow him, and plunged fwimming into the Eurotas. It cannot be denied that the feafon, and the rapidity of the current, rendered this enterprise extremely dangerous, and perhaps even rash; but there are circumstances in which rashness is rather a virtue than a fault. It is no longer rashness when it is necessary to support the glory of a whole nation, and the reputation of the general at the head of it. Epaminondas, engaged in the heart of Laconia, under the very walls of Sparta, stood exactly in this predicament; this was doubtless what determined him. He had at once every thing to fear and to hope.

While he was crossing the river some one desired Agesilaus to observe it, who could hardly give credit to what he saw. "O, intrepid mor-"tal!" says he, forbidding any opposition to be made to so impetuous a torrent. He retreated as soon as he saw him fairly landed, abandoned one part of the town, and intrenched himself in the center, after having placed guards at all the ave-

The post was excellent; it was an eminence which commanded the whole city. Epaminon-das, satisfied with having put the Lacedemonians

to flight, did not think fit to expose his troops to their despair, supported by a situation so advantageous. He only challenged Agesilaus to single combat, as the author of that war, and all the mischies it had brought upon his country. He also insulted him by some parties which offered him the grossest affronts. It was no longer that king so warm and haughty, who a sew years before could not endure the just replies of Epaminondas in the general assembly of Greece. Adversity, by a woeful change, had shewn him the frail nature of his grandeur; however, in lossing his pride he did not lose his courage.

Danger and necessity recalled the valour of the Lacedemonians, which he constantly kept up both by his orations and example, as great in his miffortunes as in his prosperity; they vigorously re-

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pelled the Thebans in every attack.

Numbers fell on each fide.* The obstinacy of the one in defending the posts entrusted to them, the eagerness of the other to carry them, made these actions remarkably bloody; besides the loss by deaths which inceffantly weakened the Theban army, there were moreover a great many wounded who were unfit for action. A relistance so vigorous on the part of the Lacedemonians, posts so difficult to be forced, determined Epaminondas to make one last great effort. The Thebans charged with their accustomed force and fury; the Lacedemonians fighting not only for the honour of conquest, but for their property, their temples, their existence, their parents, wives, and children, received them with equal resolution, and beat them off with some advantage. The Thebans however could not bring themselves either to give way

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15.

their

way or decline the action, but returned to the charge with a determined spirit, which the heat of the engagement did but increase, insomuch that they renewed the attack. The carnage spread, blood flowed in equal plenty on both sides, and each esteemed it a duty to be lavish of it. last battle was the hottest of all.

Epaminondas perceiving that he lost many men, without gaining any thing, ordered the fignal to be given for a retreat. The foldiers furious, and breathing vengeance, heard it with rage. A blind respect led them to obey it in spite of their repugnance. All repaired instantly to attend the general's orders. He was himself beyond meafure enraged at having driven the Lacedemonians fo near to ruin without being able to complete it. He again fent an herald to defy them into the field, fummoning them, in case of refusal, to acknowledge they were conquered. Agefilaus, proud of his late success, returned answer, that when he chose to decide the fate of Sparta in a general action, he would take the time which he thought the most favourable.

On receiving this reply, Epaminondas, who began to feel the inconveniencies of a fevere feafon, resolved to abandon his enterprise, and departed instantly from Sparta. His army filed off in order of battle on the banks of the Eurotas, without interruption from Agefilaus, who observed their The Thebans over-ran, like conquerors, all Laconia, and did irreparable damages to the posiessions of those who remained firm in their at-

tachment to Sparta.

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If the power of the Lacedemonians was not utterly destroyed, Epaminondas had at least so reduced it, that it would take a long time to repair

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The brevity of the Laconic language, added still to their haughtines; (p) they answered their enemies, they commanded their armies, they performed their military exercises by monosyllables only. A single word, frequently of one syllable, put many thousand men into motion; but the ill success of the war obliged them to lengthen their phrases, and enlarge their expressions. Epaminondas was very witty and merry upon it; and took as much pride to himself for this improvement, as the Lacedemonians had before taken in the conciseness and affected precision of their answers.

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He left glorious monuments of his humanity in Laconia.* The country of the Messenians was the scene of them. After many revolutions, changes of government, long and dissicult wars, this people had been unjustly subdued by the Lacedemonians. Those whom death had spared were condemned by the Lacedemonians to a rigorous banishment, dispersed thro' all Greece; forced even for fear of their conquerors to conceal themselves. These miserable people wandered for near three hundred years from exile to exile, without enjoying the poor liberty of openly regretting their country, and without daring to complain of their missortunes; victims at once to their patriotism, and the injustice of their oppressors.

A few of them were privately fettled at Ithome, a town of their ancient domains. The Athenians had permitted a few others to dwell at Naupactum and Cephalonia, towns in their dependence; others there

^{*} Arist. Rhet. B. 3, Chap. 10. (*) Note XV.

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15. Pauf. in Bect.

LIFE OF EPAMINONDAS. 103

there were, lastly, who thinking they could never get too far from the Lacedemonians, retired even into Sicily, where they gave their name to the

town of Messena.

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Epaminondas, from a spirit of justice and benevolence, which was natural to him, was touched with the cruel perfecution which a people, originally as free as the Lacedemonians themselves, had so long endured. He employed all his attention to collect them together, and to restore to them the possession of a country which had been unjustly taken from them. His generosity went so far as to rebuild their capital at the expence of his own republic. Messena, after three ages of oblivion, rose thus out of her ruins, more fair and formidable than she had ever been. He spent three whole months in restoring the walls and rebuilding the houses. To this purpose did he apply the plunder and wealth of Sparta. The Meffenians revered him ever after as their father, and the father of their country.

For fuch great, and so many favours, he required of their gratitude only, an attention to live well with their citizens and the towns in their dependence. Before his departure, he left a strong garrison in his new Messena, and at length renewed his march for Beotia, the restorer of an oppressed people, and the avenger of the liberties of

Greece.

Messena was situated at the southern extremity of the Peloponnesus, in such a manner, that to gain the isthmus of Corinth, which was the only passage out of that part of Greece into Beotia, it was necessary to pass through all the country of the Lacedemonians.

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LIFE OF EPAMINONDAS. 104

Epaminondas would perhaps have found a good deal of difficulty in effecting it, if Iphicrates, the Athenian general had poffeffed the whole extent of the isthmusses. With near 12,000 men, which he commanded, it would have been easy for him to have fecured all the paffes; but having neglected to seize that of Cenchrea,* which was the most convenient, and the fafest the Thebans could pitch upon to regain their country by, Epaminondas taking that rout, passed it without any ob-Iphicrates, who waited for him in the defiles of Mount Onius, where he lay in ambush, finding he did not appear, fent a detachment of Athenian and Corinthian cavalry to discover what road he had taken, and at what time it was likely he might reach the isthmus; for which purpose, as Xenophon justly observes, a few scouts sent through the country would have been sufficient. Iphicrates was rightly ferved; for while he waited for the Thebans, his whole detachment fell into their hands and was cut to pieces.

In pursuing his rout Epaminondas arrived in fight of Corinth. † He found all the roads covered with felled trees, filled with stones and rubbish, and whatever could render them impassable. The Corinthians intrenched behind this kind of fortification were resolved to defend it stoutly, and to revenge the affront they had received. This fresh difficulty was to Epaminondas only an occasion to gain a fresh victory. He surmounted, with a courage which nothing could check, every thing that opposed his passage. The Corinthians rather terrified at his intrepidity, than overcome by his arms, abandoned their works almost as soon C

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^{*} Xenoph. B. 6. Plut. in Pelop.

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 13. p. 146.

as the Thebans had attacked them. They fled in disorder to Corinth, closely pursued all the way by the enemy, who made a dreadful flaughter; and Corinth, defenceless, must have been obliged to open her gates to Epaminondas, had he chosen to take possession; but whether he was apprehenfive the Athenians might come to their affiftance, whether he suspected some ambush in the defiles, of which he had but an imperfect knowledge, or laftly, whether he was fearful of disheartening his men, exhausted with battles and fatigue, he neglected this conquest, and returned to Beotia, without benefiting from the advantages he had gained over the Corinthians. Winter, which was in its strength, was doubtless, besides, one of the reasons which induced him to pay them so little attention: but however, or whatever it was, his enemies, and those who envied him, did not fail to arraign his conduct on this occasion, and to accuse him of holding a criminal correspondence with the Corinthians.

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After to many fignal exploits, to many battles fought, so many victories gained, Epaminondas and the faithful partner of his glory and labours, Pelopidas, faw again at last their dear, their beloved country. From the lowest degree of humiliation they had raised her to the highest pitch of grandeur, when she was on the point of falling a victim to the ambition of Sparta. She owed these great advantages to the fole valour and ability of the leaders she had chosen; but was envy ever attentive to the calls of gratitude?

Meneclides and his partifans had diffused the poison of their jealousy into the minds of all; the avengers and deliverers of Thebes were looked upon, at their return, as usurpers of the public

authority; the malice of their enemies even gave them the odious name of Tyrants. The violence of these people carried them so far as publicly to declare their iniquitous intentions. That eagerness of the people, which these heroes had a right to expect, those testimonies of general joy they so well deferved, did not appear in the reception they met with from their fellow-citizens. The people, prepossest and prejudiced against them, regarded them only as judges do culprits. Some there were who from reproaches proceeded even to menaces; the most moderate expressed their sentiments by a fullen pensive silence, which discovered their inward indignation at their daring to continue themselves in the command of the army, in despite of the laws.

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Epaminondas bore this unjust treatment like one who wished rather to be useful to his fellow-citizens, than praised by them. The secret satisfaction he felt within, made up abundantly for what the Thebans withheld from him; but Pelopidas, whose ruling passion was the love of glory, could not patiently endure to be deprived of the only recompense he had looked for. He complained bitterly of the accusations brought against them both: his expostulations only hastened the prosecution. The two friends were cited by a decree dictated by inconsiderate rashness and ingratitude. They prepared to give an account of

their conduct.

Pelopidas appeared first.* In answer to his accusers, he openly and boldly explained to the people the shame they brought on themselves, in meanly submitting to be led by an envious faction; he declared loudly against the weakness of the

^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

the one, and the wickedness of the other. profecutors kept steady to the single point of the infraction of the laws of the constitution. added, against Epaminondas, suspicions of holding intelligence with the Corinthians, who they faid had prevailed with him, by promifes, not to punish them as they deserved, and as he had it in his power to do. They concluded with declaring openly, that his death would not be too great an

expiation for his pride and treason.

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Epaminondas, while his own life only was in question, supported with his usual firmness the false charges brought against him; but Meneclides, willing to destroy the foundation of his great reputation, having advised the people to enjoy their prosperity in the luxuries of peace, and for ever renounce war, which would constantly expose them to the ambition of their generals ----"They deceive you, Thebans,"* fays Epaminondas, in full affembly, " in representing repose as " a defirable and advantageous state to you. " these disgraceful councils, Meneclides proposes " that you should forge chains with which you " will foon be loaded, if you attend to him. This " great bleffing, which with fuch complacency he " recommends to you, can be attained only by " the help of arms; to possess it, you must know " how to repel a war, you must know when to de-" clare one: in a word," added he, " the only " way by which you can obtain the empire of "Greece, is war; it is not by the exercises of " wrestling and running that you can acquire it, " it can only be won by real combats and mili-" tary fatigue. If you have the noble ambition

^{*} Corn. Nepos.

" to aim at this supremacy, you must give up the fost tranquillity of your firesides, you must re-

" folve to live only in tents."

Epaminondas's reply was full of wisdom, but it did not justify him for having held the command beyond the limited time. Pelopidas had not produced better reasons; and the people were on the point of condemning both to death; (q) enraged more at the pride which would not allow them to ask pardon for their offence, than at their obstinately persisting not to acknowledge it.

The people, ever governed by the impressions, whether unjust or reasonable, which they receive from those to whom they give their confidence, shewed in their countenances, the decree they were ready to pass. Meneclides and his party encouraged them; their discourses and harangues against the loftiness of the two haughty culprits, had, during the time of the affembly, effectually exasperated the minds of all against them. At length thousands of Thebans pronounced almost in a whisper the fatal sentence; there remained hardly another hope for the two friends, less glorious still than unfortunate, but that of being united in their deaths, as they had been during their lives. Pelopidas on the verge of the scaffold was all that Epaminondas regarded; the danger his friend was in made him forget that he was himself in the same condemnation.*

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To disarm the fury of the multitude, he confessed the fault he had been guilty of in disobeying the law; but he took the whole upon himself. He persuaded his fellow-citizens that it was he alone,

(q) Note XVI.

^{*} Corn. Nepos.

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alone, if we may use the expression, who forced his friend to violate the law, and consequently that he alone ought to bear the punishment for He added, that it would be unjust to punish Pelopidas for an outrage which he only had committed. " I will not employ in my defence, continued he, " the aid and force of eloquence; " I did not expect to appear innocent before you, "O Thebans, except by means of my good for-" tune, and your conquests; since they plead for " me in vain, you may pronounce my fentence. "I am the first to condemn myself, and I con-" fent, if it must be so, to serve as an example; " but, before I die, fuffer me to make yet one re-" quest to you, to the end that posterity in hear-" ing of my punishment may also be informed of " the cause of it. I fuffer death for having hap-" pily led you into Laconia, into which country, " before you, no enemy had been able to pe-" netrate; I fuffer for having carried into their " towns and territories, the defolation which their " army had first brought upon our miserable " country; I fuffer for restoring the Messenians, " for re-uniting the Arcadians, for ruining the " Lacedemonians; I fuffer, laftly, for your vic-" tories, for your conquests, and for having en-" larged your power: behold the crimes for " which I am condemned! Grant me the favour " to preserve the memorial of them to posterity, " cause them to be engraved on my tomb-stone, " that the reasons of your sentence may be there " consecrated to immortality. If you promise " me this last satisfaction I shall die without re-" gret."

So pathetic a speech brought all back to a right way of thinking. It undeceived the majority of the

the audience. They perceived the horrible injustice they were about to commit; they rose from their seats and declared the accused fully

acquitted.

Meneclides and his base accomplices alone persisted in their irreconcileable hatred. The successes of Epaminondas and Pelopidas were enemies they could never pardon for the degree of contempt into which they were fallen. If they were unable to destroy these two great men, they had at least the satisfaction of seeing them excluded from the government. This envious cabal gave is chiefs worthy of itself, without talents, without virtue, and without experience. Inconsiderately raised to the first employments, their elevation served only to make their fall the more disgraceful; the common lot of those whom ambition and intrigue iniquitously raise to important stations.

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Epaminondas, by being stripped of his command, returned to the strict subordination of the poorest and most ignoble Thebans; a citizen without authority in peace, a common foldier in time of war. He bore this degradation like a real philosopher, as a defirable favour; it restored him to his former tranquillity, and to that leifure free from public business, so effential to the cultivation of the sciences. Parade and vain glory had no part in the profession he made of love for the sciences, which improve the mind and regulate the movements of the heart. A philosopher for his own immediate benefit, in his enquiry after truth and wisdom he looked for them only. After so many bold enterprises, crowned with success, he was as plain and humble as the most obfcure citizen with whom he condescended to converse. His

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His implacable enemy, Meneclides, thought to take advantage from this retired fituation to gratify the hatred he constantly kept up against him. He watched his conduct, and weighed all his actions in the balance of the most envenomed jealoufy. There were few which this passion did

not represent in a bad light.*

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Epaminondas lived a bachelor (r) and had no children. Meneclides thought this was one way to render him contemptible. He publickly reproached him with fetting himself above Agamemnon, as if he had acquired as much glory as he, and had had children to facrifice as readily to the fafety of Greece, were it necessary, as that prince had done. "It is true," Epaminondas answered him, piqued at his perpetually repeating this fort of reproach, " I am not married, and I " have no children; but why should that offend " you? Why do you feem to be troubled at it? " If I choose to take a wife, you are the last per-" fon I would confult on fuch a subject." Meneclides, who lived on a bad footing with his lady, and who was stigmatized as an open adulterer, was forced to hold his tongue.

His other charge succeeded no better. "You " really think, then, Meneclides," fays Epaminondas to him, " that I am envious of Aga-" memnon's fame; you are very much mistaken.

" What did this king, whom you so highly com-" mend, and of whom you fay I am jealous, do?

"Was not he employed ten long years in re-" ducing a fingle town? And have not I been

" so fortunate, as to overthrow, if I may use the expression,

^{*} Corn. Nepos.

⁽r) Note XVII.

" expression, the power of Sparta in one day, and

" to restore all Greece to liberty?"

From the force of these replies, Meneclides at last perceived that it was dangerous to push too far, the modesty of a man whose actions were his eulogy. One single truth of the nature of those which Epaminondas told him on this occasion, blunted the keenest shafts of envy, and retorted on itself that shame and confusion which it laboured to cast upon virtue. His neglect of his person and love of poverty, without doubt exposed Epaminondas to this persecution.

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Pelopidas, who in the lap of abundance held riches in no higher estimation, was treated with more respect by Meneclides. He was warm, impetuous, and impatient of affronts; in insulting him, he must have been prepared to give a reason for it, a risk which Meneclides did not chose to run; consequently the attacks he made upon his character were more secret, and conducted

with more address.

An eminent artist painted a piece for the town of Thebes.* Meneclides prevailed with him to choose for his subject the battle which Charon had gained some time before that of Leuctra. This was offering the grossest affront to Pelopidas and Epaminondas. The latter did not seem to perceive it; but Pelopidas enraged that this combat, which was but a skirmish, should be thus preferred before an engagement, which had secured the safety of Thebes and the liberty of Greece, openly declared his resentment. He assembled the people whose affections he had conciliated by his unremitting generosity; he informed them that it was Meneclides who had induced the painter

^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

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thus to infult him, and to deprive him of an honour equal to his highest ambition. He did Charon, in attacking Meneclides, all the justice which was due to him; but he remonstrated with the people, that it was not customary to honour only one individual for publick successes: nay, that it was even good policy to refer them to the nation at large. At length he unmasked Meneclides, and shewed him in his true colours; envious, restless, turbulent, employed only in the mischievous office of sowing discord amongst the better and more illustrious citizens, and capable of setting the whole state in a ferment, if they did not inslict some exemplary punishment upon so execrable a character.

Pelopidas had no occasion to expatiate farther on the subject; the people, ever the adorers, and too often the flaves of their benefactors, underfood quickly from his discourse what he wished. Meneclides, the just victim of his own cabals and ly intrigues, was unanimously condemned to pay a fine in atonement for his feditious attempts. It was so large, that being unable to raise the money, he was obliged to fly his country; but not, however, without first endeavouring to make an insurrection in his favour. Having nothing more to fear, he threw off all disguise, and openly distovered the most dangerous citizen that Thebes maintained within her walls. But such heads of parties are rarely supported in adversity; they have many partisans, but not one friend: prospeity brings flatterers and followers, who in adverity abandon them without shame, as well as without regret.

Thus did Pelopidas vindicate his own and his friend's character. He did not feem to fuffer any Vol. II.

thing from their joint difgrace; that liberality which was one of his most amiable qualities, attached to him, more and more, those affections which Meneclides wished to draw away from him. Epaminondas, who in the poverty he admired could not employ the same means to gain the love of the people, did not receive the same testimonies of zeal and attention: however, for all this apparent difference, both were equally happy. Pelopidas enjoyed his reputation of a generous citizen, Epaminondas the comforts of philosophy; and both the one and the other desired no more.

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After some years of peace, the war was renew. ed with more warmth than ever; Alexander, the brother and fuccessor of Jason in the throne of Pheres, was the original cause of it. The oppressed Thessalians groaned under the tyranny of their new master. This insatiable bloody monster carried his cruelties beyond the usual bounds of humanity; all his subjects dreaded him as an executioner, nor did any individual amongst them ever recognise in him the heart of a father. His wretched people recollected that Jason had some time before formed an alliance with the Thebans, whose republic was at that time the most formedable power of Greece. Never had the unhappy whom she was able to assist, applied there in vain. Messena, heretofore ruined and deserted, repeopled with its former inhabitants by the care and generofity of Epaminondas, was to those afflicted with the like calamity, a pledge of the like protection. According to the then reigning manners at Thebes, the defence of the unfortunate appeared to the Thessalians the most honourable

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They sent as secretly as possible, to implore the sistance of the Thebans; their deputies fortuately applied to Pelopidas, who was then at Thebes. The recital of the cruelties of Alexander, excited in him as much horror against the tyrant as he selt compassion for his oppressed subjects. The republic appointed him to go and remonstrate with him on the excess of his iniquities, and to declare that the cry of innocent blood would not be heard there in vain, unless he ceased to shed it.

Pelopidas departed immediately upon his embassy, and soon arrived in Thessaly. He indifcreetly suffered several bodies of the Thessalian roops to accompany him in his journey; in this conduct he departed equally from the forefight of in able captain, and the character of a prudent imbassador. In pursuing his rout, he arrived in he environs of Pharsalia, a town since become minent by the defeat of the great Pompey, who law there the liberty of Rome expire with his expiring party. Alexander marched out immeditely at the head of a large detachment. pidas, supposing he came only to meet him, and to intreat his mediation, took no alarm; he waitd for him with that cool confidence which neither fears nor foresees treachery. Alexander seeing him alone with Ismenias, surrounded him, eized him, and had him carried to the prison at Pheres; his villainy in so doing exceeding the imprudence of Pelopidas.

The tyrant not confidering that the Thebans were in a condition to exact ample justice for such

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a proceeding, treated his prisoner with the utmost Pelopidas, who even in chains had refeverity. proached him with his perfidy rather as a conqueror than a captive, bore this trial with the constancy of a man who knew how to raise himself above ad-Alexander, to humble his pride, produced him as a show to the people of Pheres: they came in crouds to fee him, but rather to pity than infult him. He encouraged these unhappy people, more disheartened with his misfortune than himself, to support the tyranny of Alexander with constancy; he also defired some persons to tell him, that he had little judgment in his cruelties; for instead of putting to death so many innocent citizens, who were incapable of taking vengeance, he ought rather to condemn him, who was inclined to punish all his crimes as soon as he was set at liberty. "Ah! why should this man," faid Alexander, "be fo willing to die?" "It is," answered Pelopidas, to whom this speech was related, " to haften thy punishment, in making thee, by my death, still more odious to men and gods."

This haughtiness, as free and as fierce in chains as if Pelopidas had been at the head of an army, induced Alexander to give orders, that no one whatever should be suffered to see him. It raised the curiofity of Thebé, the tyrant's wife, and who, for her virtue, deserved a better husband. A constancy fo firm in a situation so deplorable, appeared to her worthy of admiration. She caused herfelf to be conducted privately to the prison, to have a fight of this intrepid fufferer. The person of Pelopidas did not, at first, justify the report Thebé had heard of it; that air of grandeur which

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was peculiar and natural to him, was done away by the feverity of his confinement and the inhumanity he was treated with. Thebé contemplated him for some time, and was unable to conceive that so great a man should be hid to such a degree as hardly to be known, under the appearance of the most abject criminal. A just sentiment of compassion succeeded her astonishment; she had not power to testify in words, she could only express it by her tears.

Pelopidas, equally surprised at her conduct and her silence, addressed her first, when he had been informed who she was. This virtuous woman, affected with the situation in which she beheld him, uttered only these sew words: "How I pity your "unhappy wife, and how much do I feel for "her!" "I feel much more for you," answered Pelopidas; "you have your liberty, and yet suffer

" fuch a wicked man as Alexander to live."

These words at first made but a slight impression upon the heart of Thebé; a more particular conversation which she had with Pelopidas after this first interview, inspired her in the event with a courage above her sex: she was so bold as to form a design of delivering her country from a tyrant, in whom she forgot her husband; and she was able to put this plot in execution. We shall see in the sequel the success of so extraordinary an enterprise.

Alexander's cruelty to Pelopidas increased still daily. He had the art to preserve his life, that he might incessantly inslict upon him fresh torments: this is the favourite art and science of tyrants. Alexander carried them, if possible, further than any others. Heaven, which puts a period to im-

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punity, when men put none to their crimes, prepared for him, from that time, the fatal blow which soon after deprived him of his throne and his life.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.



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LIFE

OF

EPAMINONDAS.

BOOK THE THIRD.

THE news of the outrage which Alexander had offered the Thebans, in the person of their ambassador, soon arrived at their capital. This violent incroachment upon rights held sacred among all nations, excited less surprise than indignation; the tyrant was known for a man whose headstrong passions nothing could controul.

The infamous imprisonment of Pelopidas interested all orders of the republic in his missfortune; the people regretted a father, the country a guardian, all good men a friend and protector; one general cry declared war against Alexander. The new polemarchs received orders instantly to take the field, to punish the crime, in loading with chains him who injuriously put them upon virtue. It seems from the conduct of the Thebans, that they did not place much confidence in them: they created a general independent of their authority and their caprices; and Cleomenes, who was invested with this supreme dignity, was, under a new I 4

name, the leading man in the state, and absolute

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mafter of the army.*

Epaminondas, excluded from the command more by his own modesty than the faction of Meneclides, did not hefitate to ferve as a common foldier, rather than abandon Pelopidas; more folicitous of shewing his affection to a dear unhanpy friend, than of the dazzling honours of the highest employments. He was the first that of fered to go to Theffaly, and was enrolled without any distinction but that which envy could not rob him of, the honour of bearing a name as dreadful to his enemies as it ought to have been revered at home. Thus equally profitable to his country in disgrace or in favour, after having taught the officers how to command, he by his example instructed the foldiers how to obey in the most difficult circumstances.

The polemarchs quickly arrived in Thessaly. To conquer, they had only to avail themselves of the ardour of the soldiers. The bare resentment of the injury the republic had received from the tyrant would have supplied every defect; but if it is an happiness to generals to meet with such dispositions in an army, much address is requisite to employ them properly. The polemarchs gave a woeful proof that they were not possessed it. †

It was the genius of the Theban nation, to blame equally the virtues and faults of their generals. It was difficult to discover in the first expedition into Thessaly, the conquerors of the bravest and best disciplined people of Greece. Alexander beat them on every occasion; he pursued them, followed them closely, and at last shut them

* Paus. in Beot. C. 3. † Plut. in Pelop. Diod. Sic. B. 15. up in a small spot which he had laid entirely waste, and from which they could draw no sup-

plies.

The want of provisions reduced them to the last extremity: the loss of their lives seemed to be close at the heels of that of their reputation. The polemarchs could find no expedient to extricate them out of this danger, but that of shamefully abandoning their enterprise. The army received orders to decamp, and apprehended the design of the inexpert leaders, who were inconsiderately set at its head, of returning to Thebes; it was obliged to sacrifice to duty and subordination the grief it selt at leaving Pelopidas in the dungeons of Pheres.

It was in motion to depart out of Thessaly, when Alexander, followed by a detachment of cavalry, fell upon it unawares. The Thebans, pressed on all sides, defended themselves with desperate courage: but what signifies courage when conduct and abilities are wanting in the generals? Alexander's cavalry broke them to pieces; they were all covered with wounds, and those who had escaped unhurt were worn out with satigue. It was all over with that army which victory had so long attended, and which wanted only a head to triumph over its enemy.

In this extremity, the general voice of the foldiers conferred the command upon Epaminondas; all intreated him to accept it, and to repair, if possible, the faults of those who had been so imprudently entrusted with it. The business was so desperate, that to undertake to remedy it, must have been at the risk of his reputation: but the danger of the Thebans, his anxiety for their preservation, such a flattering instance of their esteem

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Every thing that could possibly be done in such a conjuncture presented itself to his mind instantly, and he put it in execution without losing a single moment, with a spirit which belongs only to those who are blessed with that happy quickness, which discovers the evil, the remedy, and the proportion of the means to the desired end.

He ordered some horse, and all the light infantry, to join him. They obeyed with eagerness, and he marched them boldly through showers of arrows, which Alexander's cavalry inceffantly let fly. He formed them in the rear of the retreating army, and by this movement the rear became the front. While Epaminondas made a stand, and repulsed the enemy, the Thebans taking heart rallied, recovered their ranks, and marched in order, in spite of Alexander's pursuit, who soon perceived, from this new manœuvre, with whom he had to do. Content therefore with his former fucceffes, he judged he should only risk them in persisting to push them any farther; he resolved therefore to fuffer the Thebans to retreat unmolested. They departed out of Thessaly, and shortly after arrived at Thebes without any accident.

The first thing the people did was to punish those presumptuous citizens who had arrogantly taken upon themselves a burden they were not able to support; they were each of them condemned in a fine of 10,000 drachmas. The sum was much beyond their abilities, and being incapable of paying it, they were obliged to go into voluntary exile, which was the intention of the decree.

It was necessary after their degradation to give them a successor, and it was no difficult matter to point point out the person on whom the choice of the nation must fall. Epaminondas himself had no doubt but it must be upon him. Before they proceeded to the election, he thought it his duty to inform the Thebans, that the conduct they had held with respect to him, would not in the least flacken that strictness of discipline which he had always enforced amongst them. He told them before-hand, that no unreasonable and weak fear of displeasing them, nor any ambitious desire of continuing in the command, should be capable of inducing him either to fuffer them to remain idle, or to tolerate the least remissiness. " Take care " then," fays he to them, "I declare to you, be-" fore it is too late, if you entrust to me the care " of commanding you, I accept it only for the " fake of leading you to a war which cannot be " fuccessful but by your excelling in labour and "fatigue." For all this warning, both foldiers and people elected him; he was appointed to the government of the state, both civil and military, and the republic issued an order to levy a second army to go against the tyrant of Pheres.

It repaired into Theffaly as foon as it was in a condition to march. Under the new general the fame foldiers formed a very different army. The spirit of Epaminondas, which animated them, made them, if I may so say, other men; the reputation he had acquired, had made him known and respected throughout Greece. At the bare report of his march, Alexander, deserted by his allies, was left almost alone against the Theban army. At Sparta, at Thebes, nay even in Thessally, they expected daily no other news, than that of the punishment he so richly merited, and which

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The inveterate spirit of the soldiers, their attachment to Pelopidas, the ability and good for. tune of Epaminondas, left hardly any room to doubt of victory. But he was not come barely to conquer, his first object was the deliverance of Pelopidas. He prolonged the war. Able to take the greatest advantages, he was not in a hurry to exert his whole force; he even fuffered Alexander to exercise his usual cruelties upon his own subjects, By pushing him to the last extremity, as he had it in his power to do, he would infallibly have induced him to alter his conduct towards them, Pressed by the Thebans, it would have been natural for him to endeavour to regain the affections of the Thessalians. On the other hand, the success of Epaminondas in hastening the destruction of the tyrant, might without doubt have hastened the death of Pelopidas. The apprehension of the loss of his friend, and the return of the Thessalians, induced Epaminondas to use stratagem with an enemy little worthy of it. He amused him for a long time with manœuvres as judicious as they were various; careful above all not to lofe fight of him, and to induce him to think, that he only watched for some favourable opportunity to give him battle.

Alexander, under continual anxiety, could not bear the perplexity this conduct threw him into. The fear of a rebellion of his subjects, the character of Epaminondas, and possibly more than all, the workings of his own conscience, if he was still sensible of them, heightened the danger incessantly in his eyes; so that he saw no other remedy

^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

medy for the disagreeable situation he was reduced to, but the hope of conciliating the Theban

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For this purpose he sent ambassadors to him, who after having in vain attempted to justify their master's conduct solicited peace of him: They concluded with assuring him, that Alexander was ready to accept of such terms as he should name.

Epaminondas answered the ambassadors, that he should think he dishonoured his own name and that of the Thebans, in treating with a tyrant as with an ordinary enemy; that he had entered his country with the design of forcing him to an account for the outrage he had been guilty of to Pelopidas; that the sole mean of repairing so attrocious a violation, was setting Pelopidas at liberty; and that a truce would suffice to regulate what was necessary to be done previous to that step.

Alexander, on receiving the report of the ambaffadors, accepted the truce. The preliminary article on which it was founded, and without the due observance of which it could not continue, was the enlargement of Pelopidas and Ismenias.

At length, after a most severe and dangerous captivity, this illustrious prisoner was set at liberty; the pleasure of owing it to Epaminondas rendered it still more valuable, from the affection he had for him. What transport must not a most generous and sensible heart feel, in seeing at once, and if I may so say, at one glance, the light, his friend, and his deliverer! To have any idea of it, it is necessary to have experienced the delights of the most lively and sincere friendship, formed by the assemblage of the most amiable virtues.

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Epaminondas had been drawn into Theffaly by the defire only of delivering Pelopidas. As foon as he had fucceeded in his undertaking, he retired, and left to Heaven the care of punishing a tyrant, whom the safety of his friend had obliged him to spare, and whom honour and good-faith would not permit him to attack, after having granted him a truce. The marks of joy express. ed by the Thessalians, by the army, and by the feveral people they passed through, was the sole triumph of the friend who opened the prison, and of the friend who was fet at liberty. These accompanied them as far as Thebes, where they arrived without any enemy daring to attempt to interrupt their march. They were there received with acclamations of joy by their relations, their friends, and all ranks of the republic.

The Lacedemonians in the mean time kept the peace with the Thebans, only as long as was necessary to put themselves in a condition to distress them with more certainty by a war. Agesilaus and the Ephori sent Antalcidas (t) on an embassy to the court of Persia. Their design was to engage Artaxerxes to guarantee a treaty of peace, which he had proposed to Greece, and which the Thebans alone, they said, incited by Epaminondas, resused to ratify. The Athenians also sent Timagoras to the court of Persia with the same views; but Artaxerxes, whom the Greeks called the Great King, would exert his power only to do

them justice.

Antalcidas, however, found means to deceive his equity, in representing matters to him unfairly. This reason prevailed with the Thebans to appoint also an ambassador, who might support their interests with Artaxerxes, in declaring the truth to him. Pelopidas was unanimously chosen for this important negociation: his birth, his reputation, his magnificence, his knowledge of mankind, and his address in managing them, his constancy proved by adversity, would give his embassy much more weight and consequence than he derived from it.

When he arrived at the court of Artaxerxes, the fatrapes, the generals, all the great officers of the palace and state, paid to his fame and virtue the flattering homage of their esteem and admir-A few years before, the Lacedemonians had made this formidable power tremble; their arms had shaken to the very foundation the kingdoms of Susa and Echatana. The Thebans, or rather Epaminondas and Pelopidas, had so effectually reduced the power and authority of Sparta, that they had forced this haughty republic to confine herself within the borders of the Eurotas. The Persians could not keep their eyes off a general, who had on all occasions routed the conquerors of almost all the nations with whom they had waged war.

His political talents were not inferior to his military: he gained the affections of Artaxerxes, in proportion as he became known to him and entered into his character; convinced, that when once the heart is preposses, it is easy to win the judgment. That prince imbibed so strong a prejudice for him, that he could not prevent the other ambassadors from observing it: he however, shewed Antalcidas the highest marks of distinction; he even went so far, as one day to present him his crown, after it had been persumed with the most costly essences: but he did this honour less to the

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Lacedemonians than to the former consequence which this nation had acquired throughout the world. The prince's heart exerted itself without parade and without constraint with Pelopidas; policy alone directed his conduct towards Antalcidas: a friend and intimate, if I may fo speak, with the one, and a fovereign with the other.

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The fuccess of Pelopidas's embassy shewed how far he was able to bring Artaxerxes over to his views and the interests of his country. Whatever he asked was granted him. Sparta laid claim to the fovereignty of Greece; all their towns were declared independent. Messena rebuilt and repeopled by Epaminondas, was confirmed in the enjoyment of her original liberty. The Lacedemonians were the only people of Greece with whom the king of Persia had hitherto condescended to enter into a particular alliance. The Thebans were declared friends and allies of Artaxerxes, and their descendents, for ever.

The departure of Pelopidas did him no less honour than his residence. While the other ambaffadors greedily received all forts of prefents, he accepted only of what was necessary to shew his fellow-citizens, as proofs of the favour and good-will of the prince. He carried home with him only the esteem of the Persians; but the rest were loaded with the contempt and curses of the

people along with their treasures.

While the affairs of the Thebans took fo favourable a turn in Persia, Epaminondas was employed in improving more and more the manners of his fellow-citizens. That species of men born in obscurity, whose affurance and address is their best qualification, whose poverty is their whole inheritance, and who by cunning know how to proture in a hurry the riches and confequence which nature has denied them, began now to appear in Greece. They had administrators of the public revenues, who knew how, out of them, to repair the injuries of fortune. Epaminondas well informed of the malversations of one of these vermin, resolved to make him disgorge a part of his iniquitous plunder. A friend of his, reduced by his virtue to the lowest indigence, came to implore his affistance. Epaminondas sent him in his name, to demand 600 crowns of the receiver, whose peculation he was acquainted with. This man, aftonished, ran hastily to ask Epaminondas, it what his friend had fignified to him was true; and his reason for so doing? "Because, answered "Epaminondas, he whom I fent to you is reduced "to extreme poverty, only by adhering to the "nicest probity; and that you are grown very "rich, only by having unconfcionably robbed "your country." The receiver did not think it adviseable to appeal from fo well-founded a fentence, he instantly paid the 600 crowns, in which he had been condemned; an act of justice, as speedy, as it was profitable to the state, from which the fubtlety of eloquence, and the corruption of judges, had not as yet found the means of elcaping.

Thus did Epaminondas, without touching the funds of the republic, contrive to provide honourably for virtuous citizens, who miferably languished in indigence. Whenever there was at Thebes any young woman whose parents had lest her no other fortune but beauty and virtue, he condemned the receivers general, to portion her: sometimes from a love of benevolence, his ruling passion, which might seem excessive, he went so

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Vol. II. K far,

far, as to force, if I may so call it, his friends, out of their abundance, to contribute to relieve the distresses of these unhappy persons. When they were married, and when he gave them the fortune which his generous care had collected, he named the benefactors to whom they were obliged, that they might shew their gratitude to them.

He had conceived fuch an aversion to the spirit of self-interest and avarice, that he would not spare any individual. One of his armour-bearers, having on a time received a vast sum for the ransom of a prisoner, Epaminondas sent for him. "Bring me "my buckler, says he to him, with a well-sounded "indignation; and go spend the remainder of your life in drunkenness and gluttony, which is doubtless what you propose to yourself, in basely amassing great riches: they will have too many charms to suffer you ever hereafter to expose yourself in battle, as you did when you were poor."

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A feverity so inflexible, restored infensibly good order in the finances, and fidelity amongst those to whom they were entrusted. The abolition of impunity kept at length the most greedy avarice

within the bounds of moderation.

This reform in the handling and administration of the revenues being so happily begun, Epaminondas applied himself entirely to another object of equal importance to the glory and well-being of his country.* This was the establishment of a marine, capable of making head against the Lacedemonians, and above all against the Athenians. These two people drew both in war and peace, the greatest advantages from their sleets: they gave them such weight with their neighbours, that Epaminondas

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15.

which

Epaminondas could not without jealoufy, behold them enjoy exclusively an advantage which it depended only on the Thebans themselves to partake of.

Beotia had on her coasts places the most commodious for establishing ports: rich forests, abounding in timber, the most proper for navigation, covered her mountains; her inhabitants were industrious, fond of labour; nothing was wanting to enable them to have a formidable navy but a taste for it. Epaminondas had already inspired the majority with it; nothing remained but to take advantage of the savourable disposition he

had raifed in them.

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For this purpose he convoked an assembly of the people, to whom he proved in a fet speech, how much a powerful navy had contributed to the distinction which Sparta and Athens had acquired; then artfully railing the jealousy of the Thebans, he made them perceive how difgraceful it was to them, that these two nations should divide among them the empire of this vast element, without effecting them, to use the expression, as any thing. He added, that if they had the ambition to take advantage of their good fortune, it depended on themselves alone, to be as well respected at sea as on thore; that they had in the late wars laid up immense riches, which could not be applied to a more noble or useful purpose, than the construction and equipment of a fleet; that he was not ignorant that young as they were in the knowledge of fea affairs, they would have occasion for the practice and experience of fuch of their neighbours whom time and habit had made perfect in them; but that nothing was more easy than to find out those aids essentially necessary at first, and

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which a knowledge, not hard to be acquired, would foon enable them to do without; that the people of the isle of Rhodes, of Chios, and several others, would eagerly seize this occasion of being serviceable to them; in a word, that to obtain among the Greeks the empire of the sea, as they had already gained that of the land, inclination to share it with their neighbours only was wanting.

The plan was so well laid, the proportion of the means to the end was so evident, that the Thebans could not avoid perceiving the utility of the new establishment. Hardly had Epaminondas left off speaking, when the people passed a decree, in which they ordered that he should provide a sleet of 100 gallies, of which he was to build a

part, and purchase the rest.

It was most probable that the Athenians, ever jealous neighbours, would oppose the execution of this design with all their might. The same decree directed the levying an army to go and take possession of Rhodes and Chios, where the Thebans had resolved to learn the art of navigation. Epaminondas was appointed general; and animating the ardour of the public by his own exertions, he applied them so well, that in a few days he departed to take possession of the two islands.

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The Athenians, as had been foreseen by the Thebans, sent Laches, one of their best sea officers to oppose their attempt; but the name of Epaminondas, and the character of his troops, rendered their armament ineffectual. The Thebans took possession of Rhodes and Chios, almost in sight of the enemy's sleet, which durst not even attempt to prevent their landing. Thebes, by this means, soon made great strides towards the empire

empire of Greece on both elements. What had not her enemies to dread, when these new forces, acting in concert with the troops, should attack them on all sides?

Nothing was wanting to Epaminondas but length of days, to raife his country to the fove-reignty of Greece by fea, as well as land; but death feems to delight in taking off great men, in the full career of their glory. Thebes, raifed from the lowest and most obscure situation to the highest degree of power she could wish, was deprived at length of the two restorers of her glory and her liberty; she sunk again soon after their decease into the insignificancy, out of which they had, if I may use the expression, forced her.

While indulging in the prospect of her newlyacquired greatness she seemed to enjoy a profound tranquillity, shew as upon the brink of the greatest danger that had ever threatened her. Several exiles, despairing of their recall under a government fo severe as that of Epaminondas, determined to feek their pardon in the destruction of the state. They perfuaded the restless and factious spirits, that power divided amongst several magiitrates was much more gentle, and had much greater advantages, than a popular government. They argued that this change would not be attended with fo many difficulties as they might magine, and undertook to establish an aristocracy at Thebes, provided they would fecond their zeal and courage.

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by the This was fufficient to engage a party.* All, whose irregular conduct and ruined fortune had lest them no hope but in the abolition of the K 3 ancient

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 11.

ancient laws, were eager to enroll their names

among the conspirators.

The eloquence and address of the chiefs procured allies who were to furnish them with power-ful assistance, when they declared themselves. The blow was so much the more dangerous, as it was meditated and conducted by Thebans. They were acquainted with the town; they knew at what time it might be most easily surprised. There was a particular day, on which the inspectors reviewed the arms; this was the day, when the town would be lulled in security, which the conspirators fixed upon for the destruction of all who wished to op-

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pose their designs.

The mortal blow which threatened Thebes, awakened the love of their country in the hearts of the least violent. Epaminondas, Pelopidas, all the most valuable citizens were to feal the new reform with their blood. That kind of esteem virtue ever commands, touched hearts that trembled even before the crime, and made them behold with horror the abominable facrifice of the firmelt prop of their republic: reflection made them ashamed of their conspiracy, and shame opened a way to repentance. With these dispositions, they went in fearch of Epaminondas, and informed him of the plot that was agitating against Thebes and against himself. Their pardon was the reward of their discovery.

The rest of the conspirators actually sell upon Thebes on the day agreed upon; they were attended by 300 horse, which the Orchomenians had sent to sustain them. The Thebans being instructed, waited for them in good order; they soon overcame them, and not one escaped. They were carried directly before the people; their conduct

conduct was their conviction; they were con-

demned to death, and instantly executed.

The Orchomenians, their accomplices, who looked only for an occasion of rising, were treated with the same severity: to prevent in future the like treachery from them, it was determined to raze their town. The troops marched thither with the spirit of revenge; Orchomenus was carried on the first assault; all the inhabitants were put to death without mercy; they spared only the women and children, who were condemned to perpetual flavery: a fevere and dreadful vengeance, but too justly merited by fickle and jealous neighbours, who had profuned the facredness of their alliance with the Thebans, by the blackest perfidy. Epaminondas was willing to leave a warning to traitors who might be fo abandoned and wicked, as to follow the example of the Orchomenians.

Hardly had the Thebans laid down their arms after this bloody execution, when they were obliged, by the troubles of Theffaly, to refume them.* The hopes of impunity had thrown Alexander again into his old character. To fatisfy his cruel and infatiable lust for blood and murder, he destroyed whole towns, and put to death, with the most unheard of tortures, their unfortunate inha-The cry of the blood which flowed bitants. through all parts of this defolated country, came a lecond time to the ears of the Thebans. They had already attempted to lighten for the Thessalians a yoke so insupportable; but on the contrary they had only added to the weight of it, by the relentment the tyrant felt against subjects who had

implored the affiftance of strangers.

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^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

The desperate Thessalians, who daily experienced the most deplorable consequences, sent a second deputation to their generous desenders; they sound in them the same compassion for their sufferings: all they asked was granted them. An army of 7,000 sighting men received orders instantly to go and relieve them from their oppression, and Pelopidas was appointed general, agreeably to their wishes. The personal injuries he had received from the tyrant, increased the considence they had in his prudence and his valour, appro-

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ved on fo many occasions.

Pelopidas having prepared every thing for this expedition, an extraordinary accident alarmed his army. The fun was eclipfed just as it was ready to move out of the town, and this eclipse was looked upon by the multitude as an ill omen. The diviners having been confulted about the event which the gods foretold, by this supposed prodigy, answered that the eclipse was an infallible presage of the total defeat of the army, and of the death of Pelopidas, if he went into Thessaly. vulgar, equally superstitious as ignorant, felt the whole terror of the interpretation. Those foldiers, accustomed to look death in the face with firmness, shrunk back at the phænomenon; they even declared openly their repugnance to the Theffalian war.

Pelopidas laid no constraint upon them; he only said, that he would be content with such as would turn out volunteers, and follow him.* They were a small number; for all that, Pelopidas put himself at their head, and departed with the deputies, to go to the assistance of the Thessalians; he collected on his march some bodies of troops, which

^{*} Before the Vulgar Æra 365.

which came to join him, and with this handful of men, prefuming too much on the justice of heaven and his own courage, he hastily gave battle to Alexander, who had above three times his force. The imprudence of this great man, so inconsistent with his character, carried his inconsiderate ardour so far as to make him guilty of another instance still more inexcusable: in exerting the valour of a common soldier, he gave up the glory of a wife

general.

His army gave way on all fides, and was on the point of being totally defeated. He halted at the head of his difordered troops, looked out for Alexander, discovered him, and followed by a large body of Thebans, he defied him, as foon as he got within hearing, to fingle combat. tyrant, instead of accepting the challenge, retired haftily into the midst of his guards. Pelopidas, charged, broke the front ranks, did every thing that could be expected from his courage, and fell at last oppressed by numbers: the sad but just wages of inconfiderate rashness, which led him to expose at once his own life, which he lost, and that of his men who were zealous enough to avenge it. They shewed on this occasion what refentment for the loss of a beloyed general is capable of effeeting. After being formed again around the body of Pelopidas, the horse and foot at once charged Alexander's army; they threw it into disorder, broke through it, bore down all that opposed their fury, and killed three thousand men on the field of battle.

A victory fo compleat, was not sufficient to allay the grief of the army. Some cut their hair to express it more forcibly; others, from the same motive, deprived their horses of the ornament of their

their manes. The wounded, inconfolable, refolved to fuffer their lives to run out with their blood, rather than permit their wounds to be dreffed; those who had received no wounds, took no nourishment to restore their strength, after the satigues of such a sierce and bloody engagement. The whole army seemed to esteem it a crime, to have survived a general, who had sacrificed his life in attempting to deliver them from the yoke

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The fole hope of giving more lasting testimo. nies of their affection and gratitude to the illustrious deceased, prevailed with them to moderate their despair, that they might be able to perform the last duties with a magnificence worthy of The Theffalians went in a themselves and him. body to intreat the few Thebans who had followed him, to grant them the exclusive honour of washing his wounds, embalming his body, and ordering his funeral. The favour was too flattering to the nation, to be refused. The Thessalians signalized their zeal by every means that could contribute to the splendour of the sad ceremony of conveying home the body of Pelopidas. The funeral procession commenced in their own country, and ended only at Thebes. In all the towns through which it passed, the people, the magistrates loaded with presents, and the priests clad in facred vestments, came respectfully to mingle their grief with the grateful tears of the Theffalians. The greatest honours which were conferred on Pelopidas, were those he received after his death: Rewards most flattering to his memory, and fully fufficient to excite the love of those virtues, by the practice of which he had deserved them. Not a heart but must be affected with the bare recital of them;

them; and what sentiment can arise from mature reflection, but a secret wish of one day obtaining the like, which necessarily includes that of imitating those great men, whose glory, acquired by talents and virtue, we see crowned at last with the lamentations and encomiums of all nations?

Thebé soon heard of the death of Pelopidas; the conversations she had with him in the prison of Pheres, had first raised in her soul that horror which she conceived against her husband. She construed strictly the reproof he had given her, for suffering him to live. She alone was permitted to enter Alexander's apartment.* He was surrounded day and night with a company of wretches, banished from every country for their crimes. A fit guard for so barbarous a prince, whose cruelties would not suffer him to trust the care of his person to subjects whom he governed

with an iron sceptre!

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The death of Pelopidas, brought to Thebe's recollection the counsel this great man had inadvertently given her some years before. Endued with courage above her fex, but at the fame time not sufficiently informed, she had the boldness to attempt the effecting it. Every thing feemed to contpire in drawing her on to this extraordinary purpose: the voice of oppressed innocence, the cry of the blood of fo many wretches, unjustly facrified, perhaps also her own feelings, and the continual dread in which the lived of tharing the fame fate as the miserable victims of her husband's tyranny. Full of these melancholy ideas, she gave herself entirely up to them. She dared, without thuddering, to contemplate the murder of her husband. The facred ties which attached her to him

Plut. in Pelop. Diod. Sic. B. 15. Kenoph. B. 7.

him, were not strong enough to restrain her; she looked upon them as diffolved by fuch repeated crimes, committed without remorfe. horrence they had raifed in her against the tyrant, made her forget the husband; she considered him only as the oppressor, the executioner of his subjects, and possibly, one day or other, the perfidi-

ous author of her own destruction.

Actuated with these sentiments, she conspired the death of the tyrant with his own brothers. She introduced them fecretly into his apartment, while he was afleep. Her own hands were not stained with his guilty blood; but it was nevertheless shed. Alexander fell by the stabs he received from his brothers; but his wife held the lights while they affaffinated him. A death, fays Plutarch, too gentle for fuch an abominable moniter; frightful however in its circumstances, if it is true that nothing is fo cruel, as to perish by the hands of those we love. Thebé, according to the fame author, was the first woman who was so desperate as to attempt the life of her husband and king: a deed always inexcufable, from what motive foever perpetrated.

Alexander's body was delivered to the people, and given up to their refentment. For want of a more substantial vengeance, this enraged mob of wretches, whose fathers, husbands, mothers, and children he had put to death, feized the shadow with their usual rashness and eagerness on such occasions; the corpse of the tyrant was treated with every outrage the refentment of his subjects could load it with. It was at last thrown out to dogs and vultures, like those of the vilest

criminals.

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Thus the intrepidity of one woman, capable of the most daring resolution, compleated the vengeance for the death of Pelopidas, which his army had so gloriously begun. The melancholy charge arrived at length at Thebes. It there received the tribute of tears and forrow which it merited. History does not inform us how Epaminondas supported a stroke which he must have felt very sensibly: perhaps by his silence, by which he wished to preserve the character of a philosopher, which the inconsolable affection of a friend could not support with sufficient constancy. Such trials have ever been too hard for virtue, though the

best prepared against all events.

To any other than Epaminondas, fuch a loss would have been irreparable. Death robbed him at once of a friend, who was the comfort of his life; a companion, who shared the weight of government with him; a counfellor, who affifted him with his advice in all difficult cases; and a colleague, in the command of the army, who was able in desperate circumstances, to second the prudence of the general with the boldnels of the foldier. However, Epaminondas, deprived of these essential aids, appeared only to greater advantage. When he had the fole charge of the reins of government, he surpassed the fame he had acquired while Pelopidas was living; it was fo much the greater, as his modefty had no longer any pretence for sharing it with another.

A short time before the death of Pelopidas, the king of Persia had sent an ambassador to Thebes;* he was charged with powers under the prince's seal, to receive from Greece the oath of the alli-

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ance he had renewed with them, and which he hoped they would at the same time enter into with the Thebans, who had been excluded out of the first treaty by the violence of Agesilaus. This was the most terrible blow to the liberty of Greece: she felt it; and thus, says Xenophon, the projects of empire, which the Thebans had secretly meditated, all vanished.

The deputies of the feveral states, who were met at Thebes to take the oath to the Persian ambassador, in the name of his master, would by no means consent that the Thebans should be comprehended on the same footing as Sparta. The ambassador refusing to receive their ratifications, unless they swore also to protect Thebes with all their forces, when occasion required, all returned home rather than submit to this demand.

It was equally dangerous to the Thebans to attempt forcing the states to obey, and not to support the step which the king of Persia had taken in their favour. Epaminondas, to fave the reputation of his country, without running too great a risk, determined to oblige the Acheans only to make an alliance with her. The Arcadians, who were inseparably united with them, rendered this people very powerful; their country bordered upon Beotia, and it was of much more confequence to the Thebans, to subdue or gain them, than those who were more distant. With this defign, Epaminondas made a fudden irruption into the territories of the Acheans; while they thought themselves in profound security, he appeared before the gates of their towns with an army by fo much the more formidable, as it had never fought without conquering.

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An alarm was spread far and near on his arrival; the fecrecy of his refolves, the quick march of the Theban general, had given the Acheans no time to prepare for their defence; they were obliged to determine to furrender at discretion: the chiefs of the Acheans were ordered by the people to go and implore his clemency. With these resolutions, they repaired to Epaminondas, and confented not only that he should treat them as he pleased, but also to alter their form of government if he judged

it necessary.

Epaminondas fatisfied with their fubmission, told them he had not entered their country to abolish their laws and customs; that he only asked their friendship, and that on all occasions they should receive proofs of that of the Thebans, if they would agree to form an alliance with them, and be attached to their interest. The vicinity of Sparta, ever ready to take umbrage at the least equivocal conduct of their ancient allies, rendered this a very dangerous alliance to the Acheans, and particularly to the Arcadians; but the mischief they apprehended from that quarter was diffant, and that which menaced them from the Thebans was immediate. They therefore determined on a treaty with them, and folemnly took the accustomed oaths to observe it with good faith. Epaminondas, who defired no more, returned directly with his army into Beotia, without doing the least damage to their territories.

He had not marched far, when these people already fancying they saw the Lacedemonians coming to demand the reason of this forced alliance, fent to intreat him not to leave them to the vengeance of the Spartans, by leaving them defenceless. Their request appeared to him rea-

ionable:

fonable; and to fecure them from the refentment of those ancient masters of Greece, he established Theban Harmostæ (u) in their towns, and lest them good garrisons. By this prudent conduct, a bare preparation for war happily extorted from his neighbours what they had resuled to listen to

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About the same time, the Corinthians gave a strong proof of fidelity to their ancient allies the Lacedemonians, which induced Epaminondas to grant them all they defired of his country. They were embarraffed with a difficult and dangerous The Athenians, who had declared against them, attacked them both by fea and land. The fresh levies of horse and foot which the Corinthians had raifed in a hurry, had enabled them to make a vigorous resistance; they not only stoutly defended Corinth against the attempts of the Athenians, but even beat them on feveral occasions. In fpite of these advantages, both their liberty and government must have been destroyed, had the Thebans, availing themselves of circumstances, joined their numerous enemies. The former conduct of Corinth towards Thebes, was not fuch as would tend to lessen their fears. She had but too just reason to dread both her power and resentment; she could not however with prudence propose an alliance with her: she would by that step infallibly draw upon herself the hatred of the Lacedemonians, who would not fail to do themselves immediate justice for her breach of faith. The territory of Corinth was fituated between Sparta and Thebes, the two most powerful republics of Greece: that which the Corinthians should declare against, would easily take vengeance. Their policy

licy found out a mean between these two dangerous extremes.

The council of Corinth sent an envoy to the Thebans to ask peace. Epaminondas in the name of the people granted it. As soon as the envoy reported this answer to his fellow-citizens, they ordered him to propose to the Thebans to permit their allies to meet them at Thebes, with intent that they who were for war might be authorised to carry it on, and that those who preferred peace, might have it confirmed to them. Their proposal being again accepted, they sent a deputation to the council of Sparta, to obtain their consent to the treaty of peace they desired.

The deputies being introduced, spoke thus:*

"Ye fee, O Lacedemonians, your allies and friends, who are come to acquaint you with their intentions, that they may not do any thing

" without your concurrence. All appearances " give room to suppose that you will continue the

" war; as for ourselves, absolutely unable to sup-

" port it, we come to intreat you to allow us to be at peace both with you and the Thebans.

"It is as much your interest as it is ours, to suffer

" our exhausted nation to breathe awhile: by this

" conduct you will preferve allies, who may have

" it in their power to serve you hereaster. On the other hand you will utterly ruin them, if you

" engage them in a fresh war; and you will de" prive yourselves for ever of their assistance."

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re oThe council having heard them, confented that they should make peace with the Thebans. As to us, added they, since the Gods so decree, we will again try the fortune of war. We received Vol. II. L. Messena

[·] Xenoph. B. 7.

Messena from our ancestors; the Thebans want to deliver it from our dominion: to which, be the event what it will, we will never consent.

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As foon as the Corinthians had obtained permission from Sparta, they returned to Thebes, and proposed entering into a treaty of peace. This was not what the Thebans had ever meant: they agreed to admit them into their alliance, but they were by no means inclined to grant them an unconditional peace. The Corinthians replied, that their alliance would be only a change of party, which would not at all fecure them from the war they were anxious to avoid, and that their instructions extended no further than an unconditional peace. They declared their reason for rejecting the alliance of the Thebans, was only that they might not be exposed to the necessity of bearing arms against the Lacedemonians, their constant and continual benefactors.

Epaminondas, understanding the motive from which they acted, applauded their fidelity; it was the more worthy of admiration, as in rejecting the alliance with the Thebans, they were exposed to their resentment, which they were in no condition to withstand: but it was not under the administration of Epaminondas, that hearts so pure and full of rectitude, had any cause to be afraid of explaining themselves. He chearfully granted the peace to them, and any of their allies, who wished to be included in it, on the single condition, that in case of a rupture between the Thebans and Lacedemonians, they should not join either. They kept to it effectually, and observed a strict neutrality in the war which broke out soon after.

The Tegeates and Mantineans were the cause of it. These two people jointly celebrated the Olympian

Olympian Games. This feftival was originally instituted by Hercules, in honour of Jupiter. The long wars which distracted Greece soon after, had put a stop to them. Lycurgus, who knew the great utility of this establishment, revived it with greater fplendour and folemnity than at its institution. By means of these festivals, people not easily governed, and of course with difficulty brought together, affembled punctually once in four years at the place appointed. The exercises of wrestling and running, and the prizes distributed to the conquerors, kept up a warlike spirit in a lively representation: the magnificent rewards, the poems composed in honour of those who gained the victory, nourished in the hearts of all a defire to be distinguished, and to conquer in real combats, when glory and the good of the state should call upon them.

Besides this advantage, the Olympic Games were productive also of many others. All the inhabitants of Greece were collected at the celebration of them: these games became insensibly a kind of convention of the states, where the people deliberated on their joint interests, and on the choice of the methods proposed either to augment or preserve their power. In process of time they became one of the superior tribunals of the nation, where the most weighty affairs relating to it were settled.

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The Mantineans and the Tegeates were, at this time, at war with the Eleans. They debated, at these games, whether it was adviseable to put an end to it, or continue to carry it on. The majority were for terminating it; the Mantineans alone persisted obstinately in the other opinion. Glory was perhaps the pretext for this obstinacy; but their real motive was the sear of being forced,

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when peace was established, to give an account of the treasures of the Temple of Jupiter, which they had impiously plundered during the war. The tumults of war appeared to them the only mean to fecure to themselves impunity; for they could not doubt, that a nation scrupulously observant of whatever regarded divine worship, would feel the whole enormity of it. However, the Tegeates eagerly wished for peace, and declared it was the only step they could prudently take.

The warmth of these disputes imperceptibly produced sharpness on both sides; animosity soon followed; then reason and equity having no longer any controul over minds heated, and anxious to get the better of each other, arms were foon reforted to by both people, to decide the difference

their rupture had occasioned.

As foon as war was declared, each fide took the field, and marched against one another with that furious spirit which characterises civil discords. They engaged in feveral skirmishes with equal valour, which made it doubtful on which fide victory would declare, if they should come to a decisive action.

In this uncertainty they bethought themselves of procuring powerful allies, without reflecting that under the specious name of protectors they

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were about to choose masters.

The Tegeates fent a deputation to Thebes, to implore the affiftance of that republic. Epaminondas feemed to them an invincible bulwark, should they be so happy as to prevail with him to declare for them. The Mantineans had connections with the Lacedemonians; the Thebans had no doubt but Sparta would take them under her protection;

protection; nothing more then was requisite to determine them to support the Tegeates. Thebes by this circumstance had an opportunity of profiting from all the advantages she had gained over Sparta; there was only one great stroke wanting to annihilate the remains of her power: she had the courage to attempt giving that fatal blow to this former mistress, of whom she was now become the rival. Epaminondas for this purpose was appointed general of the army the Thebans sent to the assistance of the Tegeates. As soon as it was able to march, he advanced towards their country with that ardour which usually directed his steps when he was to engage the Lacedemonians.

On the fame of his name and march, the Mantineans repeated their instances at Sparta. council at length granted them troops sufficient to make head against the Thebans: but whether the ill fortune of the Lacedemonian arms in the preceding campaigns had raised some distrust in the Manuneans; whether they wished to oblige Epaminondas to return into Beotia, from the apprehension of a powerful diversion; or whether lastly, with all the fuccours they had collected, they did not think they were strong enough to oppose the famous conqueror of Leuctra, they applied besides to the Athenians, to obtain farther affiftance. The policy of that republic was changed with the fituation of the Thebans. She succoured them in their diffress; she became jealous of them in profperity. The Athenians wanted only a pretence to oppose a power which was daily growing more and more formidable, even to those whose support she had lately implored; they therefore eagerly feized the occasion which now offered of humbling them, They voted the Mantineans considerable supplies

both of horse and foot: Hegelochus, the most able commander they then had, was put at the head of them, and he prepared to lead them without delay to Mantinea.*

Epaminondas informed of their refolve, halted at Nemea, a town of Argolis, through which the Athenians would probably take their rout. He had many views in this conduct. By furprifing the Athenians, as he hoped to do, he reckoned he should lessen the reputation they had all over Greece; neither did he doubt but that their defeat, in emboldening his allies to declare and join him, would alarm the whole Lacedemonian party and encourage those who were so inclined to break the neutrality. He well knew also, that the first fuccesses of a campaign are generally the most vatuable; they raise the spirit of the conquerors, to whom they are happy presages of greater advantages; they depreis those of the vanquished, to whom they feem to portend only further difgrace. Epaminondas was anxious only because he knew the effect they generally produced.

The Athenians disappointed his foresight and conjectures. After staying some time at Nemea, where he remained only because he expected them, he understood they were gone by sea; he was therefore obliged to give up his plan, and to pursue other measures.

He departed from Nemea and repaired to the city of Tegea itself, the capital of his allies, where he lodged a part of his troops. They were better accommodated there than in a camp. Subsistence was easier, conveniences for making the necessary

preparations were much greater, his motions, his defigns were not so easily discovered.

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The enemy appeared feveral times under the walls of the town; but as they constantly posted themselves to advantage, he was unwilling to at-This great man, who reckoned, if I tack them. may fay fo, as nothing the blood of his men, when interest, glory, or the public good reduced him to the fatal necessity of lavishing it, was sparing of it with the attention and affection of a father, rather than that of a general, when it was not necessary to shed it. *

The time however passed in inaction; and to such a commander as Epaminondas, not to conquer was almost the same as being beat. The Lacedemonians, who were mafters of the country, prevented the neighbouring towns from declaring in favour of Tegea. Epaminondas, who was much the strongest, had resolved not to attack them till he could draw them into fome difadvantageous fituation, where he might defeat them with little

Agis, who commanded, knew the great abilities of his adversary. Epaminondas having at length left Tegea without offering him battle, he concluded there was fome stratagem concealed under a conduct the motives of which he could not discover. He knew he had every thing to apprehend and to be aware of with the Theban general; bold manœuvres, fudden attacks, hidden marches, every kind of warlike finesse. He took every precaution not to be furprifed. He ordered a detachment of Cretans to observe the army of Epaminondas, and constantly give him an account of all his motions. He had spies and couriers constantly passing between the rear of the Theban army and the camp of the Lacedemonians. The event shewed that L4 the

^{*} Diod. Sic. B. 15.

the precaution was wife; it repaired the imprudence Agis had been guilty of, attracted by plunder, rashly to entangle himself in the country of the Tegeates, in removing to such a distance from Sparta. The vigilance of Agis preserved that city from the fatal blow with which she was threatened.

Epaminondas, who was never to be dreaded more than when to all feeming he appeared to be least so, laid a deep plan of an expedition, of which he alone was capable of forming and executing the design. Agis meeting with no resistance, had constantly penetrated still farther into the lands of the Tegeates, leaving Sparta very far in his rear. All he troops had quitted it. Agesilaus, who was by his great age incapable of commanding, remained there with those who from infancy, sex, and old age, were unable to act in the field.*

Things being thus fituated, Epaminondas refolved to make himself master of Sparta by surprise. His soldiers, who had by his order supped early and taken several days provision with them, marched on all night. Those who were lest to guard the camp were ordered to light fires in the evening as usual, to prevent any suspicion in Agis's

army.

Sparta was without defence, as Epaminondas had conjectured; but Agis, who had intelligence of his march, had fent feveral of his Cretan counters to Agefilaus, to prepare him for this attack. He charged them above all things to defire him not to be alarmed, but to make head against the enemy with the sew men he could collect together in the city and its environs, and that he would be at Sparta time enough to prevent the Thebans getting possession of it.

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Upon this information, Agefilaus had taken every measure that prudence could suggest to oppose Epaminondas. Zeal for his country, love of glory, a defire to preferve his capital in fuch a dreadful extremity, revived his powers, weakened by his great age. He appeared every where with the activity and vigour of a young general. He placed guards at all the gates, and in every street. Old men, children, even the women, all exerted themselves to prevent the mischief which threatened them. The women and children were placed on the roofs, from whence they might annoy the enemy with stones, and any thing else that could incommode them. Archidamas, Agefilaus's fon, who had never been in service, put himself at the head of a handful of young men, ready to shed the last drop of their blood, rather than fly or quit him, and determined to appear wherever the danger was most pressing.

In the mean while Epaminondas made his appearance. He foon perceived that his fecret had taken wind; he however entered the town, but did not advance towards the center. It was built on an eminence almost impossible to be forced, as well from its situation as the ease with which the Lacedemonians might pour upon his people continual showers of stones. He remained in the lower town, where Archidamas with his small party performed prodigies of valour. Though infinitely inferior, he shewed that nothing can withstand courage, strengthened by despair. He attacked the Thebans with a fury that made every thing give way to it: he routed them every where, and made

an incredible flaughter.

In the mean time Agis advanced with all possible expedition. The Arcadians, who were possessed

fessed of a considerable body of troops, and had not as yet declared for either side, might perhaps join him; by this means his army would be at least equal to that of the Thebans. These reslections determined Epaminondas to give up an enterprise, from the secrecy of which he had alone hoped for success. He quitted Sparta and regained Tegea, whence he had a short time before taken his departure. The satigue of a forced march, the warm reception they met with at Sparta, had tired his troops; he thought it necessary to grant them some repose: for this purpose he halted some days at Tegea, to give them time to recover, and enable them shortly to take the field for fresh enterprises.

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Nothing fucceeded with Epaminondas in this campaign. Fortune, fays Diodorus Siculus, was adverse to him in every thing. She seemed to delight in distipating his fairest hopes; but she has little influence on the minds of great men, and her frowns, as well as her favours, are indifferent to them.* When perfeverance and prudence cannot make her propitious, they are as great in their misfortunes as in their most glorious successes, A project which depend not on human wildom. that miscarried, was to Epaminondas only an opportunity of displaying the fertility and extent of his genius. Several at once offer themselves to an able commander, he is at a loss which to prefer; when that which he has fixed on unhappily milcarries, he knows how to form another. Epaminondas failed to surprise Sparta, the ally and the protector of the Mantineans; he resolved to surprise Mantinea itself, and to maintain by this expedition the glory of his arms, and the courage of his troops. Every

* Diod. Sic. B. 16.

of

Every thing feemed to favour this new design. It was the time of their harvest, which would probably employ the greater part of the horses of the Mantineans. Every one being desirous to overlook in person a work, which in securing subsistence secures repose and tranquillity; possibly their town might be as empty of men as of horses, and that they would be scattered over the country.

In this perfuation Epaminondas communicated his resolution to his army. He acquainted them with all the reasons he had to hope for good success; exhorted them not to be disheartened, to purchase by a little satigue an assured reward of glory, and advanced at the head of his brave sol-

diers under the walls of Mantinea.

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The undertaking was worthy of him who formed it; but the most extensive human forelight is confined within narrow bounds. The flightest accident which has not been, and perhaps even could not be foreseen, often frustrates the best concerted plans Such was the fate of the attack on and deligns. Mantinea: it was as Epaminondas had conjectured, without horses and without men; the harvest had drawn out all who were able to work.* Unfortunately the Athenian cavalry, who were at Eleusis a few days before, and which Epaminondas improved to be there still, had moved from thence to take up their quarters at Mantinea. They were but just arrived; they were still scattered in the houses of their friends in the town when Epaminondas appeared. Neither the men nor horses had had time to take any the least refreshment. The danger was so imminent, that the shortest delay would have produced irreparable mischief. The Mantineans, alarmed, threw themselves at the feet of Hegelochus, the Athenian general, to besech him to accept the command, and not to defer succouring them. They represented to him that the Theban army was at the gates of the city, and that there were even in Mantinea some detachments who carried fire and sword wherever they came.

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Hegelochus was a generous ally and a bold captain, he wished only for an occasion to support the honour of his country; and as Greece was then circumstanced, none could be so flattering as that of humbling the Thebans. Any one but himself would perhaps have been alarmed at the danger: he was about to engage the Thessalians and Thebans, that is to say, the most renowned cavalry of Greece. The difficulty of conquering was to him a fresh incitement. He inspired his troops with these sentiments, he distributed one part in the best posts in the town, drew up the other under cover of the walls, and stoutly opposed Epaminondas, who had no expectation of meeting with such enemies.

However, it would have been shameful for the Thebans to have retired, and above all before the Athenians.* They therefore formed in order of battle, attacked them, and brought on the most bloody engagement that had ever been fought. Each side displayed equal valour; the horsemen were so daring as to sight, if I may use the expression, hand to sist; not an arrow, not a stroke of a lance, nor of a sword, but what took place. All, on either side, who could not bring themselves to retreat before death, that is, all the boldest and bravest, were slain.

Epaminondas despairing to conquer troops that fought with such obstinacy, sounded a retreat and moved from Mantinea, after he had demanded of

the Athenians, whom he had left in possession of the field of battle, permission to carry off the dead that remained on it. The Athenians readily granted his request, and he performed the last offices to those illustrious dead, with the concern they were

so justly entitled to.

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So many and such difficult enterprises, a prefence of mind which nothing could disconcert, a fertility of genius that could never be exhausted, retreats as glorious as victories, extorted at lait from Xenophon praises, which equity ought to have drawn from him much fooner.* This however, fays he, is not what strikes us most in the character of Epaminondas; it is neither the elevation of his fentiments, nor the vait extent of his capacity, ever quick at forming the boldest and most extraordinary schemes, which deserve our highest admiration; these he enjoyed in common with most celebrated captains, who place the glory they covet only in what is great and difficult: but to have fo inured his men to fatigue, that they supported day and night without a murmur the feverest labour, that no danger could alarm them; that when they were in want of every thing, they were as orderly as when abounding in plenty, is what cannot be fufficiently admired. If he gave orders that they should hold themselves in readinels as if he meant to engage, every one ran to arms, pointed his lance, and prepared his buckler. Without commanding, it was enough to fignify his wishes, the foldier guessed the rest and obeyed. This was the happy talent which he was bleffed with above all other generals, and which compleats the real character of an accomplished commander.

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The campaign was drawing to a conclusion, and the season proper for warlike operations was very far advanced. Epaminondas felt with pain and a kind of felf-reproach that it had paffed away without any decisive action. He saw the country of the Tege. ates, his allies, covered with enemies; he alone had drawn them there, he alone had occasioned the confederacy of Sparta and Athens, by declaring for the state of Tegea; his protection had hitherto been more destructive than beneficial to it. Time how. ever pressed, and it was proper to think of returning out of Peloponnesus into Beotia, to put his troops in winter quarters; but to abandon his allies, to leave them a prey to the fire and fword of their enemies, to expose them by his departure to the whole fury of their refentment, the heart of Epaminondas was incapable of fuch a resolution.

On the other hand he forefaw the enemy would not fuffer him to get out of Laconia, without first making every effort to shut him up in some dangerous fituation; they had an army of 20,000 foot and 1000 horse. It was more than sufficient to block up and defend all the roads of the ifthmus of Corinth, through which he must necessarily take The fault they had committed the prehis rout. ceding campaign, in neglecting to feize Cenchrea, had been a lesson to them: he had every reason to suppose they would not be again guilty of it, and that much blood must be spilt before he could

regain Beotia.

Epaminondas having reflected on the lituation he was in, judged it would be more adviseable to make a bold attack, than to be exposed to a purfuit, and every instant harrassed in his retreat.

He knew indeed that he should risk all in a battle, but he had the advantage of superior numbers. His army confifted of 30,000 infantry and 3,000 horse. The Lacedemonians had but few flingers and archers, little to be feared because they had neither skill nor courage; on the contrary, there were in the Theban army a great number, and of the highest reputation, who had joined them on the confines of Thessaly. These people, instructed and habituated from their infancy in the exercises of the sling and the javelin, excelled in them. Practice perfecting their taste and natural inclinations, they were of great consequence in an engagement; rarely was the advantage on the fide against which they fought. All the difficulties which embarraffed Epaminondas would vanish, should he be so fortunate as to gain the victory. His allies would be fecured from the vengeance of the Lacedemonians. Even tho', fays Diodorus Siculus, he should purchase the victory at the expence of his life, he could not think it too dear. By this decifive blow he would confirm Thebes in her superiority over the rest of Greece. A hope lo flattering removed all his doubts; he was relolved to engage.

Here we see the chef d'œuvre of the samous Theban general. The intelligent author of the commentary on Polybius, does not hesitate to declare, that in the opinion of the very best judges in the art of war, nothing ever was better concerted, more singular, or more simple than the order of this battle, which was fought on the plain

of Mantinea, in view of that town.*

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mers. Epaminondas though stronger, as has been said already, did not look upon this as a reason for being inattentive to any thing which could contribute to the success he might naturally expect; on

^{*} Before the vulgar æra 363.

the contrary, he never employed more stratagems to deceive the enemy, to amuse, to disconcert, by concealing from him his design to give battle.* Feints, secret marches, movements apparently irregular; he practised every thing to impose upon the Lacedemonians, and to attack them with every advantage he could derive from their perplexity and his own address.

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The Lacedemonian army was encamped at the foot of mount Parthemus; Epaminondas's was upon the declivity of the same hill. He ranged round it in the order in which he meant to engage, He pointed out to the cavalry and infantry the posts they were to take when they descended into the plain, and made them go through the same movements and evolutions as would be necessary in the execution of his plan in the engagement; he took hardly any notice of the disposition of the enemy, well affured that he must baffle them by the fingularity of his attack. In his left wing, with which he meant to charge the Lacedemonians, he placed the Thebans and Arcadians, the flower of his infantry; the Argians formed the right; the Eubeans, the Sicyonians, and the Locrians occupied the center; the cavalry were placed on the two wings, and received instructions how to act when it should come up to the enemy.

The whole army having been thus made acquainted with the disposition of each corps, Epaminondas suddenly altered his order of battle. He put his army in motion, and shewed himself to the Lacedemonians in a single line, as in order of march. He actually advanced towards them, but from the order in which he moved, they were assured

^{*} Xenoph. B. 7. Diod. Sic. B. 15. Plut. in Agesil. Pausanias, B. 8.

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affured it was only to decamp. To confirm them in their mistake, after marching some time he made a halt on the heights, and ordered all his infantry to ground their arms. This step convinced the Lacedemonians that Epaminondas had a design of pitching his camp above them. Their leaders were the first to fall into the snare, they quitted their posts; the men, following their example, quitted their ranks. The whole Lacedemonian army, which till then had remained in order of battle, was broken, dispersed, and scattered all over the camp.

This was what Epaminondas had foreseen and expected. As soon as ever he saw the Lacedemonians in the disorder of an army retiring quietly into their quarters, apprehending they had nothing more to dread, he ordered his soldiers to recover their arms, to march and move on briskly. The enemy surprised, ran precipitately to regain their ranks, and to form as fast as possible: no one thought of any thing but acting on the defensive. Epaminondas was already drawn up in order of battle, when they had hardly began to form.

Although they were furprifed they quickly drew up in phalanx. The Athenian cavalry were placed in one wing, the Lacedemonian in the other. Hurry produced confusion, and when they had cast their eyes upon the Theban army, the exact order they observed in it would not suffer them to foresee any thing but an affured defeat. In this universal consternation, the Mantinean priests revived that courage which was almost extinguished in every breast. They had offered a facrifice, and the entrails of the victim promised victory to both sides: an omen which at first sight seemed only the abstruse mystery of an oracle, and which was Vol. II.

however, in the event literally fulfilled, if we be-

lieve Xenophon.

Epaminondas's cavalry had already taken post opposite to that of the Athenians, with intent to awe them and prevent their taking the army in slank. The other body of cavalry was placed over against that of the Lacedemonians, which it attacked. Epaminondas had mixed with them platoons of those active Thessalians, who were excellent at the sling and the bow. The Lacedemonians had not taken the same precaution, an inattention which gave the Thebans a vast advantage over them.

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As foon as the cavalry were stationed, Epaminondas, who appeared in phalanx in one line, moved to the wing which he commanded, made it advance in an oblique line, while the other wing remained firm; and fell, says Xenophon, like the prow of a galley upon the center of the enemy, who had no conception of such a movement.

He had taken care to place his choice troops in this wing; the greater part of those of the other likewise met it there, and became the rear to that formidable point which presented itself. His intention was to break the Lacedemonians by the weight of this column, which was continually kept up, and at last to flank the divided parts, to destroy by that means whatever might remain of good order.

The trumpets having founded a charge, the two armies as usual gave great shouts. The engagement was begun by the Lacedemonian cavalry, much weaker and sewer in number than that of the Thebans; who besides the superiority of numbers and valour, had moreover the advantage of being mixed with infantry. On the first shock the

the Lacedemonians were disordered, broken, and put to slight, without making hardly any resistance.

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The enemy's center was forced, as Epaminondas had foreseen, by the weight of the body which charged it; but this advantage instead of lessening the courage of those who composed it, animated them to perform prodigies of valour to repair the Never, fays Diodorus Siculus, had the Greeks fought one against another with such numerous armies; never were they commanded by abler generals; never did they shew greater steadiness, courage, and intrepidity. The same contempt of life, the same passion for glory, the same love of their country, animated them. This action was to decide, in fight of all Greece up in arms, which should get the better at last; Thebes, formerly little known but constantly victorious since the commencement of this war; or Sparta, crowned long before with the triumphs of ages and the fupremacy of all the Greek republics. Upon these two people the chief interest of the war turned; they were the only authors and the fole object of it. The one fought to recover the ancient glory of their arms and their reputation, the other to preherve what they had lately acquired; both equally feared and hated each other; both fooner than basely resign the victory, would contend for it with the last drop of their blood.

When the infantry of the two armies came to blows, they fell to on both fides with equal courage. The battle began with lances; they were instantly broken, and they took to their swords; the action then became one of the most bloody ever seen. In that terrible violence of passion which civil wars ever produce, life was soon forgotten, or little valued; the richest blood streamed

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on both sides, the ground was covered with the dead and wounded: victory however remained doubtful, in spite of all the precautions Epaminondas had taken to be affured of it.

It is perhaps on these occasions in which prudence and ability cannot of themselves prevail, that it is excusable in a general to forget, if I may so express it, his character, and to expose himself like a common soldier to encourage his men. Not the honour of the nation only, but the safety of a whole army engaged in a distant country, depended upon this battle. It was necessary that the most determined courage should compensate for the want

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Full of these sentiments, Epaminondas assembled the flower of his brave Thebans, exhorted them to follow the example he was about to give them, rushed furiously upon the Lacedemonians, resolved at all events to decide the fate of the day. Having arrrived within reach of the first ranks, he threw a dart at their commander and brought him to the ground; he instantly fell upon them, supported and surrounded by his band of Thebans, who thought of no danger but that which their general run into; every thing gave way before them, every thing was overthrown, the enemy's army was entirely open wherever Epaminondas came. No fooner did the Lacedemonians learn that he was at the head of this furious battalion, than all who had escaped death took to their heels: his bare name frightened them still more than his arms; they broke on all fides, and fled haftily from the field of battle. Epaminondas pursued them, and put to the fword all who being stopped by the foremost fugitives were unable to get out of his way in time. He made fuch vast flaughter, that

the ground where he passed, as Diodorus Siculus relates, was covered with heaps of dead Lacedemonians.

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To gain a compleat victory he had only to fuffer the fugitives to go off, to collect together those bold Thebans who had routed them, and with them to fall upon the wings of the Lacedemonians, which still kept their ground. Their fame and empire would have been at an end, had Epaminondas acted in this manner, as he at first intended, but fo much prudence is not always attendant upon fuch extraordinary valour; the good fense of the greatest men often has its fatal moment; their fall perhaps does honour to their memory in fuch circumstances; it is one virtue which gets the better of another; it is the triumph of a courage which nothing can check, over a command of temper still more heroick, which is unhappily loft fight of in the heat of action.

Epaminondas, hurried on by that warm zeal for his country which was his ruling passion, was unable to controul it, when he had once given it the He feemed unwilling to fuffer a fingle individual of the Lacedemonians, whom he had fo totally routed, to escape. He followed them with a kind of inveteracy which forced him on; he advanced rashly into the midst of them, without reflecting that the body of his brave Thebans, weakened by fatigue, by wounds, and the loss it must unavoidably have fustained in so warm an action, must diminish every instant, and be able to follow him but at a great distance. He found himself at last, almost alone, in the middle of a croud of Lacedemonians, much more alarmed at feeing him amongst them, than he would have been, had he M_3

been able to fee the great danger to which he was

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Reflection at last opened their eyes, blinded in a manner by the stupor into which fear had thrown them. They observed that Epaminondas, hurried away by the heat of the action, and the eager defire of conquest, most inconsiderately and thoughtlessly risked his person; they instantaneously fell upon him on all fides. Never did the most intrepid foldier fustain so unequal an attack with more courageous firmness. Pressed from all parts, he at length recovered his usual presence of mind; he shunned the darts which fell round him, he warded off others with his buckler: feveral however reached him; he had the resolution to draw them out of his body warm with his blood and cast them back upon the enemy. At last, while he was wholly engaged in defending himself against those who furrounded him, an officer quitted his ranks, attacked him with his lance shortened, and plunged it into his breast, where the iron, which was broken with the force of the blow, remained. Epaminondas, fenfeless and covered with blood, fell at length upon an heap of dead, which he had flain before he received this wound.

A piece of news of fuch importance was foon fpread through both armies. In fuch moments it is that the human heart usually changes the most poignant grief into the most desperate rage. The Thebans slew to the spot where they saw their general fall. Their natural strength, seconded by their sury, put all that resisted to the sword. The Lacedemonians for some time purchased with their blood the hope of carrying off the body of Epaminondas, around which this dreadful slaughter was made. At last the Thebans, equally brave

but much stouter, dispersed them, and with the point of the sword recovered their dying general.

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At this fight their rage redoubled; they returned to the charge, they fell upon the Lacedemonians with still greater violence, whom the impetuolity of their attack had already put to flight; but these generous soldiers were, if I may be allowed the expression, so many bodies which had lost their head. Epaminondas extended on the ground, deprived them of every hope of gaining a compleat victory, which but for this accident they would eafily have obtained; moreover the whole glory of the battle was hitherto of their fide; it would have been imprudent to risk the loss of it, and to fee the body of their general carried off. The commanding officers therefore judged it right to found a retreat to collect their men, who had every where broke their ranks in purluit of the fugitives.

The Thebans being returned into their camp, which bordered on the field of battle, their first care was to call together the surgeons. After having examined Epaminondas's wound, they declared it mortal. While the whole army was crying out in despair, they told them that there was not a ray of hope left; that Epaminondas must expire if the iron was not extracted from his breast, and that also he must infallibly die if the operation was performed. Epaminondas heard them without the least emotion.

It is not so much the death as the triumph of this great man, which the historians here describe. Condemned by the physicians, and sensible himself that he drew near his end, he ordered his shield-bearer to be called, who advanced all in tears.* Epaminondas, anxious only for his own same, and M 4

^{*} Pauf. in Beot. Justin. B. g. Diod. Sic. B. 15.

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the glory of his country, asked him if he had saved his buckler. He answered that it was safe, and produced it.* Epaminondas, transported with joy that so glorious a spoil had not fallen into the enemy's hands, clasped it, says Justin, as the dear companion of his labours and of his glory. He at last enquired which side had gained the victory: they told him the Thebans, and that the Lacedemonians had quitted the field of battle.† "I have then lived long enough, says he, since I die with the honour of having never been conquered." At these words he ordered them to extract the iron out of his breast. This dreadful order, to the horror of which Epaminondas alone was insensible, threw all the officers and soldiers into despair.

In the midst of this general affliction, one of Epaminondas's most intimate friends could not help expressing his grief in stronger terms than the rest. "O Epaminondas!" he cried, "you are dying; and when you die we shall lose you entirely, without a hope remaining of seeing you revive in your offspring; you leave us no child behind you." "You are mistaken," replied Epaminondas cooly, "I shall leave behind me two immortal daughters, the victory of Leuctra and that of Mantinea!" Having said this, he again directed that they should take the iron out of his breast, and expired, overjoyed at learning, as he died, the triumph of his country.

The term of his life was likewise that of the glory and success of his country. The routed Lacedemonians already looked for safety in flight. The Thebans were unable to compleat their conquest.

^{*} Corn. Nepos. Epam.
† Diod. Sic. ibid.
† Xenoph. B. 7.

quest. More uncertain still what steps to take, than distressed for the loss of their general, they remained motionless on the field of battle. Instead of pursuing the fugitives, who looked upon themselves as beaten, without resource, the Theban horse and soot retreated themselves, as if they

had been vanquished.

A body of archers mixed with infantry, however, got together and formed on the left wing. The Athenians defeated them almost on the first charge, and put them all to the sword. They ceased to be conquerors, nay even, if I may so speak, to be soldiers, as soon as they had lost the support of the hand which conducted them, and which made them capable of every thing. For all this disadvantage the victory remained doubtful, and all the blood which the hope of it had cost, was, according to Xenophon, shed to no

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This event, fays he, disappointed the conjectures of all Greece. All their forces were affembled at the battle of Mantinea. It was not doubted, if the two parties came to blows, but that the vanquished must be obliged to submit to the law of the conquerors, and acknowledge them for their masters. However, in the end it appeared, that after so obstinate an engagement there was neither defeat nor victory, or rather that each party arrogated to itself the honour of having conquered. Both, without opposition, erected trophies in fight of each other; each gave up, as conquerors, the dead to the other, and as if vanquished, begged in return those which they had lost in the action. Nevertheless, adds Xenophon, for all this prelending to have won the battle, things remained exactly in the same state they were in before it was

fought. There was no conquest made on either side, no town taken, nor indeed the smallest ad-

vantage gained.

With this judgment, confistent with his partiality, and his jealoufy and dislike of the Thebans in general, and of Epaminondas in particular, Xenophon, exact and faithful throughout the rest of it, concludes his history of Greece. Polybius, who has continued it, and with him all the writers on the subject, more attentive to truth, or more just, affert positively and without the least hesitation, that Sparta was never able to recover the loss the fustained in this battle, and that of Leuctra. According to Xenophon, it determined nothing between the Thebans and Lacedemonians. cording to others, this was the last effort, as well as the last exertion of the iniquitous and excessive power of the republic of Sparta. Epaminondas, expiring, faw this tyrannical power which she had usurped over all her neighbours expire with him.

Five and twenty years only intervened between this battle and that of Cheronea, which Philip gained over all Greece united against him. Lacedemonians, without having had any part in the honour of this war, shared the disgrace and mischief of it with Thebes and Athens, who at that time took the lead. We do not read any where in history of these ancient masters of Greece having the least title to be looked upon as her defenders, at the time of her decline and her subjugation. They were remarkable afterwards only for an instance of pride and vanity, as incredible as it was weak and foolish, which led them to fancy they were able to stop Philip's progress, who, to punish their presumption and ridiculous menaces, carried fire and fword through their whole country.

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The death of Epaminondas left Greece overwhelmed with the troubles and confusion which had fo long distracted her. In losing her general, the republic of Thebes quickly lost her reputation and the valour by which she had acquired it. Epaminondas, fays Justin, was, with respect to her what the iron point is to a javelin; when that is either foftened or broken, it is no longer of any use, and becomes incapable of defending or annoying. In fact, from the conduct of the Thebans after his death, one would never suppose they had loft only one great captain, it would feem as if they had all died with him. Before he was entrusted with the government, the Thebans had never been engaged in any confiderable war; after him, their shameful defeats alone bring to our recollection the happy days of their glory and military virtue. We fee them born and die with him; a clear proof that they were owing only to his abilities.

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Finally, it would be difficult to determine which was most to be admired in him, the good man, or the great commander. Little defirous of ruling, he dedicated his whole life to fecure to his country the supremacy over the other republics. Having ever held wealth in contempt, the expences of his funeral were obliged to be defrayed out of the public treasury. Ambition had as little power over him as avarice. It was with contraint he took upon himself the first employments of the republic, which were conferred by his fellow-citizens: he filled them with fuch dignity, that instead of receiving any honour from them, he embellished them by his manner of supporting them. Equally versed in the sciences, and deep in philosophy, it was difficult to discern the accomplished

complished warrior in the most consummate schoolar of his age. He died as he had lived, like a great man, says Justin, in concluding his eulogy; and surely we may justly doubt, with Cicero, whether, take him for all in all, he was not the great.

He maintained throughout life fo great an affection for poverty, that he never had more than one fuit of cloaths at a time, which, befides, was ever of the most ordinary materials, and always very plain. In this way he lived happily, and the mediocrity of his fortune being equal to his de-

fires, was equal also to his necessities. +

Artaxerxes in vain tempted him with the allurement of riches; he would accept none of the presents he offered him. Micytus, a young man for whom he had a regard, made the first proposal to him, in company with Diomedon, whom Ar-"To what taxerxes had employed to gain him. " purpose is all this money you offer me," says Epaminondas to the Persian monarch's envoy. " If your master desires nothing but what will be for the interest of my republic, there is no oc-" casion to bribe me to his views. On the con-" trary, if he has any ill defigns against her, he " is not possessed of gold and silver enough to " corrupt me. All the wealth in the universe " could not engage me to betray my country." Thus did he receive Diomedon; but lest he might meet with some other citizens not quite so scrupulous, he ordered him immediately to depart out of the territory of Thebes; more noble in his refusal than Artaxerxes in his profuse offers.

A Greek historian relates, that an oracle had forewarned Epaminondas several years before the

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^{*} Cic. lib. de Oratore. † Ælian. † Corn. Nep.

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battle of Mantinea, to beware of Pelagos; confequently, from the time he knew the menace of the gods, he never ventured on board a ship: Such was the power of superstition in that age, even over the most enlightened mind. But it was the effence of oracles, ever to prefent those who confulted them with feveral fenses in the same words; their fatal duplicity cast more than one great man on the precipice he wished to avoid, and which he could not but think he had effectually kept clear of. It was supposed the oracle, by the equivocal word Pelagos, which properly and strictly lignifies the lea, meant a forest of that name. It was not above thirty stadia from Mantinea, and on the borders of it the battle was fought, to which afterwards was given the name of that town.*

Epaminondas actually fell there, according to the prediction of the oracle. The fpot on which he dropped covered with wounds, and from whence he continued to observe the event of the engagement, was afterwards called the Observatory. His body was interred by his foldiers on the edge of the forest of Pelagos, on the very field of battle. A tomb to glorious feemed to them becoming to great a captain, who lost his life, sword in hand, fighting for his country. They erected a column over him, which ferved as a Mausoleum: the buckler of this great man was still to be seen fastened to it, in the time of Pausanias. There was a terpent engraven on it, to inform posterity that he was the descendant of those men who sprang from the ferpent's teeth with which the ground had been anciently fown by Cadmus.

Many ages after, the emperor Hadrian caused a new column to be raised, close to the old one,

doubtless

^{*} Paufan. in Beotia.

doubtless to preserve the memory of this hero from the injuries of time; he had an inscription cut on it, in modern language, nearly the same as that which appeared in the Beotian tongue on the ancient pillar.

Even in his life time Epaminondas had received the like honour from the Messenian exiles, whom he had collected from all parts of Greece, and even from Italy, with such goodness, justice and repu-

tation.

The Athenians, whose cavalry had a claim to the chief honour of the battle of Mantinea, thought fit to transmit a memorial of it to posterity, by a

public monument.

At the time, that Pausanias travelled, was still to be seen on it, Grillus the son of Xenophon, the celebrated captain and historian, giving the mortal blow to Epaminondas. There was likewise legible on the base of the statue of that samous general, an inscription in elegiac verse. The Abbé Gedoin, of the French Academy, has been so kind as to savour me * with a translation of this inscription. It is taken from an oration upon Epaminondas, which he delivered at the opening of the academy of inscriptions and belles lettres, in the assembly of 1739, and may be thus rendered into English.

The Spartan valour saw with humbled pride Her bulwarks shatter'd and her power desied; Observ'd Misenum's renovating same, Victorious, triumph o'er the Spartan name: In Megalopolis, despairing saw A sew brave vet'rans keep her hosts in awe; Th' allies of Thebes, whose sirm intrepid soul No soes could conquer, and no sorce controul; Still in her conslicts ready to engage, And sight her battles with a pious rage. Greece too is free, and her oppressors slain: These are my laurels, these the fruits I gain.

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Grillus did not long and quietly enjoy the honour of having delivered his country from fo formidable an enemy. Certain it is that he also perished a little before the conclusion of the battle of Mantinea; besides, the glory which the Athenians attributed to him, was claimed by feveral other The Mantineans were of the people of Greece. The Lacedemonians gave this honour to a Spartiate named Anticrates. His descendents ever after bore the name of the Machairionides, as having flain Epaminondas with a fword. The fervice which they afferted Anticrates had done his country by fo memorable an action, appeared to them fo important, that they decreed him the most distinguished honours, and secured them to him for life: they added moreover a general and perpetual exemption from all kinds of impost and Plutarch relates, that Callicrates, a descendent of this famous Anticrates, still enjoyed this immunity in his time.

However this was, the Athenians, the Spartiates, or the Mantineans, owed the honour they derived from the death of Epaminondas only to that which he had personally acquired, and the source from which he drew it was his own great qualities. Born in a republic which had long been difgracefully diffinguished for its weakness and obscurity, he had abilities, if I may fay fo, to make her the mistress of Greece, by the superiority of her own The generality of the great captains of this country, so fertile in heroes, Alcibiades, Themistocles, Aristides, were born among people celebrated before their time for their valour and ex-Their country furnished them with disciplined foldiers and experienced officers. Trained to the command of armies, they found their several

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states eager after glory, exercised in war, accustomed to victory, and ever ready to take the field.

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All these advantages were wanting to Epaminondas. A philosopher by inclination, he studied the art of war from conviction and the love of his country. The conduct of the most eminent commanders became the object of his meditations. Having made himself a general by a close and constant application to the military science, he had the courage and address to inspire the same spirit into his countrymen. He began with making them sensible of the disgraceful state of humiliation they were in, and exciting their jealousy against the Lacedemonians. An ambition of rivaling them quickly produced emulation, the mother of virtues and talents.

It was no easy task to keep up and direct these noble sentiments, in a people untractable, violent, and capable of the most incredible outrages. Epaminondas had the art to moderate and restrain them, by the fubordination and military discipline he established. He taught the Thebans to feel their own strength, and to blush at the oblivion and contempt in which they had hitherto lived. He at last shewed them, by the victory he enabled them to gain at Leuctra, what they were equal to. The honour of these actions is due to him; he created, if I may be allowed the expression, his own army. The republic of Thebes, before him, had only fost effeminate citizens, void of ambition and without courage. Out of fuch beings did he form foldiers and officers, who deprived the Lacedemonians of their fame, and the empire of Greece.

We must not from this single point of view judge of the extent of his talents.* He constantly improved

^{*} Died. Sic. B. 15. Justin, B. 9.

improved them by the continual practice of the most exalted virtues. Modest beyond perhaps what we would expect from an heathen, we have feen him on the field of battle, the very spot on which he had conquered, lamenting a victory which had excited in him an inward fentiment of felf-complacency, which might possibly appear just and innocent, but which he regarded as proceeding from an unpardonable pride. Other commanders have been deservedly praised for their frugality and difinterestedness; but ought not that voluntary poverty, which Epaminondas ever preferred to wealth, to raise him above them? His regard for his fellow citizens, his spirit of benevolence to his foldiers; would never allow him to be rich in any thing but liberal actions.

Simplicity in dress, sobriety in living, modesty in success, firmness in adversity, patience in affronts, strictness in military discipline, courage in fight, intrepidity in danger, his life was only a continued series of all these virtues. His sole example taught

the Thebans to esteem and practice them:

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In the arts and sciences to which he applied himself, he excelled, in the judgment of history, all the Greeks who were before or after him. Naturally inclined to solitude and meditation, he perceived from his youth the vanity of that unprofitable glory which the generality of men so ardently covet. He esteemed no talents but such as tended to encrease the welfare of mankind, or to lessen the evils that mortals are heirs to. He would willingly have made the whole world much happier than it was, and his own country happier than the rest of the world. Every kind of glory which had not respect to this object, appeared to him only as a shadow, a vapour incapable of seducing You. II.

any but weak minds, whose littleness appears in their fondness for it.

In spite of the dislike he had to the hurry of business, and the trouble attendant on the chief employments, he sacrificed his love of ease and solitude to the public good. After having made a thorough change in the temper of the Thebans, and delivered them out of the greatest dangers, he at last raised them to the summit of glory and power; this was the object of all the labours of his life, and his honourable death was the reward. He died, as he had lived, a zealous citizen, an intrepid general, and a philosopher superior to all events or accidents in life.

Justin has left us a very judicious reslection on this great man, with which I shall conclude this history. The Athenians, who made great rejoicings at his death, were not sensible of the obligations they owed him. The loss of such a respectable neighbour and rival soon took off their attention from war. Whilst Epaminondas was alive they were kept constantly on their guard, and neglected nothing to put themselves in a condition to oppose him, should they enter into a war with him. The security to which they gave themselves up after his death, was to them but a sudden change from a fondness for war and military discipline, to a spirit of negligence, of luxury, and indolence.

The public revenues of Athens, confecrated before to the maintenance of the forces both by land and fea, were thence forward employed in feafts and shows.* Agreeable talents were preferred to such as were laborious and essential. Athens no longer attended to any thing but theatrical repre-

sentations.

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fentations. A rage for shows and entertainments became the only passion of this people, enervated by the idle piping times of peace. Great poets made amends for the want of great generals, and the amusement of the people was esteemed of more consequence than the acquisition of such talents as were of the utmost importance to the public safety.

Philip king of Macedon, who had been educated with Epaminondas, knew how to take advantage of a change fo favourable to the ambitious defigns he had formed of aggrandifing himfelf at the expence of his neighbours. While Greece abandoned herfelf to the pleasures of luxury and the delights of repose, this prince formed the bold plan of fubduing her. We fee him in his hiftory, which appeared shortly after this, artfully giving way to the pride and power of the Greeks, at the commencement of his reign, to be able to attack them afterwards with more advantage. Without troops, without officers, without generals, he fought them, he formed them, he created them, among a people hitherto unknown in Greece and its neighbourhood, or at least universally despised by all who knew them.* He had learnt from Epaminondas never to be discouraged by obstacles, which labour and application could furmount. Happy, had he added the virtues of this great man to the talents he copied from him; but his ambition gave him a talfe idea of true glory, the acquisition of which he perhaps neglected, only because he was unacquainted with it. His fole view was to be a great conqueror; fuch he was in fact, and Greece, luxunous and effeminate, became the object and the

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^{*} Plut. in Pelop.

scene of his conquests, after having for several ages borne greater sway there, than either himself or his ancestors ever did in his own hereditary dominions. A deeper politician still than an able commander, his intrigues, his artifices and his negociations, contributed more to the enlargement of his empire than his arms. He never took a town by assault, without first using every other possible means to gain it, or to corrupt the inhabitants. He never gave battle till he had tried by all kind of ways to procure without it every advantage he could hope to derive from it.

His fon, honoured by history with the august furname of Great, was by no means so justly entitled to it as he was. For the conquest of Persia he had only to employ the preparations which he found on his accession already made for that samous expedition: the van guard of Philip's army was then on the march to attempt it, when death took him off. Alexander only executed his father's plan; and his father perhaps owed the boldness with which he formed it, and the sagacity with which he chose the means proper to ensure its success, to the intimacy he had in the early part of

his life with Epaminondas.

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OBSERVATIONS AND REMARKS

ONTHE

BATTLE OF ZAMA.

By M. DE FOLARD, Knight of the Military Order of St. Louis, and Colonel of Infantry.

SECT. I.

THE ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE TWO ARMIES.

THESE two orders of battle are original and singular; that of Scipio is most remarkable, and worthy the admiration of all who understand tactics, and the discipline of the infantry. If we give due attention to this disposition of the Roman general, we must allow that nothing practised in all antiquity was more surprising and more perfect in the management of the infantry, in the art of bringing them to action, and of forming them.

It was not stratagem, nor the valour of the troops which decided the point in this celebrated battle: it was the knowledge, it was the ability of the general, who was perfectly acquainted with the power of the infantry, and the best manner of bringing them into action. Hannibal, to whom this mode of forming and engaging was unknown, might say with Lysander, that he was vanquished

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not for want of courage, but skill. This battle may be said to be that, in all antiquity, in which the most extraordinary things passed, as well with regard to the obstinacy of the combatants as the

address and conduct of the generals.

Scipio is the first, after the Greeks, who was acquainted with the column, and the manner of engaging in this order; for although Regulus prefented a line of columns to Xantippus, it does not appear that he had ranged them fo as to break the enemy by the weight and firmness of his corps and the depth of his files, but folely to refift the elephants; besides that the intervals were not sufficient to afford a retreat and free passage to these animals, he had no notion of the advantage to be made of corps formed in this way; he had then only the elephants in view, against which the thickest bodies would be unable to maintain their ground. The order of battle at Cannæ was exactly the same as that of Regulus; but the ignorance of the commanders rendered it useless. By unnecessarily drawing the troops from the wings, they threw them into disorder and confusion, and the columns were perplexed in being too near each other; the front of the infantry was diminished, and Hannibal surrounded it with his wings which outlined them.

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It is furprifing that of so many historians, both Greek and Latin, ancient and modern, who have mentioned this battle, not one has entered into the reasons which induced the Roman general to engage on such principles. Nay more, not one of them seems to have understood a disposition so skillful and so singular.

Polybius, who gives us so exact and nice an account of this memorable engagement, which he describes

describes with all the art of a most experienced perfect warrior, highly praises the disposition of both armies. In my opinion, the Roman general's is much more worthy of his remarks than the Carthaginian's. He has not, however, made any distinction. He contents himself with offering his incense equally to both; and yet the latter seems to me but little to deserve it, as I shall shew in its

proper place.

Prince Lewis William of Nassau has given us a plan of this battle, in a work fimilar to this. suspect Prince Maurice was the author of it. Whichever it was, it is plain that he did not attend to this mode of engaging any more than my author, (Polybius). And as be was not struck with it here, nor in the action of Regulus with Xantippus, nor at that of Cannæ, it is not furpriling that Prince Lewis did not discover it. He did however clearly perceive this order, but the discovery of columns escaped him; for he imagined, that in this fingular disposition, the cohorts pressing and almost joining the rear of each other, and the vacancies between them, was folely intended to facilitate the progress or retreat of the elephants, and to prevent them difordering and breaking the corps, if the intervals were not fo wide; and that the fecond was in a line with the first, and the third with the second, lest the elephants should break them in their passage, if these ftreets, as Polybius calls them, had not been strait.

In fact, the direct intervals between the columns, which afforded these animals a free passage, when they met with nothing to obstruct or enrage them, were of infinite use to Scipio; but this was not the only object he had in view, when he conceived this N 4 wonderful

wonderful disposition of his infantry; he had much

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The two armies engaged in an even open plain, and confequently on an equal footing as to ground; and the wings not being brought down on either fide, abilities, and a compleat and fubtile knowledge of tactics in the weaker of the two commanders, must have determined the victory; for they were not equal in number. So far from it, that the disproportion was so great as to exclude all idea of equality, unless in the valour of the troops, their discipline, and confidence in their commander. All which feemed to prognosticate the utter ruin of Scipio, who had to oppose 50,000 men with an army of only 22,000; and yet nothing is more deceitful, fince it is manifest from numberless examples both ancient and modern, in which history abounds, that numbers will not preyail over an army commanded by a great captain, against one whom he surpasses in knowledge, in judgment, in his method of forming and engaging, and who adds belides a better mode of arming, though he might conquer without it: of fo much force and confequence is a good disposition.

Scipio observed with minute attention the order of the enemy, who drew up first in the plain, to strike terror by an opinion of his strength, which alarmed neither the Romans nor their general. He perceived that Hannibal was formed in three lines, or to speak more properly in three phalanxes. The cavalry on the wings of the first line; for the ancients brought the horse into action in a single line only, without a second to support

them.

Scipio having taken notice of this disposition, thought the Roman order of battle would be too weak

weak to sustain the weight and shock of a body of infantry, which seemed to him impenetrable, if the second line should be joined to the first and form in one, by doubling their files. A judicious resection, which the generals opposed to Hannibal, had never made during the whole course of the war in Italy.

The Roman commander apprehended, besides, some sudden and unexpected movement from the third line, which might divide from right to lest, and extend itself, gain his slank, and enclose him

entirely to his very wings.

He thought fit to fecure them by disposing his infantry in such a manner, that they might be able to sustain a vigorous attack through his whole front. He extended his forecast in an affair of such importance, even beyond what was absolutely necessary, that he might neither forget or neglect any thing which could possibly aid him in gaining the victory. In short, he provided against every thing his enemy might, or ought to do, to be prepared for whatever should happen.

He, at the same time, observed in the front of this army a line of elephants. This was not to be despised; the deseat of Regulus, occasioned principally by these animals, and the bad disposition of his columns, formed too close to each other, taught him not to fall into the same error. He proposed not so much to resist and combat them, as to render them useless, and his order of

battle relieved him from this uneasiness.

Scipio did not build fo much upon what he faw, as not at the fame time to reflect how he might guard against what he could not perceive. He had occasion with such an enemy for a quicker and more refined forecast than all the generals he had

ever

ever coped with. He knew well the sharp and subtile genius of the Carthaginians; sull of expedients and deep resources, as active in extricating himself out of difficulties as in drawing others into them.

Hannibal had it in his power to double all his lines, to reduce his adversary to the last extremity, and to render ineffectual every precaution and measure he could take; at least make them uncertain, by quick movements sudden and simple, which might eafily have been concealed from the Romans. But it does not appear, from the beginning to the end of the action, that Hannibal perceived the advantages that might be derived from the manner in which he had formed his infantry. He formed in three lines, with delign only that they should relieve one another; that the first, being routed, might be replaced by the fecond, and that by the third; not confidering that this could never be the case, unless spaces were left for the routed troops to retreat through.

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Scipio had fuch a different opinion of Hannibal, that he made no doubt he had fome scheme of tactics in this order of battle. He saw clearly that the movements his enemy might make, in his second and third lines were easy to be practised, and very dangerous on account of his weakness: and yet the Carthaginian never once thought of doubling with these two lines, which we should hardly conceive possible were not this memorable action from first to last a manifest proof of it. At the same time that it shews the most able generals, (and the most renowned in history have not always judged rightly in the most momentous circumstances, and those upon which the sate of great empires depended) it also proves that the Roman general

far excelled the Carthaginian, who performed nothing worthy of one even below mediocrity. The measures the Roman took to guard against being beaten, furrounded, and his wings doubled upon, evidently shew that he saw clearly what his enemy might do; but it never occurred to Hannibal, to feize and make use of these great advantages. Vastly superior in numbers to the Romans, and engaging in a level open plain, how came he not to think of giving battle with a more extended front? Scipio justly concluded this could not fail happening, which induced him to form his infantry in fuch a manner as to be under no apprehenfion for his wings, however he might be outlined, and to draw from his order of battle every fecurity he could reasonably expect: for as to the courage of his men, he doubted neither that nor their confidence.

All depended on this battle, and in such cases forecast cannot be carried too far. It is the beginning of conquest, says Livy, to take care not

to be conquered.

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The third line of Hannibal's army, so far distant from the other two, appeared to the Roman general to demand the most serious attention; and he reslected deeply on every use that could possibly be made of it. In effect, the Carthaginian might have gained a compleat victory with that only, for all the defeat of his cavalry, on which he did not much depend; but he knew not how to make that use of it which Scipio expected. He joined to his meditations and reslections on this, all that he had already formed in his thoughts about the other two, although these consisted of troops less experienced than the third, which was composed of the veteran bands of Italy. He doubted not but

but they would attack with confidence, and that their courage and boldness would be encreased under the orders of so famous a commander. All this appeared to him important. He reckoned indeed upon the valour and steadiness of his own men, but that would not be enough. It was necessary, as I have said before, to supply his want of numbers, that his order of battle should excel the enemy's, in being formed with more art. Thus all depended on a more knowing, safe, and perfect disposition. This able Roman could find no better expedient than to engage in the order I have described, than which nothing offers in all the art of war more formidable, more ingenious, or more difficult.

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Polybius fays, that numbers and courage were equal in both armies. It is certain he was mistaken as to numbers, as I have shewn above. And surely the text must be corrupt; for if the Carthaginian infantry had not been much more numerous than the Roman, Hannibal could never have formed three phalanxes, having no intervals between the battalions, without contracting exceedingly the front of his army, and exposing himself to be doubled upon in his wings. He was too knowing to give his enemy such an advantage.

Scipio did not confine his observations only to the redoubled phalanxes of his adversary; he had something still more important to attend to, viz. to discover what troops were to engage in the two first lines. He quickly sound that his first encounter would be with the Africans, who, however brave and warlike, were not to be compared with the veteran troops of Italy who formed the third line, and whom Hannibal led in person, and upon whose courage and experience he chiefly depended.

This line was about a stadium behind the others, as I have observed already, and this circumstance

extremely troubled the Roman general.

Who would ever have believed, that a commander fo celebrated and fo fubtile as our Carthaginian, should have no more in view from his first lines than to fatigue and weaken the Roman forces; and that after the defeat of these two, the third advancing fresh and in good order, he might attack the victors, tired, spent, and in that disorder common to troops which have engaged: What an idle notion!

The space left between his two first lines and the third, was by no means a certain way of facilitating the retreat of the fugitives, and clearing the field.

He should have foreseen, that they would run strait forward; that he must infallibly be borne down, and could fave but a fmall part of his It required no extraordinary effort of judgment to perceive that this must happen.

Scipio appeared drawn up in fight of the enemy in three lines of infantry, according to the Roman custom; so that Hannibal knew nothing of his defign, until it was too late, and when he could not eafily change his order. The cavalry covered his wings. The Hastarii composed the first line, the Principes the fecond, and the Triarii the third. The corps of the fecond line opposite to the intervals of those of the Hastarii, and the Triarii to those of the Principes. But just before the battle he reversed his whole order, by a movement so imple and fo rapid, that it was difficult to perceive or comprehend any thing of it. He ranged them in a fingle column. The following are, as I conjecture, the orders to the three lines of Roman cohorts cohorts for this evolution, which was performed all at once, and by one motion, so as to be ready to engage instantly in a line of columns. This discovery may one day or other be of use; for the times and the nature of war will oblige us, sooner or later, to have recourse to this method, as I have already foretold in several parts of this work, and I doubt not but foreigners will be the first to adopt it.

The Roman army being ranged in its accustomed order, he gave this general word of command to the infantry: one half facing to the right, the other to the left, the cohorts moving on their

flanks.

FIRST LINE.

Hastarii, stand fast!

SECOND LINE.

You Principes to the left, double under the Hastarii.

THIRD LINE.

You Triarii to the right, under the Principes. March.

As there was a cohort of Principes which covered the Hastarii on the right, and another of Triarii on the left, because the number of cohorts or maniples was equal in each line, the whole of the Principes moved to the left, and of the Triarii to the right, as I have said above; and marching on their stanks, the Principes took post in the rear of the cohorts of Hastarii, and the Triarii by the same motion gained the rear of the cohorts

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inju to pea cohorts of Principes, and by this movement the feveral corps were in a right line, in the rear of each other; but as the spaces from the one to the other were too large for perfect columns to form in, in three divisions, viz. in three bodies, he gave another word of command as follows:

Hastarii, stand fast!

You, Principes and Triarii, march.

The cohorts of Principes would take up four paces of the interval between those of the Hastarii; in like manner the cohorts of the Triarii would occupy the same interval between those of the Principes.

Scipio left the intervals for the light armed troops to fall through, into the spaces between the divisions.

The Roman general formed in this manner, viz. in perfect columns. Concluding that his fuccess in the engagement must depend wholly on the depth of his corps, on the weight of the first shock, and on the defeat of the Carthaginian first line, which being broken and hard pushed, would infallibly be thrown upon the fecond, which being likewise formed in phalanx, without any interval between the corps, and composed of one close compact mass, as well as the third, the fugitives could not tail of throwing that also into disorder and confulion; and by this admirable manœuvre he should be able to demolish the three lines: so weak and injudicious did the disposition of his enemy seem to him, however formidable it might be in appearance.

SECT. II.

THE BATTLE.

SCIPIO appeared all at once in this order, which must have surprised Hannibal, who advanced his elephants. The light armed met them, and getting behind them, turned them into the spaces between the columns, with intent to force them to pass through those intervals. Had they been too small, like those of Regulus against Xantippus, these animals would have fallen upon his columns, and must have broken them.

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This expedient of Scipio, to prevent the elephants from throwing his foot into diforder, and to oblige them, by means of the light infantry, to flip through the vacancies, had all the effect he could have expected from it. They were driven, and followed by the light troops; they did no mifchief, and reached the country, without their conductors being able to turn them to the right hand or to the left upon the columns; and while they were passing through, a party of light infantry galled them with darts and arrows from the small intervals in the divisions, left with this defign, and closed up at the instant of charging.

The elephants being thus driven, without any difficulty, into the rear of the line; and far up the country, the cohorts closed upon each other to form only one folid compact body, and the light

troops retreated into the rear.

The elephants, taken out of the way in the manner I have related, the columns moved up to the attack, and charged the front with that impetuolity which is entirely natural to this excellent mode mode of fighting; the rear ranks, as our author observes, exciting and animating by their shouts, and pressing those before them with that violence which no troops can withstand unless they engage in the same order.

The Romans met with fo stout a resistance, that history presents us with nothing similar to it in a pitched battle on an open level plain. Valour, numbers, and boldness, heightened by despair, combated on one side; and on the other, the advantage of order and the abilities of the general, which carried it against numbers. The Romans at last broke through the first line of the Carthaginians, by the weight of their columns, with such force and violence, that it was driven upon the second, which having no intervals between the corps to receive the sugitives, was thrown into most dreadful disorder, and at last broken to pieces by the croud, pushed on and sollowed by the victorious troops.

Polybius, who gives an ample account of this battle and of the circumstances preceding it, enables us to see perfectly the excellence of Scipio's

order of battle.

In engaging in such a manner there is never any consustion; each column acts and sustains itself, independent of the rest. They must all be broken and totally routed to be assured of victory; a thing which still does, and ever has appeared to me impossible, with brave troops well disciplined, accustomed to sighting, and led on by able and experienced officers. Nothing but the like order can hope to sustain the brunt of a body which attacks in this form; and whenever this happens on both sides, and with equal courage, numbers will prevail, as must infallibly have happened had Hannibal sought in this order, or at Vol. II.

least lest sufficient vacancies between his lines: and in this case, with superiority of numbers he might perhaps have gained the victory over the Romans, by the depth of his files and the defperate courage of his men. This alone would have helped to conquer; or at the worst, the Romans would have loft to many men in routing the first and fecond lines, as to be in no condition to fustain the shock of the third, composed of all the Carthaginian general's chosen troops, the veteran bands he had brought out of Italy.

I have afferted above, that nothing but a body of infantry drawn up in the fame manner, can possibly get the better of another formed on this principle, and confequently that a line ranged in phalanx ten or twelve deep, as perhaps Hannibal's might be, was too weak to withstand Scipio's columns, well ordered and able to charge with greater force and activity, and more equally than any

phalanx could do.

Scipio was anxious only to vanquish the first line, that being enough to fecure him the rout of

the other two.

A phalanx or line, without intervals, must act uniformly strait forward, viz. without wavering, and in one entire compact body, lest by giving any way it should fall into disorder. On the contrary, columns detached from each other are not fubject to these defects, they are moved without difficulty, and at the fame time kept in perfect order; and when one column breaks through a line and divides it, or one fection advances to make head against a second line, or another attacks in flank, or on the right or left, it is impossible to resist it, or remedy the mischief by any means in the world, but a fimilar order of battle.

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It may perhaps be objected to Scipio's disposition, that Hannibal might have surrounded him and thrown his columns into disorder, had he only during the engagement opened his numerous files that were not employed, and stood opposite to the spaces between the columns; that these files running and inserting themselves in these intervals, would have taken them in flank.

It requires no extraordinary penetration to perceive, that by this he would have exposed his men to manifest destruction; because columns, being equally strong in flank and rear as in front, the troops which had got into the vacancies between the two columns, must certainly have been surrounded and attacked by a superior force.

In the fecond place, the division inclosed as it were in a case, would have met in front with the light troops, posted in the rear, in the spaces be-

tween the columns.

The fame would have happened had one of the columns been entirely broken and routed. The enemy durft not have advanced far between the other two, which he would have had upon his flanks. He must have broken the whole, or at least a certain number, to be able to attack with

any lafety.

I have faid in numberless places of my commentary on Polybius, what cannot be too often repeated, that columns act independently of each other; that the defeat of one does not contribute to that of another: an advantage which our battalions are wholly deprived of. It has still greater advantages, for the column is again subdivided into as many sections as there are battalions, as was the case with Scipio's. If the first should be broken, the second appears like a second wall,

and a fresh enemy to be beaten, and which is in force not only to defend itself but to attack, without being affected by the disorder of the former; the fugitives would be at no loss, they would retire through the spaces between the columns, and the enemy could not again fall upon the Principes, without exposing their flanks to those on the sides, and to the light troops, who might be brought up as well as the Triarii.

SECT. III.

MISTAKES MADE BY HANNIBAL AT THE BATTLE OF ZAMA.

WHOEVER will reflect on what has been faid in the preceding fection, and examine it without prejudice and prepossession, must be convinced that the order of battle in columns, or to speak more properly, in a line of columns and a reserve, consisting of all the dragoons, secure from being surrounded, is superior to any thing that can be conceived in tactics; and that this mode is infinitely better, more simple, and more certain of success than that we make use of at this day.

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It must also be acknowledged, that it was not easy for Hannibal to foresee or perceive the Roman general's disposition, not before known or practised, and to frustrate a movement made at the very instant of engaging.

Nothing shews the address, experience and ability of a commander so much as his knowing how to cover his movements, and the disposition of

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his army. And we may fay of two generals as we would of two perfons at play, that he who discovers his game gives his adversary every advantage, while on the contrary he who takes care to conceal it, pursues the sure way to carry his point.

Among Scipio's great and shining qualities as a general, he particularly excelled in the art of concealing the knowledge of his movements and

order of battle.

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It is remarkable in his whole conduct, that he almost always departed from the common received rules of tactics, and ever discarded maxims generally established. His movements and his common evolutions were so simple, so quick, so new, that they could not be perceived till the enemy had no time to change or move without danger and certain loss.

Hannibal saw with astonishment his first line totally routed, and the second soon after; the deseat of which was owing wholely and solely to the sugitives, who broke it, and involved themselves in the disorder; and thus they sled precipitately over one another along the plain, in all the dis-

order and confusion of a compleat defeat.

It would have been an easy matter for Hannibal at least to have repaired the disorder of his first line, when he observed it begin to give way; for to say nothing of the vacancies he might have opened in his second, to make room for the runaways to pass, by ordering a certain number of siles into the rear, he had two surer methods, if he had not been insatuated. What was become of his knowledge, his good sense and experience? He ought to have foreseen that the deseat of his sirst line must necessarily occasion that of the second, which would therefore be useless to him; he had time enough to make these reslections, and to give his orders accordingly. How came he not to do what a second rate genius would not have neg.

lected?

Things being in this state, he had no resource but in a bold resolution. He might have divided his second line in two, when he saw the bad plight the first was in, and extended his wings in such a manner as to have surrounded the Romans and thrown himself upon their slank and rear, while the third line, which was quite fresh, marched up and took the ground of the first; and thus the Romans would have been at once attacked in front and on every side. He would have found them satigued and weakened by an obstinate engagement, which might have given him the victory, for all the defeat of his cavalry, which Lælius and Massinissa rashly and injudiciously pursued.

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I will be bold to fay more, he might have faved his fecond line even after the first was beaten. The combat was long doubtful; he might have taken advantage of that moment, and divided his third line in the same manner as I have said he should

have done with the fecond.

His first and second lines being broken and routed, Hannibal, who was with the third in person, saw that cloud of sugitives advancing upon him, when he had no possible remedy for a misfortune which proceeded purely from himself, and the bad disposition of his order of battle, and not from any fault in his soldiers, who were betrayed rather than conquered.

The Romans, in good order, pressing and driving the runaways before them, forced them on the third line, which produced many events; for they attacked attacked it in those parts where the enemy was already embarrassed. On the other hand, the Carthaginians, through fear of being broken by their own people, treated them as enemies, repelled them with their pikes, and forced them back upon the Romans to open a passage through them, that

they might come to action.

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The fight was brifk and obstinate with the third line, and the success very doubtful, when Lælius and Massinissa appeared, returning from the pursuit of the cavalry, whom they had routed. This reinforcement gave fresh spirits and courage to the Romans, who at last forced this line, composed of chosen troops, surrounded it entirely, and cut it to pieces.

Lælius and Massinissa were guilty of a great error, and yet a very common one with those who suffer themselves to be heated in the pursuit of an enemy, instead of detaching only a few troops after the fugitives, and with the rest falling upon the wings. This fault has occasioned the loss of many battles, and commanders cannot be too at-

tentive in giving explicit orders against it.

Fortune may possibly force a victory out of the hands of the greatest and most able generals, but she can never rob them of the glory they merit when they have done all that courage and conduct were able to effect. But I cannot perceive any thing done by the Carthaginian general in the present affair, which gives him the least claim to the admiration of any one who has the smallest knowledge or experience in the art of war.

Hannibal was strongest in infantry; this, as I have already shewn, must be admitted, nor could it possibly be otherwise, as the two armies engaged in an equal front, and the Carthaginians were

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formed in three lines or phalanxes; possibly this equality of front in the two armies is what Poly-

bius means.

Hannibal had it moreover in his power to have presented a much greater front, engaging still in three lines, and to have extended far beyond the wings of the Roman army, if he had but lest intervals in his second and third lines, to receive the fugitives; by this means the second would have been able to renew the combat, and the third, consisting of his very best troops, would have come into action after the other two.

Had he reflected on what it was in his power to do, and purfued proper measures, he must have perceived the inutility of his third line, from the imperfection of the other two. He might, by what I have faid, have faved his cavalry from a total defeat; for besides doubling on the Romans, could he not have mixed his horse with his light infantry, which were useless to him? He was not a stranger to this method. What more shall I fay? He had a thousand expedients, all of which escaped him. He might have concealed a corps of infantry behind the flank of his own foot, to turn those of the Romans. He availed himself of this manœuvre at the battle of Trebia. He had no expedient preferable to this among all that I have mentioned. How was it possible he should not employ one of them? In short, he did nothing of all that he might and ought to have done; he was beaten, and he deserved it.

Polybius and Livy, and many well informed authors among the moderns, cannot help expreffing their admiration of the wonderful disposition of Hannibal's army in this engagement. To say nothing of Livy and the moderns, who might not

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think it necessary to lose time in analysing the two orders of battle, as they adopted the general opinion without enquiring farther; but that Polybius, who was a proper judge, a great historian, and above all an excellent soldier, that Polybius, I say, should be the first to advance this opinion, and give the hint to the rest, is to me very surprising indeed. Was it done with a view of raising the character of Scipio, his friend, or was it from being prejudiced with Hannibal's exploits, or from want of due reslection? I will not pretend to say which, but his manner of speaking of it, and his usual openness, induce me to believe that he was defective in the last article.

A polite and esteemed author, who wants neither knowledge nor experience in war, has fallen into the same error. The praises he lavishes on Hannibal for his order of battle at Zama, convince me he did not perceive its faultiness any more than the rest.

"The day this battle was fought, fays he, Han"nibal outdid himself, whether in forming his
"army, or in giving his orders in the engage"ment: but at last the genius of Rome prevailed
"over that of Carthage, and the defeat of the
"Carthaginians lest the empire for ever to the
"Romans."

It requires but little skill in the art of war to see that Hannibal never surpassed himself less, than in this battle. I know not in what author St. Evremont found, "in giving his orders in the engagement." It does not appear that he gave one, or that he was present where his presence was most necessary.

"As to the Carthaginian general," continues this author, "he was admired by Scipio, who in

"the midst of all his glory could not help envy." ing the capacity of the vanquished." Though it is ever dangerous to be singular in ones judgment, and to attack, as I have done, a generally received opinion, I cannot help saying that this order of battle was but little deserving of the envy or praise of Scipio. I am not however surprised that he extolled it so highly; for in such circumstances, a man praises his enemy most willingly. Self-love is gratisfied on both sides. The compliments which are paid enhance the glory of the conqueror, and lessen the shame of the vanquished.

Hannibal, though in other respects admirable, yet was not fo much above the rest of mankind as to be incapable of committing a fault. did commit the groffest. He extricated himself from fome by finesse and chicane, which would have been of no avail to him, had he had more able generals to contend with. Others he did not fo well escape from. He was beaten in several actions; and towards the conclusion of the war in Italy he marched fomewhat more warily, when the Roman generals were instructed by their former defeats, viz. when they were become more experienced and able. Though he has been generally esteemed and admired by the ancients and moderns, and even by Scipio, and though he really were deferving of their praises, these authorities, respectable as they may feem, are of no weight with me in an enquiry after truth, and in instances where it may appear his conduct was not the molt regular and justifiable.

I acknowledge that all agree with one voice in the excellence of his last order of battle at Zama; but that is no reason why I should subscribe to their opinion. They have throughly

examined

examined this method they fay. Very well, why should not I have the same liberty of examining it, in my turn, and of seeing whether they are not mistaken? It is easy to judge if the object is worth the pains. There is nothing which should prevent our seeing faults in an extraordinary man, any more than in another; no one is exempt from the frailty of committing them, and the most persect is he who has the sewest to account for. Hannibal may be admitted of this number.



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The constitutions of the republics of ROME and CARTHAGE compared, with a parallel of the mannners of the two people, at the time of the second Punic war.

WEAK states grow great by the wisdom of those who have the management of them; and by the want of it, in those who govern their neighbours.

That superiority of strength which arises from superior conduct, creates in a course of time, and

sometimes in a short space, great empires.

Want of unanimity, and want of prudence in those that govern, will bring to ruin, sometimes in a few years, sometimes in a course of ages, the best established states, according as their neigh-

bours are more or less wife and attentive.

What remains in our days of the most flourishing empires and powerful republics of antiquity? Their names, the ruins of their towns, and the indiscriminate ashes of their inhabitants! History tells us, there did once exist a conquering people called Macedonians, who subdued the greatest part of the world. That there was a republic composed of citizens, brave, sober, disinterested, virtuous from choice, from honour, from emulation, called Spartans. That there was another republic remarkable for its great power, which extended its conquests and its empire over all parts of the known world, and whose citizens were called Romans.

Of all this vast greatness and power, not a single trace now remains. Their reign and their fame is like

like the track of a vessel through the waves of the sea; we know she has made one, but in vain do we search for it; it has disappeared, nothing of it is now to be seen!

How marvellous foever these revolutions may feem, they cease to be so to men of sound and penetrating judgments, where they enquire and fearch deeply into their causes. They have proceeded folely from a want of conduct and knowledge in those who had the government of these states. When we fee in one people a love for arts and sciences, an efteem for talents and virtue, a spirit of emulation, of justice, of subordination, courage, and patriotism prevail through all ranks to a high degree; if on the other hand in the neighbouring states, a habit of effeminacy, of sloth and of amusements, vice, ignorance, idleness, luxury, a want of virtuous ambition, have taken possession of all orders of the people, we may draw infallible prefages of the approaching elevation of the one, at the expence of the grandeur and even existence of the rest.

These variations of superiority of wisdom, sometimes in one nation, sometimes in another, with equal fortune, are the real causes of those great revolutions which strike us so forcibly in history. This surprise arises only from our ignorance of the causes, and the little knowledge we have of their contemporaries, who were endowed with talents, of the superiority of the conquerors in prudence, and of all the defects of the vanquished.

It was to shew the close connection between these effects and their causes, that some persons of approved merit and discernment advised me to sinish this work with a comparison of the republics of Rome and that of Carthage, according to the plan of Polybius.

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This able historian, having thought fuch a parallel might be both ufeful and agreeable to intelligent and ferious readers in his age, why should

it not be fo in ours?

Many parts of the constitution were nearly the fame at Rome and at Carthage. Each, by dividing the fovereign power between the chiefs of the republic, the fenate, and the people, reconciled and compounded the three forms of govern-

ment in one and the fame state.

The fuffeti at Carthage, the confuls at Rome, enjoyed fo great a share of power that they resembled in the prerogatives of their office monarchs, rather than chief magistrates of a free people. To behold the authority of the senate of these two cities, we should have taken Rome and Carthage for two aristocracies; and whoever considers the part the people of these republics had in the decision and conduct of the most important affairs, would

take them for states purely republican.

The power of the chief magistrates, the rights of the senate, the tribunal and jurisdiction of the people, all had at Rome and Carthage a great refemblance. By the division of authority, each part of the state had a dependence on the other, capable of every thing for the honour and advantage of their country, while they acted in concert and with unanimity, but incapable of producing any great mischief by their divisions; by the struggles which arose successively, sometimes the people against the ambition of the nobles, sometimes the senate against the jealous and seditious restlessness of the people.

This original constitution was insensibly changed at Carthage, through want of care or firmness in the fuffeti, and by the credit they fuffered some particular magistrates of the people to acquire, who

reigned absolute at Carthage during the second Punic war. We may see it in the life of Scipio. Thus the chiefs of the senate, by complying with the multitude, became victims and slaves.

Carthage had arrived to a state of persection while the Roman republic was yet in its infancy: the one degenerated, and sell off imperceptibly from its persection, in proportion as the other advanced towards it. With the Carthaginians, in the time of the second war, the people, viz. the least enlightened part of the community, and the most powerful, ruled without controul. At Rome the people never had more respect for the senate. They gave up to it, without jealously, the whole authority. At Carthage the mob decided, in preference to the most able senators; at Rome the wisest and most experienced formed and conducted great enterprises.

True it is that genius, stratagems of war, and Hannibal's good fortune, carried it against the Romans for some time. Cannæ was near being the grave of their name and power! But the vigour of their government at last prevailed. The victories of this samous general became the trophies of the Romans. The different sate of the two republics, was the natural consequence of the different

rent constitution of their governments.

With regard to war, Rome and Carthage were governed by maxims totally opposite. The immense riches their commerce brought the Carthaginians, raised in them a passion for maritime assairs. Fathers who had received it from their ancestors, transmitted it to their children. Carthage placed her chief dependence on the number, the sleetness, and the size of their ships, which gave her the command of the sea; they therefore paid little

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little attention to their land forces. The peafants of Numidia were, in the second Punic war, their ordinary recruits: mercenary troops which had

no one quality of a true foldier:

At Rome, on the contrary, the main body of their forces were composed of Roman soldiers, and those of the allies. The legions there were kept up and compleat, in peace as well as in war. The allies were obliged to furnish the quotas immediately on the demand of the republic. Their interest, their happiness, their fate, depended on that of the republic. The same courage inspired them, the same discipline led them on; they marched with the same readiness, they sought with equal boldness; they supported labour, hunger, the heat of summer, the cold of winter, satigue, the most rigid discipline, with as much constancy as the Romans.

From this difference in the troops, a difference of fuccess must naturally arise. The Roman, courageous, intrepid, invincible, was superior to every thing, because in fighting he defended his country, his religion, his family, his property. He had personal motives which forced him to be brave: this made him despise danger. He met death coolly in his post rather than break his ranks.

What hopes could the Carthaginians have against such troops? They were a company of merchants engaged with a nation of soldiers. Their armies were almost wholly composed of foreigners, to whom the interest of Carthage was a matter of indifference. The pay of the republic brought them together; the perils of it separated them. Having nothing to lose but their reputation, which they little valued in comparison with their lives, they ran no risk by slying, but the loss of gain

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and riches: as ready to abandon their leaders through cowardice, as they were to fell their fervices from interest.

The want of foldiers attached by affection to the Carthaginians, was productive of another evil, attended with fatal consequences. If they were beaten, they required much time to set on foot a new army; besides, their neighbours would take advantage of their misfortunes, and demand higher wages; their minds would hesitate between sear and greediness of gain: with some terror would prevail, and covetuousness with others. An ill-judged conomy would necessarily protract and delay the levy of the troops.

At the battle of Zama, which was but the third the Carthaginians lost to the Romans in Africa, Carthage was conquered without resource. The senate, the council of one hundred, Hannibal himself, was so convinced of the impossibility of maintaining the war, that if Scipio had insisted on terms of peace even more severe than he did, the Carthaginians must doubtless have accepted them.

It is in this particular above all, that we see the excellence of the Roman government and its superiority over that of Carthage. The Romans had lost two battles in Spain; they had not been more fortunate in Italy. Trebia, and the lake Thrasimene had been witnesses of their deseat. After such great losses, we are justly astonished at seeing an army more numerous than all the republic had hitherto raised. The love of arms, and that of their country, furnished more soldiers at Rome, than Hannibal could raise by his victories.

When this general reckoned he had only the broken remains of old legions to engage with, he encountered an army of near 100,000 men. He

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cut it to pieces at Cannæ. Who would not suppose that Rome must at last yield to such great successes, and sink under the weight of her calamities? But it was the Roman generals only who were beaten: Rome, after so many and such dreadful blows, preserved all her constancy, all her sirmness. She was not to be conquered while she had any citizens lest, and until Italy was ut-

terly despoiled of inhabitants.

Hannibal suffered her to breathe after the most compleat victory. He halted at Capua, perhaps with a design of extending the time of his command, of which the peace that must have sollowed the reduction of Rome would have deprived him. Two powerful armies made their appearance again in the succeeding campaign; and while encamped under the walls of Rome, the Carthaginian general set up the honour and wealth of the Romans to auction, a third army marched out of the town for Spain, with as much security as if this formidable enemy had been at Carthage.

To this facility of levying troops Rome owed her fafety. Every citizen was in time of war a foldier. Full of love for their country, animated with a defire of distinguishing themselves in arms, all prevented the wants of the republic. The greater they were the greater was their ardour. The magnitude of the danger was, it seems, a fresh incitement to hearts born with a passion for glory, and a desire of revenge. A fund of natural courage supplied in sea engagements, what they wanted in naval skill and practice. The Carthaginians were masters of it in a high degree, but their sailors, as well as soldiers, were mercenaries; and the Romans had, on both elements, the advantage of valour, which in sea fights, in

those days, decided much more than the experience of mariners and the lightness of the vessels.

The generality of mankind are born with national virtues or vices. An eagerness for war, an universal passion for distinction, formed the particular character of the Romans. All at Rome cultivated these dispositions which they had received from nature. All there talked of the glory they had acquired in arms; every one recommended it, every thing inspired the love of it. Trophies of war adorned the public places, the spoils of enemies were hung up in the temples, the very fenate house had no other ornament: but what contributed more than all to excite in youth a defire and emulation to fignalife themselves in arms, was the honours paid to illustrious citizens, who had ferved their country, after their death.

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Polybius has handed down to us a detail of ceremonies used on these occasions. The laws which appointed them were so full of wisdom and justice, they were in themselves so respectable, that we shall not hesitate, long as they are, to set them down, that we may be the better able to understand all the address of the Roman legislators, who availed themselves so effectually of the virtues of the dead, to excite the emulation of the living.

When any one eminent for his actions and military fervices died at Rome, his corpfe was carried with great pomp to the Rostra; there set upright, and dressed as on a day of triumph, it was honoured with the lamentations and veneration of the public.

The fon of the deceased, if he left one, or else the nearest relation, or if such could not be found, a public orator, recounted to the audience the history of his life, and briefly recited his enterprises and fuccesses. Eulogies dictated by truth, no longer tainted with envy or flattery after death, raised in all hearts a just sense of the loss they had sustained. The tears of strangers, even of those who had been soes to the deceased, were mixed with those of his relations and friends; the grief of one family caused a general mourning, and the hearts of all the assembly became the living monuments of the glory and virtues of the illustrious dead.

Having thus fatisfied the laudable curiofity of the youth and people, they had a bust of the deceased made as like him as possible, to preserve the memory of these great men. Their heirs raised to them a kind of family temple in the most beautiful part of their houses, where these busts were placed; on sestivals they were uncovered,

and fet off with all forts of ornaments.

When any one of the family died, the busts of their illustrious ancestors were carried in the funeral procession. They were placed in chariots magnificently decorated, preceded by the sasces, the battle axes, and other ensigns of the offices those they represented had filled. The prætexta, or robe of the consuls, the purple of the censors, gold stuffs, if they had obtained the honour of a triumph, covered them again with glory on these days of mourning.

When they came to the Rostra, they were placed in ivory chairs; there, in full possession, as I may say, of all their reputation, they received the plaudits of the assembly as if they had been still living. An awful and venerable spectacle, which excited in the hearts of youth a desire of being worthy of the same honours by acquiring those talents and virtues they admired, and which they

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faw still rewarded, if I may be allowed the expression, long after the decease of their ancestors.

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Distinguished virtue enjoyed among the Romans the same honours as the divinity. These honours preserved the memory of virtuous citizens; it was from the reverence paid them, that posterity became acquainted with the great services they had done their country. What happy effects must not ceremonies so honourable and so magnificent produce in general, and particularly in the young men of the same families.

These honourable rewards were neglected and totally unknown at Carthage. Seldom is the love of riches, and of the honours annexed to great virtues united. Nothing was esteemed at Carthage but immense wealth. The more ships a man had, the more respect he gained. Men of virtue were scarce, a seat in the senate gave them no consequence; they lived neglected and unknown, and when they died, their memory died with them.

The Camilli, the Manlii were still present at Rome many ages after their decease. The illustrious men of Carthage were hardly known while living, and when dead their names and their virtues were buried without honour together in their tombs.

Hence arose the number of great men at Rome, and the sew we find at Carthage. True it is indeed, that this republic, infinitely inserior to Rome in virtue, vastly exceeded her in riches and abundance.

The means also of acquiring wealth in both nations were very different. Nothing was unlawful at Carthage. Whatever tended to enrich, was not only permitted but encouraged. The suffeti, invested with the first dignity of the republic, were

the first merchants, and often the most selfish. Those who had the most public merit, were not those who were raised to the first employments; this method of obtaining them was too uncertain at Carthage: but they who had most money to purchase votes. The office of chief magistrate, the command of armies, justice, innocence, every thing was venal, and had its price; and scarcely were these purchasers entered into office, but they repaid themselves with interest, by any and every means, the expence they had been at in obtaining them.

At Rome the abhorrence of wealth, amaffed at the expence of justice, was not less than the esteem for what was fairly acquired; bribery once proved was an irrevocable exclusion from all offices. Juftice, valour, zeal for the public, were the only steps to preferment; there patriotism constantly reconciled private interest with public good. these happy days of the republic, a virtuous spirit reigned through all ranks and degrees, because virtue was the furest road to honour and fortune. The pleasure of deserving these honours, the glory of enjoying them, gained them the preference of the pleasure of acquiring and possessing great riches; they could only lead to an obscure life, virtue on the contrary could elevate to the most The appearance of justice, and difinterestedness in their citizens, who had art enough to conceal all but the most favourable side of their character, might fometimes impose upon the Romans; but hardly were these men, not sufficiently known when they were raifed to employment, out of office, before they were severely punished for their avarice and injustice, and condemned to shameful penalties, often indeed to perpetual exile.

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From these different principles sprang the difference of conduct between the Romans and the Carthaginians; the two following instances will fuffice to shew it. Paulus Emilius conquered Macedonia; his victories made him mafter of the treasures of the king of Persia: they were immense. But far from being tempted to apply the imallest part of them to his own use, which he might have done without the least fear of reproach, he did not fo much as deign to look on them; he was fatisfied with receiving the account, and configning them to the care of fure and faithful persons, whom he could trust. There still remained an easy way of enriching himself in a conquered country, at the expence of the vanquished, by demanding contributions; but this was as inconfistent with his principles, as it was with the dignity of the Roman name. He returned therefore from Macedonia poor, though he went there rich. He was flain some time after at the battle of Cannæ. His benevolence to his foldiers, his difinterestedness to his enemies, had entirely ruined his private fortune. The inheritance he left was not enough to make up the portion he had received with his wife, they were obliged to fell his lands and moveables, which altogether were scarcely sufficient. Such was the conduct of a Roman general!

Much about the same time Asdrubal the son of Gisco commanded the Carthaginian army in Spain. On his arrival the greater part of the Spanish princes declared for him; their succours were of vast use to him, and contributed much to his success. Indibilis was one of those Spanish monarchs

narchs to whom he owed the greatest obligations, This prince, to ferve him, had abandoned his dominions, which lay open to the incursions and ravages of the Romans; he had exposed his life an hundred times after he had facrificed his kingdom, to shew his attachment to the Carthaginians. In return for fuch and fo great fervices, Afdrubal demanded of him a fum of money, fo confiderable as he could hardly have raised had he been in peaceable possession of his dominions. Upon this impossibility, rather than refusal of the prince to fatisfy his avarice, he forced his children from him as hoftages for the fum. Indibilis fent his complaints to Carthage, where these innocent victims of their avarice were confined; he could obtain no fatisfaction. Thus the Carthaginian general behaved on every occasion, where hope of gain flattered his covetous disposition.

If we compare the two nations with respect to religion, we shall find them still differ as widely. The silence of Polybius on that of the Carthaginian, whilst he gives a long account of the Roman, sufficiently shews the little regard the former

had for the worship of the Gods.

He not only commends the great attention paid the Gods at Rome, but approves of the superstitions and ceremonies established there, and zeal-ously observed. These observances might appear tristing to a few intelligent people, but they were in a manner become necessary to the ignorant multitude. The Roman legislators thought the restraint of human laws too weak to controul a people, inconstant, inconsiderate, and ever ready to sly to arms: but these laws, supported by the will of the Gods, became most binding and respectable; it was chiefly from a dread of offending the Gods, that they derived their authority.

The neglect of divine worship bred at Carthage all the abuse and all the iniquity which prevailed there. It was this which had rooted probity and

good faith out of the hearts of all.

The fole religion of an oath, which the Romans were obliged to take on entering upon the great employments of the republic, was with them a facred and inviolable fecurity. It was rare to find at Carthage a man who fpared the public money. On the contrary, at Rome, it was extraordinary to find one who was capable of misapplying it. These are Polybius's own expressions.

We cannot close this comparison better, than with an instance this Greek historian relates; to shew on the one hand the sirmness of the Roman senate, and the integrity of that people in keeping their word; and on the other, the weakness of the senate of Carthage, and the treachery of its inhabitants, in circumstances nearly the same. We shall observe in them a very different conduct.

At the affair at Cannæ, the Romans left 8000 men in their camp to defend their lines. battle being loft, Hannibal with a part of his army fell upon these troops, and took them all Ten of the principal Roman officers prisoners. proposed to the Carthaginian general to suffer them to go to Rome, to endeavour to procure the ransom of the prisoners of war, upon taking an oath to return, whatever might be the fuccess of their negociation. Hannibal permitted them to One of the officers, under fome specious pretence, went back to the camp as foon as they had left the entrenchments. He flattered himself that by this equivocation he should acquit himself of the promise he had made of returning. Being come to Rome, the officers laid an account of their errand

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errand before the senate, and petitioned it to redeem the men, and fuffer them to pay their own ransom, that they might be enabled again to stand forth in defence of their country. Hannibal's view in this conduct was to raise money, which he stood in need of, and to lower the courage of the Romans, by letting them fee, that though vanquished, they had no cause to despair of life and liberty. The fenate faw through his defign, and thinking it would be for the interest of the republic, to shew him the greatness of their courage and principles were proof against the compaffion which the misfortune of their fellow-citizens excited, and the want of officers and foldiers, this public interest was alone attended to; the senate also judged it proper, to destroy Hannibal's hopes, to pass a decree enjoining every soldier to conquer or die. The prisoners of war were punished for not having obeyed it, as if it had been published before their misfortune. The fenate fent back to Hannibal on their parole, the nine officers who confented to furrender; as for the tenth, who attempted to avail himself of a dirty quibble to get rid of his oath, he was returned in the custody of a guard of soldiers.

Hannibal by this instance knew the kind of enemy he had to deal with. The firmness of the Romans, at a time when he thought their courage wholely subdued, the generosity of their resolution, their greatness of soul, alarmed him more than all his victories encouraged him; this inexorable steadiness of the senate, in the most trying criss, was perhaps one of the chief causes of the safety of

Rome.

Many, both ancients as well as moderns, have charged Hannibal with being guilty of an irreparable

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rable mistake, in not leading his army from Canna strait to Rome. Must not the facrifice the Roman republic then made to her principles and valour, to that rigid discipline she aimed at establishing in her army, cause Hannibal to hesitate upon so bold an enterprise? If the senate esteemed, if I may fay fo, as nothing above 8000 men, how many must there not have been at Rome, and in its neighbourhood, able to defend that town against the attacks of the Carthaginian general, who was in want of every thing necessary for such a siege? The unshaken firmness of the vanquished Romans must naturally have raised in him such reflections, and if they were as well founded as they appear to us to have been, ought we to condemn him for want of conduct?

But to return to our parallel of the two republics. After having feen the behaviour of Rome, in circumstances the most unfortunate she had till then ever experienced, let us turn our eyes on the conduct of the Carthaginians in the same situation.

The defeat and capture of Syphax, had reduced Carthage, as we have feen, to the last extremity. The leading men of the fenate, and of the council of an hundred, came as suppliants to Scipio, to beg for peace. He granted them a truce, that they might have time to go and make propolals to the fenate at Rome. The oaths to suspend all hostilities, usual on such occasions, were solemnly taken by each party, and the Gods invoked to witness them. During the suspension of arms, a Roman fleet, driven by a tempest, was run aground near the port of Carthage. It was laden with provisions and ammunition, which the town was then in want of. The senate, and the council of an hundred, instead of protecting it, shamefully deliberated

deliberated whether they should respect the misfortune of the fleet, or feize it. The people loudly demanded the plunder, and interrupted their con-Here the senate of Carthage had a fultations. fine opportunity to check the infolence and avarice of the multitude. But the fenate only wanted a pretence to determine perfidiously and treacher-The fanctity of oaths was forgotten or despised; the assembled senate had the wickedness to suffer them to seize the Roman ships. They were immediately brought into the harbour of Carthage. The blackest villainy instantly followed this violation of oaths. Scipio having fent ambaffadors to demand the veffels of the republic, they could prevail nothing. The people rose, and wanted to infult them. The fenate gave them to understand, that it was not in its power to quell this mob, and advised them to depart. They also fent two gallies to escort them, the better to cover the treachery they meditated. While they wished to appear to take measures proper for the security of the ambaffadors, they privately gave an order to Asdrubal to attack their ships as soon as the convoy had left them, and if possible to fink them. Their villainy was not fuccessful, but they were not the less blameable.

Such then was the difference in the constitution of these two republics with respect to their manners, their religion, and their military discipline. Such the difference of their regard for the public good, for the applause and the honours due to talents and virtue, employed in the service of our country. Therefore the different success of the Romans, and the superiority of their fortune, ought not to appear surprising to us.

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A Comparison between EPAMINONDAS and SCIPIO, the first who was surnamed AFRICANUS.

THE reader has feen, at the conclusion of the history of Scipio, some reflections on the similitude and dissimilitude of character and conduct which appeared between him and Hannibal: the resemblance was so faint from the enormous faults of Hannibal on one side, and on the other the virtues of Scipio, that it was hardly possible to draw an exact parallel. The greatest resemblance between them, arose from their mutual warlike genius and abilities; each was possessed of them in the highest degree. Epaminondas was the hero with whom Plutarch compared the samous conqueror Hannibal. To supply in some measure the loss we have sustained of his parallel, I propose to close this history with the following.

Epaminondas and Scipio were born of illustrious parents. Epaminondas was descended from the kings of Thebes: Scipio from one of the most ancient houses of Rome. But birth, which was attended with great advantages among the Romans, on account of the credit and distinction of the senate, was productive of none with the Thebans. The popular government put all the citizens upon a level. The blood of kings was there consounded indiscriminately with that of husbandmen and manusacturers. Even talents and virtues were, before the time of Epaminondas, so little regarded, that they were very uncertain

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It was quite otherwise at Rome. There the Patrician families held the first rank. To be sprung from these families was to have a right to the first dignities, the greater part of which were appropriated to the Patrician body. Nor was it till after an obstinate resistance on their part, that the boldness, the ambition, and the intrigues of the Plebeians opened to them the doors of the senate-house.

From hence it evidently appears, that Scipio, the son of a patrician, and of a consular patrician too, must have set out in life with great advantages over Epaminondas. It is possible indeed that each might have had the same helps from education, from polite literature and philosophy, but Epaminondas could attain nothing more at home. The art of attacking and defending a place, of taking ground with advantage, of giving battle opportunely, of making a retreat judiciously, of disciplining troops, of conducting an army; in a word, the whole military science was

absolutely unknown at Thebes.

Scipio, on the contrary, might have had from his infancy excellent mafters to instruct him in the elements and general principles. If he had not strangers engaged for this purpose, he had at least, in his own family, his father and uncle, under whom he made his first campaigns, at the age of seventeen: he even at that time was present at the battle of Ticinus, in which his father was deseated, whose life he there had the honour and happiness to preserve. Born in Rome, which was, if I may use the expression, only a camp of soldiers, he served his time to the military profession in actual war; besides, under what masters? Under the greatest generals of their time. With the happiest

happiest natural disposition, with his ambition, his love of glory, is it surprising that he made the most rapid progress in the career of arms? More-over he had the command of armies, and had gained victories at an age at which Epaminondas had not perhaps studied the first elements of the art of war.

He did not apply himself to it till he was pretty far advanced in years. His own genius, equal to every thing, was the only mafter he had, in a science hardly possible to be learned from speculation. From reading the history of the great captains who were before him with attention and reflection, he understood of what importance an individual, a knowing and fagacious general formetimes is to a state. As deep a politician as he was a philosopher; on viewing the situation the affairs of Greece were in in his time, he forefaw all the evils which threatened his country. He doubted not the destruction of her liberty; and he perceived at the fame time that war alone could pre-He therefore applied himself wholly to it; he resolutely detached himself from his delightful philosophic meditations, which contributed only to his own happiness, to give himself up to the study of war, which might one day contribute to that of his country. He was already able to command and conquer, while his countrymen were still ignorant of his being a soldier, The fuperiority of his talents only discovered his modesty. He wished to be capable of filling all the employments his republic might entrust him with, but he was little anxious they should know He never canvaffed but to avoid he was fo. the first appointments, as has been related in his history.

Scipio

Scipio purfued a very different line of conduct. At the age of twenty-leven, he offered himself for the most important post of the republic in Spain, and even at a time when she was exposed to the An ambitious man would at once greatest perils. pronounce, that ambition only could have directed him to this step. A judge of greater moderation, and perhaps greater equity, would be convinced that he then acted from an inward feeling, which perfuaded him, that the remnant of the army, and of the Roman party in Spain, required a man who was born a warrior. Convinced of his genius for war, he doubtless looked upon himself as accountable for it to his country: why not refer to the zeal he ever shewed for her, what possibly was much rather the effect of that zeal, than an eager defire of command? Epaminondas thought it was the business of his fellow-citizens to know him, to find him out in the obscurity he chose to live in, and to employ him as they judged proper. Scipio might think, that on difficult occasions a man may be permitted to put himself forwards, and that perhaps he is not justified in concealing superior qualities, which may be beneficial to a whole nation. What difference soever there may be between these two fentiments, they may nevertheless, both the one and the other, proceed from the same principle, the defire of glory and the good of our country.

Be this as it will, Scipio and Epaminondas having attained to the command of armies, the one by avoiding, the other by claiming it, conducted themselves entirely alike. It is surprising there should appear so great a conformity in the principal events of their lives. The same situation of the two republics, the same difficulties to surmount, the same dangers to run, the same motives

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for being exposed to them, the same means employed by each for their justification, the same success of these means, the same advantages procured for their country, the same respect from the

enemies they had to engage with.

Nothing is more common than to meet with a refemblance between generals in qualities effential to a general. Extent of genius, surprising presence of mind, zeal for discipline, prudence, address, valour; it is from a combination of these talents and these virtues, that a man born to command is formed. This rare affemblage is found in Scipio and Epaminondas. We are even inclined to think that the Greek surpassed the Roman in the art of instructing and forming officers and foldiers; Scipio, to have the most excellent, had occasion only to reanimate the courage of the legions, disheartened by several years of disgrace and ill fuccess. They were men formed to the exploits and fatigues of war, and infatiable for glory, their univerfal ruling passion.

Epaminondas formed his army out of a people wholly unacquainted with the art of war, accustomed for a long time to sink under the neglect and contempt of their neighbours. It was necessary he should first conquer in the Thebans the prevailing habit of luxury, indolence, and inactivity, and this was but half the business; he had to replace this pernicious habit, with the spirit of emulation, of valour, of intrepidity, and an eager desire of distinction; and this he effected. He raised in his country the science and love of war. Possibly Scipio might have done the same, had he sound it necessary; we may fairly presume as much, from his conduct with the first troops he commanded, but circumstances were to him more

favourable,

favourable. He commanded Romans, the very name of the nation was characteristic of its genius. Epaminondas was at the head of the inhabitants of Beotia, and the very word Beotian conveyed

the idea of a dull, heavy, stupid man.

The state of affairs at Rome and Thebes was the fame, when Scipio and Epaminondas began to have a share in the government. Each was threatened with immediate fervitude; Thebes by the Lacedemonians, Rome by the Carthaginians, the most formidable powers of their times. The Roman, from his youth, gave proofs of his love for his country, and his fensibility of the evils with which she was afflicted; such was the famous oath he exacted of all the officers of the legion, preparing to abandon the republic, after the loss of The Greek had not an the battle of Cannæ. occasion of distinguishing himself so early in life by an action fo brilliant. He did it only by his constant application to reform the effeminate manners of the Thebans, and inspire them with an abhorrence of the fervile dependence in which they When in full were held by the Lacedemonians. convention he opposed the claims of Agesilaus, the absolute master of Greece, he gave an instance of courage, so much the more worthy admiration, as the heat of an action, fuch as that of Cannæ, had no part in it, and as courage is not fo eafily roused in cold blood.

Scipio having reduced Spain under the Roman yoke, conceived that the only mean of delivering his country from the attacks of the Carthaginians, was to carry the war into their own territory, and to oblige them in their turn to act upon the defensive. He had hardly formed the intention, before he began to look out for the means of

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None could be fo effectual as an executing it. alliance of the Romans with some powerful prince in Africa. He was separated from that country by a passage of only a few hours, but it was not permitted him to undertake the voyage without the consent of the senate, and he was certain that the fecret jealoufy of his enemies, and the timid prudence of the leading men of the senate, would never grant it. It was however an effential point for the execution of a design upon which the safety of Rome depended. At the risk of his head he left his army, against an express law to the contrary, croffed the sea, repaired to the court of Syphax, made an alliance with him, and fortunately returned into Spain, without the fenate having the least knowledge of his proceedings. Thus did his zeal lead him generously to expose his life for the fecurity and honour of his country!

On a like occasion Epaminondas had, before him, pursued the same conduct. In the midst of his successes, upon the point of giving the last satal blow to the power of Sparta, the term of his command was near expiring. It was at Thebes only that he could be continued in the post of general. In holding it by his own private authority, he made an attack upon what the people held most dear, the honourable and trisling privilege of electing their own masters. This attempt must naturally subject him to the resentment of a

whole people jealous of their rights.

On the other hand, in going to Thebes for the election of polemarchs, he could not avoid carrying the army there too. By this step he must have given up all the advantages he had over the enemy, have suffered him to repair all his losses, and have exposed his own country shortly to fall a

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facrifice to the superior forces of the Lacede. monians, unless he compleated their destruction, Determined by these resections, he did not hesitate to fet posterity the example of interpreting human laws according to circumstances, and entering even by an open and actual violation of them, when abfolutely necessary, into the spirit and intention of legislators, which ever is the greatest public good. He therefore took the resolution of extending and fecuring the conquests he had gained over Sparta: he continued himself in the command; he beat the Lacedemonians and their allies on every occasion, put all their country to fire and fword, restored to liberty the people over whom Agefilaus, or his predeceffors, had usurped an unjust dominion: in short, he totally and utterly destroyed the power of the Lacedemonians, and afterwards returned to offer his head to his fellow-citizens, to answer to them for the liberty he had taken to fecure, without their formal confent, their happiness and independence. people prejudiced, and exasperated by some orators, jealous of Epaminondas's glory, were prepared to condemn him to death. Epaminondas confented to it, on conditions which have been already mentioned, and by this moderation he regained the hearts iniquitously incensed against him. There were but few citizens in Thebes to whom he had not done all the good which his authority enabled him to procure them. He made no use of his power and interest, but to display his love of justice, and to practice beneficence, his two favourite passions.

Scipio, after having rendered, like Epaminondas, the most important services to his country, was like him cited before the people, to be judged by their tribunes, who were the most daring, the most formidable, and the most powerful magistrates in Rome. He followed precifely the fame conduct as Epaminondas. A plain recital of the abridged history of his life, of his enterprises and his victories, suspended the rage and indignation of the Roman people at his pride; but he performed the fame action with greater haughtiness, an effect of the prejudice of his rank. was he convinced that the people would never heartily forgive him, that though he was not banished from Rome, as he had reason to fear, he went into voluntary exile to avoid it. He never re-entered Rome after he had received fuch just cause of disgust. He had nothing more to wish, his country was victorious; he defired only her happiness and an increase of her power, little anxious of filling there any longer the first posts, which he could not have failed of obtaining by a condescension, to which he was incapable of ttooping.

Epaminondas outdid Scipio. Ejected from the command by the influence of the opposite faction, he did not think that the rank of a subaltern, to which he saw himself reduced after having commanded with success, would justify him in quitting the service of his country. After his disgrace, he was the foremost to offer himself to make the first campaign in quality of a soldier. The need in which the Thebans stood of him, from the inability of those who were appointed to succeed him, soon obliged them to do him justice. From the degree of a common soldier, he was raised by the public voice to the rank of commander in chief. He was hardly elected, before he proved by fresh victories how worthy he

was of the appointment.

He conceived that the furest and shortest way to destroy the power of the Lacedemonians, was to attack them in their own territory. The project was as hazardous as it was excellent; but it is by the success of such extraordinary enterprises, that great men are distinguished from the croud. An ordinary commander would have been satisfied with having forced the enemy to retire out of his country, and putting it in a state of security against his ambition. This would have been effectually doing a great deal; but this success was to Epaminondas only a step leading to events much more decisive.

It was from Sparta, which was the root of the evil, it was from the heart of that imperious town that all the attacks proceeded which threatened the liberty of Greece. To Sparta therefore he led his army, after ravaging her lands and those of her allies. That he did not destroy it was owing to that constant moderation from which he never departed: having it in his power, he thought it more noble to preserve it. He desired only justice and liberty. He therefore was satisfied with weakening his enemies, with humbling them, with braving them; to let all Greece see how low he had reduced them, and to what a degree of superiority he had raised the Thebans, formerly their slaves.

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Scipio, when he had gained Spain from the Carthaginians, acted in the fame manner. It looks as if he had chosen Epaminondas for his model. As soon as he was raised to the confulate, he declared his design of carrying the war over into Africa. He maintained, in contradiction to the experience and authority of the sage Fabius, that they had no other part to

take if they wished to strike at the root of the war. He met with numberless obstacles. It was necessary he should triumph, if I may so speak, over the timid and tedious circumspection of the fenate, before he could obtain permission to triumph over the Carthaginians. His firmness and his eloquence furmounted all difficulties. Like Epaminondas, he at length got leave to attack the enemy in his own country, passed into Africa, defeated Hannibal, and reduced Carthage to obey the Romans. He made himself beloved by the troops, by his attention to them; feared by his feverity when they deferved it, and esteemed by his capacity; they were ever ready to follow, when he thought proper to lead them. Rare and happy talents, by which in acquiring the confidence of the foldiers, they are enabled to effect whatever they please. No generals ever possessed them in a higher degree than Scipio and Epami-The likeness is equally strong in the circumstances by which they were raised to command, and in the famous adversaries they had to engage with. Thebes and Rome were on the brink of ruin. If the Greek captain had to make head against a general, whom Xenophon, his too partial admirer, has looked upon as so accomplished that he has fet him down as a model for a foldier, Scipio encountered an enemy not less formidable in Hannibal. If it required the whole force of the genius of Epaminondas, all his vigilance, all his activity, all his stratagems, all his military manœuvres, all his courage, and lastly all his ability to conquer Agefilaus in the heart of Laconia, as much was necessary to Scipio to overcome Hannibal under the walls of Carthage. If

If we compare Epaminondas and Scipio on the score of the advantages they procured their country, we shall find the resemblance not less striking. Sparta and Carthage subdued, delivered Thebes and Rome from the fear of the most terrible enemies they ever had to contend with. The public good, the repose of families, the freedom of commerce, the fecurity of the country, were the fruits of their victories; and could they have produced any more flattering and more glorious? The infant, fafe in the arms of its mother, the shepherd undifturbed at the head of his flock, the husbandman fecure of reaping the crop he had fown, must they not have constantly exclaimed both at Thebes and at Rome: It is to Epaminondas, it is to Scipio we owe the bleffings we posses: it is to their exploits, to their abilities, and to their good fortune we are indebted for our lives, and that pure happinels we now enjoy!

These are the motives which incite to great enterprises, such as have the courage to form them. It is the hope of being rewarded with the love, the esteem, and the gratitude of a whole nation, which induces them to confecrate themselves wholely to the fervice of their country. From this fource arifes that patience which is invincible in forming officers and foldiers, and habituating them to labour from example, the great teacher of mankind. To habituate them, I fay, to subordination, to hunger, to thirst, to the colds of winter, to the heats of fummer, to the most imminent dangers, to a continual triumph over the natural fear of death, which in rencounters, in fleges, and in battles, constantly hovers round the intrepid soldier, who meets it every where without dreading,

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But what virtues must not a general possess to be able to acquire over his men fuch an absolute power, as to make them prevent, if I may fo speak, the orders of their commanders? A fatherly affection for the foldier, feverity and indulgence feafonably used, distrust of the favours of fortune, firmness when she changes, a prudent forefight, which discovers and prevents all the enemy's defigns, the practice of those virtues which are required in the subaltern, sobriety, strict discipline, regularity of life and manners. Thus it was that Epaminondas and Scipio became what we have feen they were, the honour, the delight, and the fafeguard of their country. Put a body of men, undisciplined, ignorant, stupid, accustomed to an idle life, which becomes infamous from their not knowing how to employ it, under the command of generals who refemble these great models, it will foon become a band of heroes. To me the history of Scipio and Epaminondas is a clear proof of it.

But these two great men, equally virtuous, exercised those same virtues in a very different way. The severity of Epaminondas's manners communicated to his character an air of austerity, incapable of being softened, which makes him still more to be admired. We regard him, because we cannot refuse our esteem to his principles, which in virtue looked for virtue only. He presents her to us naked and stripped, if I may use the expression, of all those ornaments which recommend her to our love, in making her appear still more lovely.

Scipio, on the contrary, fhews her with all the embellishments she is capable of. The sweetness of his conversation, the nobleness of his manners,

the gentleness of his conduct, dresses her out so enchantingly as to conceal whatever is hard and difficult, under the most pleasing amiable ap-

pearance.

Perhaps all that the Thebans wanted was such a man as Epaminondas, who would force them to raise him to the first employments in their republic, in spite of the natural repugnance they had to a perpetual and inexorable censor, and to a chief of such inslexible severity. The Romans, on the other hand, desired the elevation of Scipio as much as he did. Every thing bore, both in his person and manners, that happy character which preposses, which affects, and which interests. All hearts surrendered to him from choice and resection. Epaminondas carried them by a kind of violence, which the superiority of his genius, his talents and his virtues did even from his enemies.



Observations of Mr, Chevalier DE FOLARD, on the Battles of Leuctra and Mantinea.

PLUTARCH feems to me, not to inform his reader fully in his account of a battle fo remarkable as that of Leuctra. It was worthy of greater attention and minuteness. A good epitomiser should never pass by the circumstances of a fact out of which great events arise.

The author fays not a fingle word of the cayalry. Had he confulted Xenophon, he must have observed that there were some in both armies, and that the Theban horse contributed

much to the victory.

To supply the defects of this author, I have followed Xenophon, who says, that Cleombrotus formed a first line of his cavalry, which he placed on the right of his phalanx that supported it.

The Thebans were the weaker by one half, but being well commanded and better disposed, they moved up to the enemy, who out-flanked them extremely on their right.

Epaminondas was well aware of it: to deprive them of this advantage he made a movement wor-

thy of an able and artful commander.

He resolved to begin the attack on the lest; he strengthened it with all his choice and heavy armed men, whom he drew up fifty deep, viz. in a column, composed as I conjecture of 3000 men: a company of 300 completed this wing. The rest of his men, his light infantry, and the troops which were not in his first phalanx, were extended in a single narrow line, three or four deep only, because

cause he reckoned, that in forming obliquely he should avoid engaging on that side. With respect to his cavalry he regulated them from the disposition of his enemy.

Cleombrotus formed his phalanx after the Greek manner. His horse, as I have already said, was on the first line on his right, ranged in squadrons. Such was the order and arrangement of the two

armies in an open level plain.

The Thebans at first shewed themselves formed in one strait line opposite to the Lacedemonian phalanx; they made a fudden movement, and while the extremity of their right wing remained firm, all the rest of the line wheeled half round, viz. moved as it were upon its center, in fuch a manner that the right wing was separated far from the left of Cleombrotus. By this movement the Thebans with their left continually drew nearer to the right of the Lacedemonians, upon which they intended to fall. This disposition of Epaminondas is the fixth of Vegetius, which he calls in similitudinem veri. It is the order oblique, upon which he lays greater stress than on any of the other feven which he gives us in his book. ancients called it the floping battle, that is to fay, when they place all their choice troops in the wing intended for the attack, while all the rest of the line is kept back from the enemy.

It is clear that Epaminondas preferred it to all others; it is in fact the best, the oblique line, or the sloping order of battle, it being of all others the most to be dreaded, and the most skilfull in tactics; it is the resource of the weak, and especially when columns are introduced into the wing which is to attack, there is more art than is generally suspected in the manœuvres of the oblique;

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I prefer it to the curve, which, though able and excellent, is less sure than the other. Be this as it will, knowing as the ancients were in the oblique as well as the curve, they never introduced columns on the side where they meant to lay the stress of the battle, before Epaminondas did it in this.

His Royal Highness the late Duke of Orleans (v) seemed surprised at this order of battle, when I had the honour to lay it before him. Those who are judges will not think less favourably of it than this able and experienced prince. Let us

resume our subject.

The cavalry foon came to blows. As that of the Thebans was better mounted, and had feen more fervice than the Lacedemonians, (which were never good for any thing) the latter were not long before they were broken and forced back upon their infantry, which they put in confusion.

The Thebans after this first success immediately attacked the right of the phalanx. In the mean while the company of 300 wheeled upon the wing, and took it in flank, while the heavy column engaging in front, bore down all resistance, broke through it, and faced about upon that part which still remained entire, that it might

not have time to recover from its surprise.

This wing being totally routed and put to flight, the cavalry pursued them closely, while the victorious infantry making the most of their first advantage, gained ground continually to the left. The left seeing the confusion on the right, and the enemy continuing to advance, concluding that all was lost, gave way and ran. The disorder on the

the right occasioned the loss of this battle, which after all would not have been lost if the generals had not despaired; it may be reckoned among the most famous of antiquity; Lacedemon never experienced such and so disgraceful a blow. Cleombrotus the king was slain in it, and with him fell 1000 Lacedemonians. They were the flower of Sparta, those who fled were only the scum; as in all actions those are who do not come into the

engagement.

Epaminondas reasoned like a great captain, and inftantly forefaw what would happen, from the superiority of the artful and able disposition he had made. As he was a great general of foot, who knew its force fo well as to make his foldiers also sensible of it, he saw clearly that the enemy must in vain resist the shock and weight of so formidable a column, and that of the 300 men, which he had opposed to the Lacedemonian phalanx, formed only twelve deep. Cleombrotus was guilty of a fault in diminishing the depth to extend the front, when he had a superiority of numbers. This superiority is of no use against a general who deprives himself of one wing, and gives the other this advantage of the oblique. Here was one enormous error in Cleombrotus, behold a fecond full as great.

He placed his cavalry in the first line, on his right, supported by his phalanx: this was still within the rules of war and the art military, if we consider that it was a compact body and without any intervals or divisions between the lines. should have left vacant spaces between the ensigns, to have afforded avenues for the passage of his cavalry in case of accident. They might have recovered from their disorder in the rear of the

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infantry, why neglect this precaution? It is always done when the infantry are meant to be supported by the horse, or when they cannot depend on their courage. After all, this would have been of little or no avail against columns, for I see no method of resisting this attack but to engage in the same order.

When Cleombrotus perceived that the Thebans moved away from their right, and advanced on their left, he should have doubled and trebled the This movement was simple, files of his phalanx. easy and quick; instead of which he marched by the wing on his right, viz. he extended it to avoid being flanked on that fide on which the enemy stretched forward. On the contrary, he ought to have opposed a body equal in depth to the Theban infantry, and at the fame time have thrown his cavalry at the head of his wing that was attacked, and intermixed some foot with them, after the Greek method. He did nothing that he should have done, he was beaten, and who can deny that he deferved it?

Epaminondas was so well pleased with this disposition at the battle of Leuctra, that he did not sail to recollect it at that of Mantinea. He engaged upon this principle, and gained the victory solely by it. He was killed in this important engagement, and with him the glory and hopes of the Thebans also perished!

VOL. II.

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On the Battle of Mantinea, in which EPAMINONDAS was flain.

EPAMINONDAS's order of battle at Mantinea was upon the same principle as that of Leuctra, and gained him the reputation of being the greatest general of foot, and one of the first masters of tactics of the age he lived in. Without this science we cannot hope for any thing great.

The order and distribution of the troops in this battle are worthy the admiration of the ablest judges; I know nothing more excellent and fingular. Since Epaminondas we have not one example of the like order; this is the mafter-piece

of that great captain.

The observations I am about to make on this battle will be the more pleasing, in as much as no commentator, nor any military man, has paid the least attention to so beautiful and able a disposition. I cannot help being furprifed, Xenophon having written fo full and fo clearly, that it is impossible not to perceive the strength of his reasoning, without having much experience and know-

ledge in war,

Xenophon, who describes this famous action like a man of ability and experience, speaks first of the march of the Theban general. He tells us it was made in the order in which he meant to engage, to avoid being obliged, when he came in fight of the enemy, to lose in disposing his troops that time which is so precious in great enterprises. This time lost or well employed, is the test of merit or infufficiency in a general.

Epaminondas

Epaminondas did not move directly or in front to the enemy, but he shewed himself at the head of his infantry in a fingle column, as in marching order. He at first drew up his army in one line, on the height adjoining to the plain, the cavalry on the wings of his phalanxes. He had had the precaution to bring up the center (which would have been his right in engaging in the usual way) and doubling the depth of this wing to give it weight and force for the shock. He thus appeared in front and in order of battle in fight of the Lacedemonian army, and halted on the heights in this order, which deceived the enemy, who imagined he was going to encamp; but what was their furprise when they perceived him moving and coming straight down on them contrary to their expectation. One part of his cavalry moved to the right, leaving the phalanx in the plain, the other took to the left. They observed a little after, another movement in the infantry, of which at first they could make nothing; this kept them in uncertainty and suspence, so apprehensive were they of the address and stratagems of the general. This movement foon discovered an inverted phalanx by a half-wheel of his whole line of infantry at once, and by the fame motion; and then marching by the front of his wing, and not directly towards the enemy, and keeping the other wing off in an oblique or flanting line, be bore down and charged with a point like a galley, fays Xenophon, convinced that by the force alone and weight of his dilposition, he should enclose the enemy and break through his center, and divide it from the wings; but lest the Athenians, who were in the lest wing, should fall upon that fide of this prodigious column, and check its course and violence, he posted

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on an eminence, the cavalry on his left, which he intermixed with his light infantry; and as this cavalry faced that of Athens and kept it at bay,

nothing was done on that fide.

It was not so with the cavalry on the right of the Thebans. It attacked that of Lacedemon, which not being so stout, was broken, driven beyond their wing, and put to slight, though it was more numerous and the squadrons larger. The cause of this deseat proceeded partly from the general's neglecting to insert between their squadrons their light infantry, which they stationed in the rear of their phalanx or of their army, (for authors do not say which) where it was not in the least degree useful.

This was not the groffest fault committed, there are many others for which they deserved blame. They doubled their squadrons, not only making them too deep, but also still encreasing their size, for they must have consisted of 128 horse, contrary to the custom of that age. On the other hand, Epaminondas engaged in small troops, which moved as briskly as the others were heavy and unweildy. Besides the advantage which the small squadrons had of turning or facing about easily, they were moreover covered and supported by the

light infantry of the Theban army.

Epaminondas determined immediately to attack the Spartan infantry, whose courage and experience he little regarded, confident that if his own was victorious, he should have less trouble in opening the road to a compleat and decisive victory; for he depended upon penetrating the phalanx with the head of his column, and then opening to the right and lest, while the rest of his army would wheel, and afterwards fall in a line and not

in a point, upon all that still kept their ground and remained entire. He foresaw what would happen from what he intended to do, and every thing fell out as he had foreseen; for when he had hemmed in the infantry, and broken the line by the weight and depth of his column, which was exposed almost equally on all sides, he took in stank that which still maintained its ground.

This formidable column having penetrated to the center of the Lacedemonian phalanx, there followed on that fide the greatest disorder imaginable, and victory soon sprang out of that consusion, for nothing else could be expected from an army broken and divided to the center. Epaminondas was wounded in this action, and fell by the stroke of a javelin, of which he died in about two hours after. He said before he expired, that he lest no issue except two daughters, Leuctra and Mantinea; two celebrated victories in which fortune had no hand. O the great man, said Agessilaus; and I will add, O the great captain, the honestest man, and the ablest officer of infantry Greece ever produced!

We may apply to him the handsome compliment which Montecuculi paid Marshal Turenne, when he heard of the death of that famous general, What a pity to lose such a man, who did honour

to human nature!

This battle may furnish a good lesson to those commanders who fancy there is no better method of conquering than to engage with the wings; which appears to me to be a mistake they have not sufficiently attended to. An army has infinite resources, when it is attacked on one of its wings, but if it is broken in its center, I see no remedy, because it is cut off and separated from its wings, with

with very little hopes of receiving fuccours. What I am amazed at is, that there should be men who think a battle can never be loft in the center, there are however too many examples which prove the contrary; it is certain, that whenever it has been determined to attack an army in the center: victory has always followed in that quarter. This I should think enough to destroy such a notion. Not that I would reject the mode of attacking on the wings, but I maintain that it is better to engage in the center. In this quarter it was that Gustavus Adolphus king of Sweden began the battle of Lutzen. This action may be compared to the most famous of antiquity, in the disposition of the two armies and the reputation of the two commanders.

A plan and description of it may be seen in the sixty-third page of a Treatise of the Column, by the Chevalier de Folard.

NOTES

ONTHE

HISTORY OF EPAMINONDAS.

NOTE I. (a)

M. DE TOUREIL. His historical preface to the harangues of Demosthenes, contains perhaps, in few words, the best abridgment of the Grecian history that is extant.

NOTE II. (b)

Velleius Paterculus.

NOTE III. (c)

Plutarch calls him Pammenes; but in this he does not agree with other historians. Plut. in Vit. Pelop. Epaminondas's mother's name is not known. Plutarch accufes Xenophon of negligence, who might easily have preferved it, and reproaches him as guilty of a kind of thest in the history of this great man. Plut. in Vit. Ages.

NOTE IV. (d)

Plutarch dates the arrival of Philip at Thebes, and his stay there, long after the battle of Leuctra. In Vit. Pelop. Diodorus Siculus, whom I have chiefly copied in what I

have

have related of the education of this prince, and of that of Epaminondas, afferts the contrary so positively, and enters upon this article with so many particulars, that I thought it necessary to prefer his opinion. Is it possible to suppose that Epaminondas, after having gained such a famous battle as that of Leuctra, should continue under the care of a tutor or master?

NOTE V. (e)

The philosopher Theanor did not come to Thebes till some years after the time in which I have here mentioned him. I thought it best to relate this fact in the beginning of the life of Epaminondas, as it would elsewhere have interrupted the thread of the history, which I think should never be done but when it cannot possibly be avoided.

NOTE VI. (f)*

The Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes, was the best fortress in Greece, and the bulwark of Beotia. It was named from Cadmus, the founder of Thebes, who built it. We may judge of its strength from the garrison it contained. The Lacedemonians, after surprising it, put 1500 men in it, to defend it against the attacks of the Thebans.

NOTE VII. (g)

It is very furprifing that Xenophon, who relates this fact, makes not the least mention of Pelopidas, to whom the other historians, with Plutarch, refer the whole management of the conspiracy. This is not the only occasion upon which he has affected filence on the actions of Pelopidas

The reference to this note, in the text, is misplaced; it should have been in page 32, line 20, instead of page 39, line 10.

Pelopidas and Epaminondas. He is guilty of the same fault, whenever the glory of these two samous captains may obscure that of his hero Agesilaus. The sequel will shew the motive to this injustice, which has perhaps deprived us of particulars much to be regretted, and which he alone was qualified to transmit to us.

NOTE VIII. (b)

M. De Toureil, of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, and one of the forty of the French Academy, in the historical preface to his works.

NOTE IX. (i)

The animofity of Agefilaus against the Thebans must have been well known, when he was obliged to have recourse to such management, to avoid passing for a tyrant. The Spartans themselves, as Xenophon his apologist confesses, were ready to give him this odious title, if he had marched in person against the Thebans. Xenophon, without doubt, would not have made this remark, except to excuse him by this shew of moderation; but the war was not the less warmly prosecuted under the command of the other king of the Lacedemonians, so that the injustice of Agesilaus, who was the author of it, must remain for ever.

NOTE X. (k)

Xenophon, who relates this fact, as well as all the other historians, makes no mention either of Epaminondas or of the firmness with which he opposed Agesilaus in full congress. "To heighten the portrait of this king, his fcholar," says a celebrated academician, * "he finely draws

M. De Toureil, of the Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres, and of the French Academy.

" draws that of Epaminondas, in which he describes the most exalted virtues in profile, and the slightest faults in full view."

Whatever merit we may allow the Greek writer in other respects, this partiality is inexcuseable in an historian. It has probably been the cause of our losing the most beautiful passages in the life of Epaminondas, whose reputation Xenophon, who was his contemporary, facrifices on all occasions to the glory of Agesilaus.

NOTE XI. (1)

It was what the Lacedemonians called a Scytale. It was a thong of leather or parchment, which they twined round a baton, in such a manner that there was no void space. They wrote upon this thong, and then unrolled it and sent it to the general for whom it was intended. This general who had a fellow baton to that upon which the thong had been rolled and written, placed it upon his baton, by which means he discovered the order and connection of the characters, which otherways were so confused as to be unintelligible. Plut. in Vit. Lys. M. Rollin. tom. 2. I. 5. art. 7.

NOTE XII. (m)

The cave of Trophonius was famous all over Greece. Plutarch relates, that the oracle of this place was the only one which continued to answer when all the rest had ceased and become silent. Pausanias, who gives a very copious description of the worship paid Trophonius, with all its mysteries, was desirous of judging himself of all the wonders related of him. * He repaired to the temple, consulted the oracle, and all his doubts vanished; that is

to say, setting aside the veil of superstition, that the priests of Trophonius managed the ignorance and credulity of the people better than the rest, and preserved their credit and influence over them.

NOTE XIII. (n)

It is necessary only to turn over the ancient histories to give notes an air, frequently too deceitful, of deep reading. An opportunity offers here, which decency forbids me to make use of: the fanctity of our religion, and the purity of our manners, will not permit an explanation of the original of the sacred battalion; it is a kind of mystery which it would be dangerous to the honour of antiquity to develope. Let it suffice candid readers, who will perceive the reasons which oblige us to silence on this subject, to know that this corps was always distinguished by an heroic courage. In return for these services, the republic of Thebes afsigned it an extraordinary pay, and entrusted it with the guard of the Cadmea.

NOTE XIV. (0)

A striking resemblance between Scipio Africanus and Epaminondas. The former in leaving Spain and his army to go and make an alliance with Syphax, the most potent prince in Africa, exposing himself to almost certain death; but the interest of his country called upon him, and he attended to it only. Epaminondas, in holding the command of the army beyond the appointed time, ran the same risk. He was not ignorant of it. The same motive, the greatest public good, determined both, on the same occasion, to infringe the law.

NOTE XV. (p)

Philip king of Macedon having sent to them, If I enter your country, I will put all to fire and sword. They answered, If; meaning that they would take good care that it should not happen. To several of the same king's dispatches they answered simply, No. Another time when this prince wrote to them in a haughty and menacing air, they sent no other reply but, Dionysius at Corinth; as much as to say, recollect that Dionysius, heretosore as great a tyrant as thyself, leads at this day a private life at Corinth, and keeps a school there. Demetr. Phaler. de Eloc. lib. 8. M. De Toureil, in his historical presace, vol. 2. of his works.

NOTE XVI. (9)

Epaminondas was on this occasion in greater danger than in all the battles he had fought. The most important services would not, among the Greeks, dispense with the observance of the most trisling laws, much less with those which were essential. Themistocles, Miltiades, Phocion, were eminent examples of it. Athens, a few years before had condemned eight victorious generals to death, and for what? For not having buried the dead after the battle; a violent storm had prevented them from sulfilling this duty. No attention was paid to this reason. Six of the offenders were convicted, and conducted from the court-house to the scaffold. Xenoph. Plut. Polyb.

NOTE XVII. (r)

The historians in general, Plutarch, Pausanias, Diodorus Siculus, Cornelius Nepos, affert positively, that Epaminondas died a bachelor. Polyenes, an inaccurate author, expressly advances the contrary, and says he was married,

married, and had a fon by his wife. To make this flory interesting, he makes Phæbidas, who surprised the Cadmea. have a strong passion for Epaminondas's wife. She informed her husband of it, who instructed her not to deprive this amorous man of all hope, and that with a defign that he should fall into a trap he had laid for him. A mean artifice, absolutely inconsistent with the manners and character of this great man. Polyenus finishes this intrigue with the unraveling of Pelopidas's plot. He makes Phæbidas to be affaffinated by a party of young men difguifed as women; though feveral years after, this same Phæbidas appears still at the head of the troops of Sparta. He describes the fon of Epaminondas, whom he calls Stefibrotus, an extravagant rake, as unlike such a father by his imprudence, as he would have been worthy of him for his courage. He relates, that in the absence of Epaminondas, he fought a battle contrary to his orders; and that Epaminondas at his return cruelly gave him up to the rigour of the laws, and condemned him to death. Was it worth while to conjure up this unhappy child to make him die fo miserably? But his death, as well as his existence, is all a whithfical fable, which far from embellithing a history, as without doubt Polyenes imagined it would, shamefully degrades and disfigures it by being evidently false.

NOTE XIX. (t)

M. Dacier fays in his remarks, that Antalcidas was not then at the court of Persia. He condemns Plutarch for having either been missinformed, or meaning to say Timagoras instead of Antalcidas. To prove Plutarch's mistake he quotes Xenophon, who says indeed that Timagoras was then with Artaxerxes, but that he was entrusted with the affairs of Athens, not those of Sparta. However the Lacedemonians; according to Plutarch, had an embassador

in Persia, and why might it not be Antalcidas? True it is that Xenophon does not name him, nor does he say it was not he. Perhaps M. Dacier has been somewhat rash in his censure.

NOTE XX. (u)

A name which the Lacedemonians gave to officers appointed for the defence of a province or town.

NOTE XXI. (v)

Philip the Second, who was regent of the kingdom after the death of Louis the XIV th.

NOTE, omitted in its proper place.*

Plutarch fays, that the name of this flave was Chlidon. He relates a great dispute that this man had with his wise, about his horses bridle, which was out of order. Chlidon grew warm, so did his wise; they came to high words. The time slipped away during this quarrel, and Chlidon, terristed with the horrid imprecations of his wise, at last resolved to remain at home. In my opinion, these little circumstances, in great events, do but ill accord with the dignity and importance of history. Plut. in Vit. Pelop.

^{*} This note relates to the servant of Hypostenidas, page 39, line 17.

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